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Abstract
This Ph.D thesis applies an epistemic logical approach to formulate and
structurally analyze social influence in two specific contexts: 1) scientists
who acquire knowledge through observation and interaction; and 2) traders
who reason about asset values and about other traders. In particular, the
thesis focuses on informational social influence: People are under
informational social influence when they accept information obtained from
someone else as evidence about reality.
The main part of this thesis consists of five research articles. Article 1
introduces an epistemic logical framework for observation and belief revi-
sion in a scientific context. In this framework, informational social influence
is modeled via the communication of privately obtained evidence and the
belief formation of agents based on both the outcomes of their private obser-
vations and the information from other agents.
Articles 2 and 3 explore the higher-order reasoning employed by a so-
called greater fools trader: By reasoning about other traders’ willingness to
engage in trade, a greater fools trader decides whether or not to buy the asset
for a certain price. Investigating the epistemic conditions for greater fools
trades and financial bubbles, Articles 2 and 3 aim for a better understanding
of informational social influence in trade markets.
Articles 4 and 5 relate to the main topic of this thesis in a way that sup-
ports and supplements the first three articles. Article 4 investigates protocol
frameworks for epistemic logic: Protocols are formal mechanisms that con-
trol which actions may or must be executed when. Article 4’s comparison
of two different protocol frameworks may thereby improve the structural
investigation of informational social influence utilizing epistemic logic.
Article 5 presents a philosophical discussion of the choice to apply epis-
temic logic to actual human behavior. Containing arguments for why and
how one should apply epistemic logic to topics like social interaction, Arti-
cle 5 presents the methodological considerations behind the first three arti-
cles and—indirectly—behind the fourth article.
The articles are preceded by an elaborate thesis overview that positions
the topic of this thesis in a wider perspective. This overview discusses some
multi-disciplinary approaches to studying the problems of informational so-
cial influence and introduces the standard framework of epistemic logic. It is
argued that epistemic logic is a natural and expressive framework to study
informational social influence, as epistemic logic allows to abstract away
from irrelevant details and at the same time focuses on informational content
of social influence such as higher-order reasoning and information change.
This thesis thereby shows that an epistemic logical study provides a novel
perspective on well-known problems of informational social influence.
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Resume´
Denne Ph.D. afhandling bruger epistemisk logik som tilgang til at formulere
og strukturelt analysere sociale pa˚virkninger indenfor to bestemte kontek-
ster: 1) videnskabsfolk, der tilegner sig viden gennem observation og inter-
aktion; og 2) handlere, der gœr sig overvejelser om værdier af aktiver og
om andre handlere. I særdeleshed fokuserer denne afhandling pa˚ informa-
tionsdrevne sociale pa˚virkninger. Personer er under informationsdreven soci-
al pa˚virkning, na˚r de accepterer information, givet fra en anden, som evidens
vedrœrerende virkeligheden.
Hoveddelen af denne afhandling besta˚r af fem forskningsartikler. Artikel
1 introducerer en ramme for epistemisk logik vedrœrende observation og re-
vision af formodninger indenfor en videnskabelig kontekst. Indenfor denne
ramme modelleres der informationsdreven social pa˚virkning via kommuni-
kation af privat indsamlet evidens og agenters udvikling af formodninger.
Artikel 2 og 3 udforsker de hœjereordens overvejelser, der bruges af en
sa˚kaldt greater fools handler: Ved at ræsonnere omkring andre handleres vil-
lighed til at indga˚ i en handel, vil en greater fools handler afgœre hvorvidt de
vil eller ikke vil kœbe aktivet for en bestemt pris. Ved at undersœge de episte-
miske betingelser for greater fools handler og finansiele bobler, sigter artikel 2
og 3 mod en bedre forsta˚else af informationsdrevne sociale pa˚virkninger pa˚
handelsmarkeder.
Artikel 4 og 5 relaterer sig til hovedemnet for denne afhandling pa˚ en
ma˚de, der understœtter og supplerer de fœrste tre artikler. Artikel 4 giver
en formel undersœgelse af protokolrammer for epistemisk logik: Protokoler
er formelle mekanismer, der bestemmer hvilke handlinger der ma˚ udfœres
hvorna˚r. Artikel 4s begrebslige sammenligning af to forskellige protokolram-
mer kan dermed forbedre den strukturelle undersœgelse af informations-
drevne sociale pa˚virkninger med epistemisk logik.
Artikel 5 præsenterer en filosofisk diskussion af valget at bruge episte-
misk logik til at undersœge adfærden af mennesker. Ved at argumentere for
hvorfor og hvordan man burde bruge epistemisk logik pa˚ emner som social
interaktion, viser artikel 5 de metodiske overvejelser bag de fœrste tre artik-
ler og—indirekte—bag den fjerde artikel.
Artiklerne kommer efter en uddybende introduktion til afhandlingen,
som positionerer emnet for afhandlingen overfor et bredere perspektiv.
Introduktionen diskuterer flere multidisciplinære tilgange til at undersœge
problemerne vedrœrende informationsdrevne sociale pa˚virkninger og
introducerer standardrammen for epistemisk logik. Det argumenteres, at
epistemisk logik er en naturlig og tydelig ramme for at undersœge
informationsdrevne sociale pa˚virkninger. Denne afhandlinger viser dermed,
at en undersœgelse gennem epistemisk logik giver et nyt perspektiv pa˚
velkendte problemer ved informationsdrevne sociale pa˚virkninger.
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Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift wordt epistemische logica toegepast bij het formuleren en
analyseren van sociale invloed in twee specifieke contexten: 1) wetenschap-
pers die kennis vergaren door observatie en interactie; en 2) handelaren die
redeneren over waarde en over andere handelaren. Het proefschrift is in het
bijzonder gericht op informatiegestuurde sociale invloed: Mensen zijn onder-
hevig aan informatiegestuurde sociale invloed in het geval zij informatie van
iemand anders aannemen als bewijs over de werkelijkheid.
Vijf onderzoeksartikelen vormen samen het belangrijkste deel van dit
proefschrift. In artikel 1 wordt een epistemisch logisch systeem voor waar-
neming en herziening van overtuiging gepresenteerd dat toegepast wordt
op interactieve wetenschappelijke gemeenschappen.
In artikel 2 en 3 wordt het hogere-orde redeneren onderzocht zoals een
zogenaamde greater fools handelaar dat toepast: Door te redeneren over de
bereidheid van andere handelaren om handel te drijven, besluit een grea-
ter fools handelaar om wel of niet iets te kopen tegen een bepaalde prijs.
Epistemische condities voor greater fools handel en financie¨le bubbels wor-
den onderzocht, zodat in artikel 2 en 3 beter begrip naar voren komt van de
informatiegestuurde sociale invloed in handelsmarkten.
De artikelen 4 en 5 verhouden zich in die zin tot het hoofdonderwerp
van dit proefschrift dat zij de eerste drie artikelen ondersteunen en aanvul-
len. In artikel 4 worden protocolsystemen voor epistemische logica onder-
zocht: Protocols zijn formele mechanismen die bepalen welke acties wanneer
worden uitgevoerd. De conceptuele vergelijking van twee protocolsystemen
in artikel 4 kan bijdragen aan het structurele onderzoek naar informatiege-
stuurde sociale invloed met behulp van epistemische logica.
In artikel 5 wordt een filosofische discussie gepresenteerd over de keuze
om epistemische logica toe te passen bij het bestuderen van menselijk ge-
drag. Het artikel bevat argumenten voor de vraag waarom en hoe men epis-
temische logica zou moeten toepassen bij onderwerpen als sociale interactie.
Hiermee geeft het artikel de methodologische overwegingen achter de eerste
drie artikelen en—indirect—achter het vierde artikel van dit proefschrift.
De artikelen worden voorafgegaan door een uitgebreid overzicht dat het
hoofdonderwerp van dit proefschrift in een breder perspectief plaatst. En-
kele multi-disciplinaire benaderingen van informatiegestuurde sociale in-
vloed worden besproken en het standaard systeem van epistemische logica
wordt geı¨ntroduceerd. Met behulp van epistemische logica kunnen niet-
relevante details genegeerd worden en kan alle aandacht gericht worden op
de informatie-inhoud van sociale invloed, zoals hogere-orde redeneren en
het veranderen van informatie. In dit proefschrift wordt daarmee aange-
toond dat een epistemisch logisch onderzoek een nieuw perspectief biedt op
bekende problemen van informatiegestuurde sociale invloed.
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Part I
Overview and context
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Example
It is Monday morning, the sun is shining and I walk through the
aisles of the weekly food market. Right next to me, a greengrocer
yells across the square: “5 bananas, 1 euro!”. First nobody reacts.
Again: “On sale now, 5 bananas, 1 euro!” Now, a young man
looks up and quickly makes his way to the banana seller and an
old lady slowly follows his lead. Then another greengrocer yells:
“Apples, delicious apples, 2 euro a kilo!” At the same time, in
the next aisle, a baker advertises freshly baked bread and shortly
after a loud voice in the distance announces the sale of old cheese.
I decide to buy a bread and 5 bananas. I need the energy today: I
have to write my PhD thesis.
This anecdote may be analyzed from the perspectives of many different
disciplines. For example, a psychologist could ask: How does the banana
seller feel when nobody initially reacts? Or, a sociologist could ask: Is the ap-
ple seller’s announcement a reaction to the banana seller’s announcement?
Or, an economists could wonder why the bananas are on sale: Is it to com-
pete with the apple seller, or because the bananas will soon go bad?
These approaches investigate emotions, relationships and intentions.
They focus on the social and cultural context of the situation—on how and
why something is said or done. In contrast, a logician focuses on the logical
structure of information processing—on whether and how something is
derivable from a set of premises. For example: May it be concluded from
this example that people only buy bananas if they are on sale? As a sub-area
of logic, an epistemic logician focusses on the logical structure of what is
known or believed. For example: What does the young man learn from the
· 3 ·
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second announcement after having heard the first announcement? And:
Does the banana seller believe that the old lady is willing to pay more than
1 euro for the bananas?
This thesis applies an epistemic logical approach to formulate and struc-
turally analyze socio-informational concepts such as communication, belief
revision and trade. Instead of investigating these real-world phenomena
through empirical methods, formal methods of mathematics and philosophy
are used to study the concepts in a more abstract way.
1.2 What is this thesis about?
This thesis presents an epistemic logical study of social interaction in situ-
ations like the example of the food market above. In particular, this thesis
studies social interaction in the following two information-driven contexts:
1. Scientists who acquire knowledge through observation and interaction;
and
2. Traders who reason about asset values and other traders.
These two contexts can be better understood by considering their similarities
and differences, explained below.
First, both contexts involve individuals in a group who act and react to
each other. Scientists publish their results, read research articles and books
of their peers and discuss their work at conferences and meetings. Traders
observe other traders’ attitudes towards buying and selling, negotiate about
the price and agree to exchange money, goods or stocks.
Second, through social interaction, the individuals in both contexts un-
der study are influenced by each other. In particular, the social influence
among scientists and traders is informational. Informational social influence
occurs when people are influenced by the group because they believe that
others are differently or better informed, thus using others’ beliefs or behav-
ior as an actual information source (Deutsch and Gerard 1955; Cialdini 2008;
Aronson et al. 2013). Informational social influence may be contrasted to nor-
mative social influence: when people are influenced by the group to be liked
and accepted by the others. The scientists under study in this thesis use a
combination of private observations and information from other scientists as
evidence about reality. Similarly, the traders under study use other traders’
beliefs about the value of an asset and about other traders as an information
source to determine what price to pay for the asset. As such, both scientists
and traders act under informational social influence.
Third, inherent to informational social influence is the use of higher-order
information. Higher-order information is information about other people’s
knowledge and belief (second-order), and about other people’s knowledge
· 4 ·
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
and belief about other people’s knowledge and belief (third-order), and so
forth. Higher-order information is central to this thesis, as both scientists
and traders reason about others to determine what is true or how to act.
Fourth, this thesis models scientists and traders as non-cooperative indi-
viduals: Although all individuals in the group primarily pursue the same
goal (i.e., scientists aiming to discover a new theory and traders aiming to
maximize their profit), they do not cooperate to reach that mutual goal. In-
stead, scientists and traders deliberate, decide and act towards reaching their
individual goals. Compare this, for example, to players in a soccer team who
do cooperate with the purpose to win the match together.
Besides the above mentioned similarities between the two contexts under
study, there is one important difference: The scientists and traders under
study in this thesis differ in their application of higher-order information.
While scientists reason about other scientists in order to track the truth about
the object or concept under study, a trader’s prime interest is to know what
other traders know or believe about the value and what they know or believe
about yet other traders. That is, a trader reasons about other traders’ beliefs
of the value of the asset, but may regard it irrelevant whether or not that
belief is based on true information about the asset (at least so is assumed in
this thesis).
To illustrate this difference: The type of reasoning of a scientist is similar
to the old lady who may observe the actions of the young man and conse-
quently conclude that the bananas must be tasty, while the type of reasoning
of a trader is similar to the apple seller who may wonder what price the
people at the food market are willing to pay for bananas—while not being
interested in whether the bananas are actually tasty or not. In other words,
both scientists and traders accept information from others as evidence about
reality (cf. Deutsch and Gerard (1955)’s original definition of informational
social influence), but the part of reality they are interested in differs: Scien-
tists are interested in learning about the concept under study, while traders
only want to know what other traders believe.
By focussing on specific cases of informational social influence, the title
of this thesis as well as the content of the introduction put emphasis on the
first three articles in this thesis: Article 1 investigates scientists who acquire
knowledge through observation and interaction and Articles 2 and 3 study
traders who reason about asset values and other traders. The two additional
articles of this thesis relate to the central topic of this thesis in a way that
supports and supplements the first three articles. Article 4 investigates and
characterizes so-called intensional protocols for dynamic epistemic logic. Such
protocols are formal tools that make it possible to structurally investigate
(social) information dynamics while focussing on the development of knowl-
edge and belief. In this way, the outcomes of Article 4 may enhance studies
like those of the first three articles. Furthermore, Article 5 is a philosophi-
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cal discussion of the choice to use epistemic logic for studying actual human
behavior. Containing arguments for why and how one should apply epis-
temic logic to topics like social interaction, Article 5 presents the methodolog-
ical considerations behind the first three articles and—indirectly—behind the
fourth article.
1.3 What is the importance of this thesis?
Information from others may sometimes be reliable evidence about reality: If
someone is known for being more knowledgeable or experienced than you,
it is reasonable to follow his or her moves. For example, imagine that the
old lady from the food market is, besides slow on her feet, also almost blind.
In her case, it saves her a lot of time and energy to just copy the behavior of
the young man instead of carefully investigating the fruit stalls at the food
market one-by-one. However, sometimes informational social influence may
lead to undesirable situations. Undesirable consequences of informational
social influence may moreover be amplified by higher-order group dynam-
ics. As an illustration, consider the following elaboration of the food market
example:
At the Monday food market, the banana seller puts his bananas
on sale because they already show signs of decay and will soon
be unsellable. The young man notices the state of the bananas
and decides to buy the bananas nevertheless: He wants to bake
a cake for his daughter’s birthday this afternoon, so over-mature
bananas are good enough for him. Not knowing for what occa-
sion the man buys bananas and neither investigating the bananas
herself, the old lady copies the man’s behavior and buys her own
bananas in the expectation that they will last for another week.
By the look of two costumers at the banana stall I conjecture that
the bananas must be really tasty and take my place in line. As I
am occupied puzzling on an axiomatic system for a logic of belief
revision, I overlook the big black spots on the bananas. Only back
at the university I find out that I have been fooled by the social
dynamics at the food market.
The information-driven group dynamics in this example are a form of
informational herding. Informational herding occurs when people in a group
(attempt to) copy the beliefs or behavior of the group instead of deliberating
on the basis of their private information. The cases in which informational
herding leads to problematic outcomes are widely studied in e.g. sociology,
economics and political science. For example, informational herding is used
to explain socio-informational phenomena such as informational cascades
· 6 ·
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(when individuals ignore their own information and sequentially conform to
the choices previously made by other members of the group, Bikhchandani
et al. 1998), the bystander effect (when individuals are less likely to offer
help to a victim when other people are present (Latane´ and Darley 1968))1,
or group polarization (when deliberation makes individuals in the group
believe in a more extreme version of their initial belief, Sunstein 2009).
Informational herding is a special case of informational social influence,
as informational social influence as such does not necessarily lead to herd-
ing or conformity. The scientists under study in this thesis are involved in
herding, as they base their beliefs about the concept under study directly on
information from others. The traders under study in this thesis are however
not herding: Although some types of traders do in fact follow the crowd,
this is not the case for the type of trader under study in this thesis—a greater
fools trader. A greater fools trader does reason about others and may occa-
sionally exhibit the same beliefs and behavior as others, but she does not do
so by herding. Compare the old lady who actually copies the behavior of the
young man (herding) and the apple seller who puts her apples on sale not
because the banana seller did, but because her apples coincidentally will also
soon go bad (non-herding).
Whether instances of herding or not, informational social influence
among scientists as well as traders has shown to sometimes lead to
problematic outcomes. When scientists converge too quickly, the beliefs of
the entire community may be grounded in very little information. This
conflicts with the idea of thorough and carefully conducted scientific
research. In case of a trade market, traders’ beliefs and actions based on
higher-order information may be fuel for financial bubbles, which may
destroy entire economies. Moreover, the invention of modern information
technologies have magnified and amplified the dangers that are associated
with informational social influence. By the growth of the internet, there is
more information available and ideas spread more easily than before, as
argued in Hendricks and Hansen (2016) and Hansen et al. (2013).
Although problems of social influence through higher-order information
occur everywhere, they are not fully understood yet. Informational social
influence in many cases may be advantageous, so the solution to generally
not act on information obtained from others would miss the mark: Such so-
lution will not only avoid cases of false informational cascades, but it will
also stop true information from spreading. By structurally studying the cir-
cumstances under which informational social influence leads to undesirable
situations, this thesis aims at a better understanding of the underlying in-
formation dynamics. Eventually, in combination with the outcomes from
1Informational herding is not the only explanation for the bystander effect: An alternative ex-
planation is the diffusion of responsibility in large groups, Darley and Latane´ 1968.
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other disciplines, this understanding may contribute to the design of resolu-
tions and recommendations to protect society against harmful consequences
of information-driven group dynamics.
The main technical framework used in this thesis is epistemic logic. Epis-
temic logic is a highly abstract framework, while the real-world phenom-
ena under study are complex and concrete. Therefore, the application of
epistemic logic to real-world phenomena is a challenging task. However, if
performed carefully, the obtained insights may be valuable exactly because
epistemic logic abstracts away from irrelevant details and at the same time
focuses on informational content of social influence such as higher-order rea-
soning and information change. Through the application of epistemic logic
to interacting scientists and traders, the approach and content of this thesis
are uncommon but relevant. In particular, to the best of my knowledge, this
thesis provides the first logical analysis of greater fools reasoning.
By studying the informational dynamics of social interaction with epis-
temic logic, the value of this thesis lies in both the philosophical analysis and
the technical results: On the one hand, this thesis contains novel formal re-
sults concerning the widely applied framework of epistemic logic. On the
other hand, this thesis contributes to the structural understanding of infor-
mational social influence in trade markets and science through formal philo-
sophical analysis. As informational social influence is also studied in areas
such as sociology, economics and philosophy of science, the outcomes of this
thesis may thereby be of value to non-logical disciplines as well. By using
insights from multiple disciplines, this thesis may furthermore provide in-
spiration for new connections between these disciplines—e.g. between social
psychology and economics.
1.4 Overview Part I
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of this thesis gives an
overview and context to the five research articles of this thesis, which can
be found in Part II. Chapter 2 of Part I discusses various multi-disciplinary
perspectives on informational social influence and it is concluded that more
research is desirable. Chapter 3 provides an informal introduction to epis-
temic logic and protocols for epistemic logic, as well as an overview of rel-
evant logical literature on informational social influence. It is argued that
epistemic logic is a natural and expressive framework for studying informa-
tional social influence. Chapter 4 is an overview of the five articles of this
thesis that outlines their correlation. Finally, in Chapter 5 a few concluding
remarks are given and various future venues are discussed.
The articles in Part II are self-contained, so the reader may also skip Part
I and directly proceed to reading (one of) the articles.
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Informational social
influence
2.1 A variety of approaches
There is a large and varied branch of literature that concerns informational
social influence. Although the main approach in this thesis is logical, the con-
tent relates to many other disciplines such as psychology, sociology, neuro-
science, biology, economics, history, political science and philosophy. Sec-
tions 2.2-2.4 exemplify this variety of approaches by presenting a few classi-
cal studies on information-driven social interaction and Section 2.5 discusses
the role of informational social influence in financial bubbles. Thereby, this
chapter provides a broad context to the five articles in this thesis while show-
ing how outcomes from other disciplines have inspired the research in these
articles. More directly related literature is given in the individual articles in
Part II.
Furthermore, the variety of approaches of the examples in this section
shows that there is a need to investigate informational social influence from
different perspectives, using different tools and methods, each with its own
strengths and limitations. In Chapter 3 it will be shown that epistemic logic
provides a natural and expressive framework to study informational social
influence, thereby supplementing the existing variety of approaches.
2.2 Strength of social influence
There is no doubt that people are influenced by others: In a positive sense,
a marathon runner may be encouraged by the cheering crowd while run-
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ning the last kilometres of a race, and, in a negative sense, teenagers may
be persuaded by group pressure to bully their own classmates. However,
there are a lot of unanswered questions about when, how and why people are
influenced by others (see e.g. Kelman 1958 and Cialdini 2008).
After the second world war, inspired by the soldiers who followed horri-
ble orders from the Nazis in Germany, people started wondering how pow-
erful social influence actually is. Psychologists designed experiments to in-
vestigate under what circumstances social influence is strongest and how far
it can drive people, looking at social motives such as belonging to a group,
gaining power, listening to authority, shame and insecurity. Famous exam-
ples of experimental studies from that period include Milgram’s Behavioral
study of obedience (1963) and Haney, Banks and Zimbardo’s Interpersonal dy-
namics in a simulated prison (1973) that both suggest that ordinary people may
become perpetrators of evil.
Another famous example in this line of research is a series of experiments
by Asch (1951; 1956). In Asch’s experiments, the participant is placed in a
group. The group is presented one line of a given length and three lines of
varying lengths. One of these lines is identical to the first line, while the oth-
ers are clearly different. The individuals in the group are then asked to tell
in succession which line matches the first line. To face the participant with a
conflict, the other members of the group are coached actors who have been
told to deliberately give the wrong answer. On average a third of the time
the participants in the experiment gave the same wrong answer as the group,
although the correct answer was very obvious. Asch concluded that social
influence may lead people to doubt their own knowledge when it is contra-
dicted by the majority of the group, even if there is barely any uncertainty.
There are different theories as to why the participants in Asch’s exper-
iments conformed to the group. Some participants said that they did not
really believe their conforming answers, but had gone along with the group
out of fear to reject the group norm. The participants moreover often showed
signs of anxiety or distress, which was explained by Asch to reflect their fear
for being ridiculed by the group. These participants were assumed to be af-
fected by normative social influence. Other participants said that they really
did believe the group’s answers were correct. These participants were said
to be affected by informational social influence (terminology of Deutsch and
Gerard 1955).
To further investigate these motives for conformity, Deutsch and Ger-
ard (1955) designed a follow-up experiment where the individual participant
only observes the group’s answers indirectly through an electronic signal. In
these experiments, the participants still often conformed to the group even
though there was no direct social pressure. This outcome suggests that infor-
mational influence may have also been a relevant factor to the participants’
displayed behavior. Deutsch and Gerard conclude that the anxiety and dis-
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tress that Asch’s participants expressed may have come partly from their
conclusion that their own senses were somehow not reliable.
The results from Asch and Deutsch and Gerard are interesting in light
of this thesis as the informational explanation for social influence suggests
that it may be valuable to further investigate the role of information in these
situations. This inspires the application of epistemic logic to informational
social influence: As will be shown in Chapter 3, epistemic logic is an intuitive
framework for studying information dynamics in a social setting.
2.3 Social influence in science
The scientific world is inherently affected by in social interaction: Scientists
are social beings who are subject to psychological mechanisms that influence
their work such as confirmation bias, greed to fraud or financial interests.
Scientists furthermore interact with each other in order to build further on
the achievements of others, as nobody has endless time to obtain the skills
and knowledge to build their own theories from scratch. These psychological
mechanisms and social interaction makes science necessarily a social practise
and social influence in scientific groups unavoidable.
Although nowadays social dimensions in science seem hard to ignore
(see e.g. Pedersen and Hendricks (2014) who study scientists’ individual
incentives to follow the group), they have not always been part of science
analyses (Longino 2016). One of the earlier theories that does acknowledge
the inevitable effects of social factors on science is Kuhn’s model of scientific
change, presented in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). It
often takes a long time before a new scientific theory is accepted by the
community. Kuhn’s explanation for this is that people collectively believe in
a paradigm: an explanatory framework that constitutes all true theories,
research methods, postulates, etc. According to Kuhn, scientific progress is
not a continuous process that accumulates unbiased findings linearly.
Rather, science evolves through scientific revolutions: developmental
episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an
incompatible new one. Instead of doing lab experiments like Asch and
Deutsch and Gerard, Kuhn based his philosophical theory on the history of
science where paradigm shifts have occurred, such as the Copernican
revolution.
Kuhn (1962; 1977) recognizes that scientific practise includes irrational
elements. The choice between the incompatible old and new paradigm that
follows, cannot be made by relying on normal logical procedures, since those
are determined by a paradigm. Instead, Kuhn argues, social factors must
settle disputes between competing theories or paradigms. Therefore, theory
choice is socially motivated. His work thereby raises interesting questions,
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such as which kinds of social structures are more susceptible to scientific
revolution. This question has partially motivated the research in Article 1,
which introduces a logical framework to study the effect of social structures
and higher-order reasoning on scientific progress.
2.4 Higher-order reasoning in a trade market
The examples of research on social interaction in this section involve infor-
mational social influence in economic theories about trade. Inspired by the
employment crisis of the late 1920s, Keynes compares the stock market to
“newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six
prettiest faced from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the
competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences
of the competitors as a whole” (Keynes 1936, p.156)1—later famously re-
ferred to as beauty contests. A successful competitor in a beauty contest does
not pick the face he or she regards prettiest, but picks the faces he or she be-
lieves the other competitors will pick. Likewise, a successful trader in a stock
market deliberates what price to pay for an asset by considering what price
other traders are willing to pay for the asset.
The analysis of Keynes is important to understanding the vital role of
higher-order information in financial markets. Through his metaphor,
Keynes argues that a trader’s estimation of the intrinsic value of a stock
should not play a role in a trader’s considerations. The intrinsic value of a
stock is solely based on the stock’s so-called fundamentals (see Section 2.5 for
an explanation) and ignores the money that one could get when reselling
the asset. Following Keynes’ metaphor, traders should rather reason about
the group’s higher-order estimations of the intrinsic value (i.e., what the
group believes that the group believes that the group believes, ..., what the
intrinsic value is), while realizing that all traders are looking at the problem
from the same point of view. The more steps of higher-order reasoning a
trader makes, and the more accurate these beliefs are, the better the trader
will be at determining what price to pay for the asset in order to maximize
profit. Some traders may act based on their personal beliefs of the intrinsic
value, but the type of trader under study in this thesis to a large extent uses
the strategy described by Keynes that focuses on the beliefs of other traders.
Other economists theorize about the concept of higher-order information
in terms of the possibility to trade. Aumann (1976) and Milgrom and Stokey
(1982) investigate the idea that, under certain conditions, higher-order rea-
soning makes trade impossible. The general argument starts with the idea
1The page citation refers to the quote in the 1953 edition of The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money.
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that traders have to agree to disagree in order to trade. Surprisingly, Au-
mann and Milgrom and Stokey show that asymmetric information between
two traders is not sufficient for an agreement to disagree. In short: For “like-
minded” traders, any attempt to initiate a trade will reveal the initiator’s
private information and therefore no trade will take place. The conditions
under which these so-called no trade theorems hold include—roughly stated—
that traders have the same prior knowledge and desires, that traders assume
that they are both rational, and that the structure by which traders acquire
information is known. In case of asymmetrically informed traders, a ratio-
nal trader who learns about another trader’s willingness to trade recognizes
her own ignorance and reflects carefully about what the other trader knows,
what the other trader knows about what she knows, etc., and consequently
reconsiders her own attitude towards trading.
For example, imagine trader a who owns a share of some company while
trader b is interested in buying the share. Further, they initially do not come
to an agreement to trade because they have the same prior belief that the
company’s dividend pay-out creates a share worth of 50 dollar. Then, trader
b suddenly offers trader a to buy the share for 60 dollar, because she has
privately been informed that the company’s pay-out to shareholders will in-
crease in the coming year. If trader a is rational, she must wonder whether
selling for 60 dollar is still a good idea, because apparently trader b has re-
ceived some new information about the company’s value that may change
a’s belief of the share’s value.
Contrary to the no trade theorems, in reality traders do frequently en-
gage in trading. That may be because some of the conditions of the no trade
theorems are often violated in real life, such as identical prior knowledge or
common assumptions of rationality. Keynes’ (1936) description of higher-
order reasoning in trade markets is also different in theory than in reality.
Making an effort to catch the average opinion, people usually act on the ba-
sis of incomplete information, while they are at the same time limited in the
amount of reasoning steps they can make.
Even though these economic models give no accurate description of real-
ity, they do contribute to a better understanding of reality. That is, because
the theoretical conditions set stage for a clear and crisp analysis of the struc-
tural conditions for trade and liquid markets. Likewise, in spite of ideal-
izations and abstractions in models of epistemic logic, a logical analysis of
social interaction may contribute to the structural understanding of a real-
world phenomena, as will be argued in Chapter 3 and in Article 5 of Part
II.
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2.5 Information-driven financial bubbles
Informational social influence also plays an important role in the explana-
tion of financial bubbles. The role of information in financial bubbles has long
intrigued economists and led to many experimental studies (e.g. Smith et al.
1988; Lei et al. 2001; Haruvy et al. 2007; Levine and Zajac 2007; Koessler et al.
2012; Palfrey and Wang 2012; Palan 2013; Cheung et al. 2014) and theoretical
models (e.g. Harrison and Kreps 1978; Allen et al. 1993; Avery and Zem-
sky 1998; Zeira 1999; Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003; Conlon 2004). See also
Brunnermeier (2001), Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) and Vogel (2010) for
elaborate overviews of literature on bubbles and crashes. Still, there is no
wide agreement on how the empirical data on stock prices should be inter-
preted. Two questions shape the main debates on financial bubbles: When
do we speak of a financial bubble? And: What are the underlying forces that
generate bubbles?
Describing the pattern of asset prices, a bubble may be defined as an
upward price movement over an extended time period that then implodes
(e.g. Kindleberger and Aliber 2005). Following this definition, price curves
of famous examples like the Tulip Mania and the Mississippi and South Sea
Bubbles (see e.g. Brunnermeier and Schnabel 2016 for details) provide evi-
dence for the existence of bubbles. A consequence of this definition is that
one can only tell in hindsight whether or not a financial bubble has occurred.
An alternative way to define a bubble is to compare the market price to
the asset’s fundamental value: Then, a bubble is said to occur if the asset
price exceeds the asset’s fundamental value (e.g. Brunnermeier 2001). The
fundamental (or intrinsic) value reflects the asset’s fundamentals: e.g. dividend
pay-out, revenue, growth potential, degree of risk and level of interest rates
as a stable alternative to the stock market (Malkiel 2015). From a trader’s
perspective, a trader’s belief of the fundamental value is the money she be-
lieves she would obtain when forced to hold the asset forever, that is, if she
is not allowed to re-trade (Harrison and Kreps 1978).
The intuition behind a fundamental value is that two identical assets
should have the same fundamental value. That one of two identical assets is
sold for (much) more than the other may be thus considered as testimony of
a financial bubble. For example, around the 1960s many companies changed
their name to include the word ‘electronic’ or ’tronic’, even if the companies
had nothing to do with the electronics industry. The shares of companies
with these new names were then suddenly sold for prices much higher than
before, while their prices came crashing down a couple of years later. This
tronic boom, as referred to by Malkiel (2015), is comparable to the DotCom
bubble in the late 1990s where traders massively invested in companies with
a “.com” in their name Phillips et al. (2011). The apparent influence that a
name may have on the price of the share exemplifies how asset prices may
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sometimes deviate from the asset’s fundamental value.
In spite of the above definitions and examples, the fundamental value re-
mains a problematic concept in theoretical models of financial bubbles. The
fundamental value is extremely complex and may rely on inaccessible in-
formation, so it is practically impossible to calculate the actual fundamental
value of an asset (Malkiel 2015; Mendelson and Tunca 2004). Therefore, there
is no unique way for economists to interpret empirical data of eventual bub-
bles: While some may study empirical data and argue that the market price
exceeds the fundamental value, others may argue that it reflects the funda-
mental value. Garber (2000) for example argues that the Tulip Mania and
the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles are not actual testimony of bubbles:
According to Garber the price curves in these episodes were in fact driven by
fundamentals. Moreover, advocates of the Efficient Market hypothesis argue
that the fundamental value and the market price must necessarily coincide
and hence that prices can impossibly exceed the fundamental value.
In this thesis, bubbles are defined as periods where market prices exceed
the highest fundamental value that anybody in the community considers
plausible—thereby generalizing over the size of the bubble, i.e., the differ-
ence between the market price and the fundamental value. As the models
in Articles 2 and 3 are not based on emprical data, the above-mentioned
problem of the fundamental value is not an issue in these articles: Given
a fundamental value, the epistemic logical models in the articles explore the
epistemic conditions for a bubble.
Accepting the possible existence of financial bubbles, there is no consen-
sus on what drives a bubble. First of all, note that there are different strategies
for trading. Some traders only use information about the company to as-
sess whether stocks are attractive for purchase or sale. Other traders choose
to not even consider the fundamental value to predict stock prices. For ex-
ample, some traders predict the future course of stock prices by looking at
trends: When the price has been going up for a while, they predict that the
price will continue to grow and consequently they decide to buy—opposite
for selling.
Given these different types of traders, there is a debate about the ratio-
nality of traders involved in financial frenzies (Brunnermeier 2008). Many
observers cite the bubble episodes as clear irrational behavior that is driven
by emotion. For example, Shiller (2005) discusses the influence of psycho-
logical factors such as overconfidence, biases judgment, herd mentality and
loss aversion on bubble phenomena in financial market.
Others wonder whether rational investors will “correct” the irrational be-
havior, or whether it is rational to jump on the bandwagon, e.g. Fama (1965).
In a rational bubble, traders know that they are involved in a bubble but still
continue to trade. By a backward induction argument, it may be concluded
that rational bubbles cannot possibly occur (Tirole 1982). Under the assump-
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tion that there is a finite horizon with a final payoff from which traders can
discount backwards, rational traders will know that the bubble must burst at
some point, so nobody will start buying an overpriced asset in the first place.
According to Tirole, a rational bubble can thus only exist when traders expect
the bubble to grow ad infinitum.
Allen et al. (1993) however show that even with a finite horizon and ra-
tional expectations equilibrium, the backward induction argument may fail.
Allen et al. present an example in which a bubble occurs even though ev-
ery agent is rational and knows with certainty that they there is a bubble.
The reason that a rational bubble still exists in their example is that traders
are uncertain about the information that others trade on. As a consequence,
traders may believe that they are able to sell the overpriced asset at an even
higher price to a less informed trader. In Kindleberger and Aliber’s (2005)
terms this type of trader is called a greater fool: It may seem foolish to buy
an overpriced asset, but the belief in an even greater fool who will pay even
more for the asset justifies that choice.
Rational traders understand that the market will eventually collapse but
meanwhile would like to ride the bubble as it continues to grow. The challenge
is to correctly time the bubble and get out before the market collapses.
In the same line of research, Conlon (2004) presents an asymmetric in-
formation model of a finite horizon nth order rational asset price bubble. In
the model, all traders know that (to level n) the asset is worthless. Conlon
shows that bubbles can still exist even if traders know that others are skepti-
cal about asset prices as well. That is, bubbles are robust to traders knowing
a lot about one another’s beliefs.
It is important to know whether bubbles are necessarily caused by irra-
tional behavior: If bubbles can occur even when everybody is rational, this
must be considered when designing policy that ought to prevent future bub-
bles. As the concepts of rational bubbles, higher-order reasoning and greater
fools trading are not yet fully understood, further analysis is desirable.
2.6 An epistemic logical approach
The examples in this chapter show that there are many ways to study the
problems of informational social influence. The advantage of looking at in-
formational social influence from different perspectives is that each perspec-
tive may shed light on different aspects. This thesis uses an epistemic logical
approach to study informational social influence, as its central concepts—i.e.,
higher-order reasoning and social interaction—are naturally captured by the
frameworks of epistemic logic.
In the next chapter I explain what epistemic logic is all about.
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Dynamic epistemic logic
3.1 Introduction
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) comprises a host of formal frameworks de-
signed to reason about the three topics of its title: dynamics, epistemics and
logics. In this chapter, basic concepts that are shared by the majority of the
DEL frameworks will be informally introduced. Formal details are intro-
duced in each individual article in Part II as the details differ from article to
article. For elaborate introductions to DEL, see for example van Ditmarsch
et al. (2008), Baltag and Renne (2016) and Moss (2015).
The foundation of DEL is logic. The most basic elements are so-called
atomic propositions representing facts of the world. Such could be p and q
with their intended reading given by context—an example follows on the
next pages. Atomic propositions can be combined using logical connectives
such as ¬ (“not”) or ∧ (“and”), making e.g. p ∧ ¬q a formula. Formulas
only involving atomic propositions and logical connectives are often called
Boolean.
Next, epistemics enter the picture when one seeks to describe agents’ infor-
mation about the world, e.g., their knowledge, beliefs or justification. Such
propositional attitudes are represented using modal operators, like Ka and Ba
representing, respectively, knowledge and belief of agent a. The formula
Kap ∧ ¬Baq then states that agent a knows p and does not believe q. The
language of epistemic logic is particularly expressive because it allows for
higher-order epistemic expressions such as KaKbp, which means “agent a
knows that agent b knows that p”. Seminal works by von Wright (1951) and
Hintikka (1962) are acknowledged as having initiated the formal study of
epistemic logic as we know it today.
Finally, dynamics fulfill the desire to model the development of agents’
information. To represent informational changes in the language of DEL,
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additional operators are introduced, for example [!q]. The dynamic operator
[!q] concerns the change induced by the truthful announcement from a fully
trusted source that q is in fact the case. The formula ¬Baq ∧ [!q]Baq would
thus read “agent a does not believe q, but after the announcement that q,
agent a believes q”. The history of dynamic epistemic logic draws on work
in philosophy, linguistics and theoretical computer science. Two early con-
tributions essential to this thesis are Plaza (1989) who first introduced public
announcement logic and Baltag et al. (1998) who offer its broad generaliza-
tion through the introduction of action models.
Formulas of dynamic epistemic logic may be formally explored in two
ways: 1) A proof theory (e.g. a set of axioms and derivation rules) is given to
study what may be proof-theoretically derived; and 2) The truth of sentences
may be defined with respect to a class of models to study whether the truth
of a conclusion semantically follows from the truth of given premises. If the
proof system and the truth definitions “correspond”, that is, if what can be
proven in the proof system is true in the class of models, and visa versa, the
logical system is said to be sound and complete. See e.g. Blackburn et al. (2001)
or van Ditmarsch et al. (2008) for details.
This thesis mainly uses the semantic approach: to explore the truths of for-
mulas in specific classes of models. First, Boolean formulas are true relative
to a world. Second, agents’ epistemic conditions are represented by relations
between worlds, for example indicating which worlds an agent cannot tell
apart given its information. Jointly, a set of worlds (sometimes including a
denoted actual world) with a set of suitable relations is often called an epis-
temic model. Third, dynamics involve moving from one epistemic model to
another, e.g. by deleting worlds to represent learning through shrinking un-
certainty. Hence the Boolean formulas speak of a single world, the epistemic
formulas speak of many worlds collected in an epistemic model, and the dy-
namic formulas speak of many epistemic models and the transitions between
them.
3.2 Example
Epistemic models as described above may be given various philosophical in-
terpretations. Following the articles in this thesis, the exemplifying models
in this section are based on the following interpretation: A reflexive, sym-
metric and transitive relation respective to an agent represents the agent’s
indistinguishability relation; When two worlds are not related, the agent has
the information to distinguish between the two worlds. In other worlds: If w′
is related to w by a’s indistinguishability relation, then a considers w′ possible
in w. Given some world w, agent a is said to know formula ϕ if, and only if,
ϕ is true in all worlds that a considers possible in w.
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To assume reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity of the indistinguishabil-
ity relation reflects an indefeasible interpretation of knowledge, but weaker
types of knowledge may also be defined (see e.g. Rendsvig and Symons
forthcoming). This indistinguishability interpretation of an epistemic model
is sound and complete to the so-called S5 proof system.
Figures 3.1-3.3 are examples of epistemic models, based on the description
of the food market in Chapter 1. In the examples, let p be short for “5 bananas
cost 1 euro” and ;et q be short for “the bananas are on sale”. Further, let m
denote the young man and a denote the apple seller.
p, q
w1
p, ¬q
w2
¬p, q
w3
¬p, ¬q
w4
m
m
a a
a,m
a,m
a,m
a,m
Figure 3.1: An epistemic model. The rounded rectangles represent possi-
ble worlds. The worlds w2, w3 and w4 are alternatives to the actual world
w1—denoted by a bold contour. The valuation of the propositions p and q is
denoted in the worlds. For example, in world w2 the bananas cost 1 euro but
they are not on sale (i.e., p ∧ ¬q is true in w2), while in world w3 the bananas
do not cost 1 euro but they are on sale (i.e., ¬p∧q is true inw3). Labeled edges
between worlds represent the indistinguishability relations of a and m.
In the model in Figure 3.1 p is true in all the worlds that are related to w1
by m’s indistinguishability relation (i.e., w1 and w2), while m considers both
q and ¬q possible. Hence, the young man knows that the bananas are 1 euro
while he does not know that they are on sale (i.e., Kmp ∧ ¬Kmq is satisfied
in w1). Similarly, by studying the indistinguishability relation of a, it may be
concluded that the apple seller knows that the bananas are on sale while she
does not know that they are 1 euro (i.e, Kaq ∧ ¬Kap is satisfied in w1).
By moving over multiple edges, higher-order formulas may be investi-
gated. For example, it is true that the apple seller knows that the young man
does not know that the bananas are on sale: i.e., Ka¬Kmq is satisfied in w1.
That is, because in both worlds that a cannot distinguish between (i.e., in w1
and w3), m considers it possible that q and ¬q. Further, it is for example true
that the apple seller knows that the young man knows that the apple seller
knows whether q or ¬q: i.e., KaKm(Kaq ∨Ka¬q) is satisfied in w1.
To also model beliefs, models may be enriched with a plausibility relation
that reflects the agents’ relative plausibility: When world w relates to world
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w′ by a’s plausibility relation, then agent a considers w′ more plausible than
w. By giving the plausibility order specific properties, belief is in the arti-
cles in this thesis defined as ‘truth in the most plausible world(s) among all
the worlds that the agent considers possible’, but other interpretations exist
(see e.g. Rendsvig and Symons forthcoming). This interpretation of belief is
sound and complete with respect to the so-called KD45 proof system.
p ∧ q
w1
p ∧ ¬q
w2
¬p ∧ q
w3
¬p ∧ ¬q
w4
m
m
a a
a,m
a,m
a,m
a,m
Figure 3.2: A plausibility model. Arrows reflect the plausibility relations of a
andm. Agentm considers w1 more plausible than w2, and w4 more plausible
than w3, while agent a considers w1 and w3 equally plausible, as well as w2
and w4. Given actual world w1, m’s most plausible world is thus world w1
and a’s most plausible worlds are thus w1 and w3.
In the epistemic plausibility model (also, plausibility model) in Figure 3.2, the
young man knows that p while he believes that p ∧ q, i.e., Kmp ∧ Bm(p ∧ q)
is satisfied in w1. Furthermore, the apple seller knows that if the bananas
are 1 euro (as in w1), then the young man believes that they are on sale:
Ka(p → Bmq), and that if the bananas are not 1 euro (as in w3), then the
young man believes that the bananas are not on sale: Ka(¬p→ Bm¬q).
Using information updates, the information in the models may be trans-
formed as a result of various changes: events from the outside, observations
by agents, communication between agents, etc. A simple action is for exam-
ple the public announcement of a formula ϕ that informs everybody that the
formula ϕ is true. Actions may be executed on epistemic models in order to
generate information change. By executing an action on an epistemic model,
a new epistemic model is obtained. Therefore, actions are sometimes called
model transformers.
The plausibility model in Figure 3.3 is the result of a transformation of
the model in Figure 3.2 by the public announcement [!q]. Recall that in the
original model in Figure 3.2 the young man did not know that the bananas
are on sale. However, after the announcement that the bananas are on sale,
the young man knows that they are. Thus, ¬Kmq ∧ [!q]Kmq is satisfied in w1
in Figure 3.2.
More complex actions such as private communication, belief change or
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p ∧ q
w1
p ∧ ¬q
w2
¬p ∧ q
w3
a
a,m
a,m
Figure 3.3: The result of a public announcement of q executed on the plau-
sibility model in Figure 3.2. After it is publicly announced that q, the young
man and the apple seller both now that q is true: Kaq ∧ Kmq is satisfied in
w1.
ontic change may also be modeled with dynamic epistemic logic. For exam-
ple, the banana seller may lower the price of his bananas and share this infor-
mation only with the costumers at the food market, leaving the apple seller
ignorant about the new price. Such more complex actions may be modeled
as action models with epistemic and plausibility relations to capture knowl-
edge and belief of the agents about the action, preconditions that define con-
ditions for the action to be executable and postconditions to capture ontic
change. Announcements and more complex action models will be properly
introduced in the articles in Part II so further details are omitted here.
The models in Figures 3.1- 3.3 capture agents’ knowledge and belief about
bananas and about each other. At the same time, the models omit a lot of
details, such as the city in which the events takes place, the cultural back-
ground of the agents, and the amount of money the young man can spend.
It is thus the task of the modeler to include the essentials and ignore the irrel-
evant information. By keeping the models simple and compact, all attention
is focused on the information-driven interaction between agents.
Furthermore, note that models of epistemic logic do not include the rea-
sons behind the epistemic and doxastic states: In the examples, the model
does not capture why the apple seller does not know the price for bananas,
nor why she knows that they are on sale. Likewise, the framework does not
capture why an event occurs: Why does the banana seller announce that his
bananas are on sale? Why does the young man decide to buy bananas? When
modeling information dynamics with dynamic epistemic logic, it is the mod-
eler’s choice to execute an action model on a given epistemic model. How-
ever, protocols may be specified to control which actions may or must occur
when. Different types of protocols and the possibilities of using protocols
will be discussed in the next section.
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3.3 Protocols for epistemic logic
As explained above, DEL provides a framework in which epistemic models
may be transformed by means of action models. As such, the factual and
epistemic effects of an action may be explored. In the execution of an action
model on an epistemic model, the action model has “gatekeepers” (i.e., so-
called preconditions) to ensure that the action may only be executed on the
model when reasonable. For example, p may typically only be announced
if p is true, and a light may only be switched off when the light is currently
on. While DEL thus does controle whether a given action may be executed
or not, it does not provide a machinery that controls the overall execution
of action models: Should it be announced that p or should it be announced
that q? Or, should I switch the light off or should I play some music? To
facilitate such “global” control, a protocol may be specified that determines
which actions may and must be executed when.
There are different ways to specify a protocol for epistemic logic. Typi-
cally, the dynamics of epistemic logic are based on a problem specification
presented in natural language. In that case, the modeler has to translate the
natural language protocol into action model sequences.
To study information flow in a more structural way, a protocol may also
be specified formally (e.g. Fagin et al. 1995; van Benthem et al. 2009; Hoshi
2001; Wang 2010; Rendsvig 2018). Following terminology of Parikh and
Ramanujam (2003), formal protocols may be categorized as either extensional
or intensional protocols. An extensional protocol is a sequence of actions
α1, α2, α4, α1, α1 (or a set of sequences of actions) that together with an ini-
tial model constitutes adynamics. An extensional protocol thereby specifies
the full extension of the action sequence: At the first time-step do α1, at the
second time-step do α2, at the third time-step do α4, etc. As an example,
consider the following extensional protocol for a treasure hunt:
First turn left. Then walk 10 meter. Then turn right.
Then walk 5 meter. Then dig a hole of 1 meter. And
finally open the box.
Alternatively, the protocol may be specified as a program: a description
of which action (or actions) may be executed as a function of the current epis-
temic model. An intensional protocol specifies the intension of the dynamics—
driven by the state of the epistemic model itself. Consider the following in-
tensional protocol for a treasure hunt as an example:
If you are at the tree and face the lake, walk forward. If you
are at the lake and face the house, turn right and walk
forward. If you are at the flag, dig a hole. If you find a box,
open the box.
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Both protocols may tell you how to find the treasure, but depending on
the circumstances, one may be more convenient than the other: In the spe-
cific example of the treasure hunt, the temporal approach of an extensional
protocol is appropriate when the treasure is hidden in the dessert, there are
no other things to refer to than time and distance and you know where you
are on the map; The conditional approach of an intensional protocol is appro-
priate for a treasure hunt when you are not able to measure time or distance
and you do not know where on the map you start.
In terms of protocols for epistemic logic, an extensional protocol can con-
trol the dynamics through information that is not expressed by propositional
letters—e.g time, while an intensional protocol has the tools to describe the
dynamics towards the solution of an informational problem in a finite and
non-revealing way. A more substantive introduction and comparison of in-
tensional protocols (cf. Rendsvig 2015) and extensional protocols (cf. van
Benthem et al. 2009) is given in Article 4.
Protocols may be used to structurally study the effect of specific
sequences of actions in the context of informational social influence. For
example, it may be interesting to study the effects of mutually influencing
agents. Going back to the example of the food market: What happens if
both the banana seller and the apple seller adjust their prices by always
offering their fruit for a cheaper price than the other does? Rendsvig (2014)
uses a protocol mechanism to invoke agent choices that are based on the
behavior of others in context of the bystander effect.
Further, one may be interested in investigating whether a certain epis-
temic state can be achieved given an initial model: If it is not allowed to
yell across the market, how can the banana seller inform everyone about the
price of his bananas? See e.g. literature on epistemic protocols for spreading
secrets for similar research questions (Apt et al. 2015; van Ditmarsch et al.
2017).
Finally, it may be important to know whether some particular situation
can be avoided, as in security protocols (Hommersom et al. 2004): Is there a
way to avoid that all customers go to the same food stall at the same time? All
such questions may be explored by means of protocols for epistemic logic.
3.4 Epistemic logic and social influence
The formal tools of epistemic logic have only recently been used to study so-
cial interaction and informational social influence. The present-day applica-
tion of epistemic logic to social phenomena is a result of recent developments
in epistemic logic, e.g. the formalization of multi-agency, communication, belief
revision and ontic change. Due to these advancements, there is now growing
body of research going on around the application of logic to social interac-
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tion. Besides publications in logical journals, numerous international con-
ferences are organized and dedicated volumes are published. This section
mentions some research directions relevant to informational social influence.
Additional references with particular relevance to the individual articles are
cited in the respective articles in Part II.
A well-studied parameter of informational social influence is the network
structure of a group. Drawing on contributions by Seligman et al. (2011,
2013), progress has been made in the context of logic and social relations.
Seligman et al. introduce a hybrid logic that combines epistemic logic with
the social structure of a group. Continuing this line of research, Ruan and
Thielscher (2011) and Christoff (2013, 2016) study the effects of social rela-
tionship structures on the dynamics of belief change in a community. Like-
wise, Baltag et al. (2018) studies the diffusion of behaviors in social net-
works. More specifically, Christoff and Hansen (2013) and Christoff et al.
(2016) study the dynamics of social influence in social networks by differen-
tiating between agents’ internal mental state and their observable behavior.
The network structure of a community is also a central topic in Article 1 of
this thesis.
Another well-studied parameter in information social influence is an
agent’s attitude towards other agents. For example, Liau (2003) and Herzig
et al. (2010) present different logical frameworks to characterize the
concepts of trust and reputation in the context of belief change. Likewise, Liu
et al. (2014) look at the extend to which agents regard others to be an expert,
and thereby study the strength of influence. Further, Baltag, Rodenha¨user
and Smets (2012) and Rodenha¨user (2014) study the agent’s opinion of the
trustworthiness of a particular information source. Another way to
formalize strength of influence is to use threshold models (e.g. Baltag et al.
2018 and Article 1 of this thesis): The higher the threshold, the more it takes
to influence an agent.
Additionally, also with particular relevance to Article 1 of this thesis, the
relation between social influence and justification and evidence-based beliefs is
a well-studied topic in epistemic logic. While some frameworks on justifi-
cation of knowledge and belief focus on individuals (Artemov 2008; van Ben-
them and Pacuit 2011; Baltag, Renne and Smets 2012), more flexible frame-
works are developed that allow for evidence-based belief change in a social
context (Renne 2008, 2009, 2012).
Furthermore, while much research focusses on the positive effects of
teamwork (Dunin-Ke¸plicz and Verbrugge 2012) and belief merge (Baltag
and Smets 2009, 2013), other research focuses on the problems of belief merge.
For example, epistemic logic is applied to the problems of belief merge in
informational social influence in case of false informational cascades (Baltag
et al. 2013; Rendsvig 2013; Hendricks and Hansen 2016) and pluralistic
ignorance (Christoff and Hansen 2013; Rendsvig 2014; Proietti and Olsson
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2014).
Finally, related to Articles 2 and 3 of this thesis, the social dynamics of trade
have previously been studied in an epistemic logical setting by De´gremont
and Roy (2012) and Demey (2014). De´gremont and Roy (2012) and Demey
(2014) have formalized no trade theorems in dynamic epistemic logic, while
focusing on the role of common knowledge, common belief and iterated pub-
lic announcements.
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Chapter 4
Overview articles
4.1 Article 1
Title: The Logic of Observation and Belief Revision in Scientific Communities
Article 1 is one of the three articles in this thesis that applies epistemic logic
to a specific kind of informational social influence: in this case, scientific
knowledge inquiry through observation and communication. In spite of
scientists’ efforts to carefully collect and analyze scientific evidence,
evidence may sometimes be false or deceiving. By interaction between
scientists through publication, presentation or casual interaction such false
evidence may spread across the community. The aim of studying
informational social influence in scientific communities is to understand
when and how communication among scientists leads to the spread of false
beliefs across the entire community.
Article 1 introduces a dynamic epistemic logical framework called Multi-
agent Epistemic Observation Logic (MEOL) that is suited to model the infor-
mation dynamics of scientific inquiry through interaction. The motivation to
construct a logical framework for studying the social dynamics of scientific
inquiry is twofold. On the one hand, there is an ongoing debate in social
epistemology of science about the effect of various network configurations
on the epistemic reliability of scientific communities. While early studies
suggest that less interaction has a positive effect on the truth-tracking abil-
ities of a scientific community (Zollman 2007, 2010, 2013; Grim 2009), later
studies refute this hypothesis (Grim et al. 2013; Rosenstock et al. 2017; Borg
et al. 2017). As the contributions to this debate do not use frameworks of
epistemic logic, the outcomes of Article 1 may provide novel insights to the
effects of network configurations on belief formation in scientific communi-
ties.
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On the other hand, Article 1 relates to literature in dynamic epistemic
logic and social interaction among rational agents, building further on recent
developments in the areas of evidence-based belief change and social net-
work structures. In particular, the logical framework introduced in Article 1
combines 1) the approach of Baltag, Renne and Smets (2012) that introduces
a logic of justified belief change, soft evidence and defeasible knowledge to
allow for evidence acceptance and evidence-based belief update, and 2) the
approach of various logics for belief change and diffusion in social networks
such as Liu et al. (2014); Baltag et al. (2018).
Article 1 formalizes three types of actions that are central to informational
social influence in a scientific context: observation, communication and belief
revision. The actions are designed with the idea to be executed by the fol-
lowing informal protocol: First, agents conduct experiments and collect the
outcomes in an observation set. Agents then communicate the content of their
observation set to a selected group of agents in their network. All the agents
in the community consequently form their beliefs on the basis of two kinds of
evidence: the outcomes of their private observations and information from
agents who have shared their own experimental outcomes with them.
As observations are assumed to be defeasible, agents may obtain contra-
dicting evidence. By numerical comparison, agents in Article 1 are modeled
to update their beliefs in accordance to the evidence that is observed most
often in their network. The modeled scientists are thus under informational
social influence as they use the observational evidence obtained by other sci-
entists to form their beliefs about the concept under study.
Inspired by the aforementioned debate on epistemic reliability of scien-
tific communities, the framework presented in Article 1 is designed to study
effects on the community’s epistemic reliability of various parameters: group
size, network structure, distribution of prior beliefs and frequency of com-
munication.
4.2 Articles 2 and 3
Title Article 2: A Formalization of the Greater Fools Theory with Dynamic Epis-
temic Logic
Title Article 3: Higher-order Reasoning and Overpricing in Trade Markets
Compared to Article 1, Articles 2 and 3 apply epistemic logic to a different
kind of informational social influence: in this case, reasoning about other
traders in a trade market. In particular, Articles 2 and 3 focus on a specific
type of trader—a greater fools trader—that trades on the basis of higher-order
beliefs. By modeling various epistemic situations with public announcement
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logic (originally proposed in Plaza 1989), Articles 2 and 3 aim at obtaining a
better understanding of the informational structure of greater fools reason-
ing and its potential role in the formation of a financial bubble.
The greater fools explanation of a financial bubble states that traders are
willing to pay more for an asset than they deem it worth, because they antic-
ipate they might be able to sell it to someone else for an even higher price. In
spite of numerous theoretical (e.g. Allen et al. 1993; Abreu and Brunnermeier
2003; Conlon 2004; Kindleberger and Aliber 2005) and empirical (e.g. Smith
et al. 1988; Brunnermeier and Nagel 2004; Temin and Voth 2004) bubble stud-
ies in economics, there is no consensus on the potential role of greater fools
traders in the formation of financial bubbles (see also Section 2.5).
As agents’ beliefs about other agents’ beliefs are at the heart of the greater
fools theory, dynamic epistemic logic provides apt tools to formally study the
informational structure of greater fools reasoning. However, the epistemic
logical approach to studying greater fools reasoning is novel. Articles 2 and
3 may therefore shed a new light on the greater fools theory by focussing on
different aspects of a trade market than traditional economic models.
Article 2 presents a first step in the formalization of greater fools rea-
soning and bubbles in the language and models of epistemic logic. Stated
informally: Greater fools trader a is willing to buy the asset for price p if, and
only if, agent a believes that the asset’s value is higher than p, or if agent a
believes that some other agent b is willing to buy the asset for price p′ higher
than p. The higher-order belief further unfolds as the willingness of agent b
to buy the asset for price p′ may in turn be based on the belief in an agent c
that is willing to buy the asset for price p′′ higher than p′. Etcetera. Thereby,
a greater fools trader is under informational social influence, as her willing-
ness to buy is based on her beliefs about other traders.
Further, Article 2 defines a financial bubble with respect to the highest
value that anybody in the community considers plausible, denoted vBmax: A
bubble is a sequence of events where at some point there exists an agent that
is willing to buy the asset for price p higher than vBmax, while at a later point
nobody is willing to pay more than vBmax (i.e., the bubble has “crashed”).
Article 2 includes some first results about the epistemic conditions for a
greater fools bubble. First, by providing concrete examples, Article 2 shows
that the existence of two agents with identical first-order beliefs about the as-
set but different higher-order beliefs is sufficient for the formation of a bub-
ble. Second, Article 2 differentiates between two types of rationality: a static
greater fools trader who acts as described above and a dynamic greater fools
trader who additionally includes her knowledge about the expected future
course of events to decide whether or not to engage in trade. Article 2 then
shows a bubble may also occur under the interpretation of a dynamic greater
fools trader. Third, Article 2 points out that under common knowledge of v∗
no bubble can exist.
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Article 3 continues in the same direction as Article 2 by exploring the
informational structure of greater fools reasoning. The most fundamental
difference between Article 2 and Article 3 is the definition of a greater fools
trader: In Article 2, an agent a is willing to buy the asset for price p if there
exists another agent b who agent a believes is willing to pay more than p (as
in a de re statement); In Article 3, an agent a is willing to buy the asset for p
if she believes that there exists an agent b that is willing to pay more (as in a
de dicto statement). The difference in terms of plausibility models is that in
Article 3 agent a may believe that either agent b or another agent c is willing
to pay more for the asset, while in Article 2 agent a must believe in the same
agent b in all most plausible worlds, as Figure 4.1 illustrates.
b
w1
b
w2
b
w1
c
w2
a a
Figure 4.1: Let b be short for “agent b is willing to buy the asset for p′”, and
c be short for “agent c is willing to buy the asset for p′”, where p′ > p. In
the left model, agent a is willing to buy the asset for p in both de re (Article
2) and de dicto (Article 3) interpretations of a greater fools trader, as the same
agent b is willing to buy for p′ in w1 and w2. In the right model, agent a is
only willing to buy the asset for p in a de dicto sense, as there does not exist
one agent b that agent a believes is willing to buy the asset for p′.
Under this weaker definition of a greater fools trader, Article 3 studies
the epistemic conditions for trade. The article studies the conditions under
which there is a trading opportunity: when one trader is willing to sell the
asset at price n, and another trader is willing to buy the asset at the same
price. Like Article 2, Article 3 shows that greater fools bubbles may exist
in a trade market that consists exclusively of greater fools traders. Further,
Article 3 explores the effect of traders’ announcements of willingness to sell
or buy on the possibility of a trade.
4.3 Article 4
Title: Intensional Protocols for Dynamic Epistemic Logic
While Articles 1, 2 and 3 use epistemic logic to study a particular concept,
epistemic logic is the concept at study in Articles 4 and 5. Article 4 investi-
gates protocols for epistemic logic: control mechanisms that determine which
actions may or must occur when. Where protocols for epistemic logic may
appear in various forms (as exemplified in Section 3.3), Article 4 focuses on
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a specific class of intensional protocols referred to as DEL dynamical systems.
A DEL dynamical system behaves as a program consisting of a set of pro-
gram lines “if ϕn, do αn” that is applied to an epistemic model.1 When
the epistemic model satisfies the test condition ϕn, the DEL dynamical sys-
tem selects the action αn that transforms the model into an(other) epistemic
model. Applying a DEL dynamical system iteratively to an initial epistemic
model thus results in a sequence of epistemic models.
Following methodology of van Benthem, Gerbrandy, Hoshi and Pacuit
(2009), Article 4 investigates DEL dynamical systems by describing the in-
formation dynamics that may be constructed with a DEL dynamical sys-
tem in terms of the assumption-free models of epistemic temporal logic (ETL).
Thereby, the information dynamics that may be constructed with a DEL dy-
namical system are characterized as a set of ETL properties. The obtained
properties include for example the well-known perfect recall that describes
that agents never forget what they have learned (although new uncertainties
may be introduced), and point bisimulation invariance that describes—roughly
stated—that two “similar” (i.e., bisimilar) epistemic models will always be
transformed similarly by the same action.
Article 4 furthermore relates DEL dynamical systems to the main protocol
framework in dynamic epistemic logic: the extensional DEL protocols of van
Benthem et al. (2009). As DEL protocols have also been characterized by
ETL properties in van Benthem et al. (2009), the comparison between the
two protocol frameworks is carried out via ETL models.
Article 4 concludes that the representation of a DEL dynamical system
as a mapping is both a strength and a restriction: For some modeling tasks,
as exemplified in Article 4, a DEL dynamical system formulates a finite and
informative description of the information dynamics—this, in contrast to the
DEL protocol equivalent. At the same time, that the information dynamics is
controlled by a formula in the language (i.e., the test formula ϕn) implies that
a DEL dynamical system cannot capture agent behavior that is not expressed
in the formal language. Recall the example of the treasure hunt in Section
3.3 where different protocols were suitable for different treasure hunts. As
argued in Article 4, this restriction may be considered desirable when mod-
eling agents that base their decisions fully on information they can explicitly
reason about through the formal language.
4.4 Article 5
Title: The Role of Epistemic Logic in Understanding Human Behavior
Article 5 comprises the methodological considerations behind Articles 1-3
1In fact, Article 4 applies DEL dynamical systems to the more general Kripke models.
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and indirectly also behind Article 4: Article 5 discusses the current and po-
tential role of epistemic logic in understanding actual human behavior. This
discussion is important because although Articles 1-3 aim at modeling real-
world concepts, the notions of knowledge and agency captured by epistemic
logic fail to connect to real-world knowledge and agency in many ways. For
example, the well-studied attribute that logical agents are logically omniscient
(see e.g. Stalnaker 1991) does not match the imperfect reasoning abilities of
real humans.
Discussing the relevance of epistemic logic with respect to actual human
behavior is in particular relevant in light of recent developments in epistemic
logic. Recent introductions to the formalization of multi-agency, communica-
tion, belief revision and the positioning of agents as active agents facilitated
a ‘societal turn’ (terminology of Article 5) that lead to the wide application of
epistemic logic to social concepts such as informational social influence. As
a result, the domains of epistemic logic that strive more explicitly for an un-
derstanding of actual human epistemic behavior have grown during the last
ten years (see, for example, Liu 2009; Baltag et al. 2013; Vela´zquez-Quesada
2014; Smets and Solaki 2018 and Articles 1-3 of this thesis).
The main criticism to using epistemic logic for understanding actual hu-
man behavior is that the models are highly idealized. As idealization is a topic
of interest to any methodological study of formal modeling, Article 5 refers
to the broad literature on merits and drawbacks of formal modeling in gen-
eral. In summary, by their simple and precise structure, formal models are
useful to clarify, explore and verify concepts at study (Klein 2015). Further-
more, the extent to which idealizations are problematic depends on various
factors such as the object of study, research context and intended aim.
In conclusion, Article 5 states that epistemic logic may be useful for un-
derstanding actual human behavior in three ways. One: When the frame-
work is sufficiently close to reality. For example, under the assumption that
a scientist’s behavior matches the reasoning abilities of an epistemic agent
more closely than the behavior of an old lady in a food market does, a logical
model of interacting scientists may be closer to reality than a logical model of
and old lady doing grocery shopping. Two: When we may learn about real-
world phenomena from the mismatch between idealized models and reality.
For example, epistemic logic may be useful in testing security enigmas: If
perfect logical reasoners cannot solve a security enigma, then an imperfect
human reasoner can neither. Finally: Article 5 argues that there is potentially
an even bigger role for epistemic logic in understanding actual human be-
havior if epistemic logicians continue to develop more realistic frameworks
in the future.
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Conclusion
5.1 Concluding remarks
This thesis explores informational social influence in two specific scenario’s:
scientists who acquire knowledge through observation and interaction, and
traders in a stock market who reason about asset values and other traders.
This chapter ends Part I by giving some final remarks and mentioning direc-
tions for future research.
As shown in the previous chapter, the content of this thesis is relatively
broad. Besides the different concepts under study, also the extent to which
the articles come to logical terms varies: While Article 4 (on protocols) is
highly technical and abstract, Article 5 (on the methodology of epistemic
logic) is not technical at all. Furthermore, Articles 1-3 do come to technical
terms, while they at the same time explain the conceptual implications of the
logical results.
Through its broad content, this thesis may be valuable to a broad pub-
lic. In particular, epistemic logic may now be used interdisciplinary to in-
vestigate the information driven aspects of social influence. Furthermore,
by providing a logical analysis of greater fools reasoning, the thesis extends
Aumann (1999)’s ambition for what he called “interactive epistemology”.
Moreover, the logical models of Articles 1-3 and higher-order reasoning
in trade markets may also be applied beyond their default contexts, i.e., sci-
ence and trade. With respect to Article 1: To combine private observations
with input from other agents does not uniquely apply to a scientific context—
people combine private evidence with higher-order information all the time.
The reason that Article 1 focusses on interaction in a scientific context is
to contribute to the ongoing debate in social epistemology of science. The
framework of Article 1 may additionally be perceived as relevant to gen-
eral epistemological debates about knowledge and justification in a multi-
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agent context, in spirit of e.g. Baltag, Renne and Smets (2012); Baltag et al.
(2014). With respect to Articles 2 and 3: Higher-order reasoning compara-
ble to that of greater fools traders—and likewise to contestants of Keynes’
beauty contest—may also be found in other social contexts such as politics
or online media.
5.2 Future research
The content of Articles 1-3 opens up for a whole body of future work: While
Article 1 introduces an epistemic logical framework to study informational
social influence in scientific communities, the actual analysis is future work.
While Articles 2 and 3 have formulated the greater fools reasoning in the
language of epistemic logic, there are many possible directions to further ex-
plore the informational dynamics of a greater fools bubble. The frameworks
of Articles 2 and 3 only include simple dynamics (public announcements),
but more complex actions (e.g. belief update and private communication)
may well be added. Thereby, for example, the effects of asymmetric infor-
mation inquiry may be modeled (Brunnermeier 2008). Furthermore, Articles
2 and 3 set the stage for the formalization and investigation of interaction
between different types of traders.
Epistemic logic and protocols In order to perform more structural analy-
sis of the informational social influence in scientific communities and trade
markets, the outcomes of Articles 1-3 and Article 4 of this thesis may be in-
tegrated. Articles 1-3 are designed to model a certain sequence of actions.
To structurally investigate such sequences of actions, protocols may provide
a suitable formalism. As argued before, dynamic epistemic logic has the
tools to model information change as a result of a particular action, but it
does not have the tools to formally control the choice of action. As protocols
may facilitate such control, future research on informational social influence
may utilize protocols for epistemic logic. In particular, Article 4’s concep-
tual comparison of intensional and extensional protocols may improve the
application of protocols for epistemic logic.
Epistemic logic and interdisciplinary research Furthermore, this thesis
may inspire more interdisciplinary research combining epistemic logic, so-
cial psychology and economics. More intense collaboration between sociolo-
gists, economists and philosophers of science may enhance the understand-
ing of informational social influence in science and in trade markets: On the
one hand, models of epistemic logic may provide a deeper and more robust
foundation if they are inspired by outcomes of other disciplines and criti-
cized by experts from other fields. On the other hand, research questions
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from other disciplines may benefit from the insights and the possibilities of
epistemic logic.
For example, the formal outcomes of this thesis may increase in value
when compared to psychological and sociological evidence about how peo-
ple actually reason and interact. Existing literature that empirically tests gen-
eral assumptions of logical agents (e.g. levels of higher-order reasoning, Ver-
brugge and Mol 2008, or limitations to mental resources, Smets and Solaki
2018) may be consulted. Additionally, new data on actual agent behavior and
belief formation in scientific context or trade markets may be collected. The
outcomes of empirical research taken together with the outcomes of theoret-
ical research in epistemic logic, economics, biology, philosophy, and other
relevant disciplines may then lead to a better understanding of the problems
of informational social influence.
Until that moment comes, I will use the unfortunate purchase of 5 over-
mature bananas at the food market as a good excuse to bake my own banana
cake!
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Abstract
Scientists collect evidence in order to confirm or falsify scientific theories.
Unfortunately, scientific evidence may sometimes be false or deceiving
and as a consequence lead individuals to believe in a false theory. By
interaction between scientists, such false beliefs may spread through the
entire community. There is currently a debate about the effect of various
network configurations on the epistemic reliability of scientific commu-
nities (e.g. Zollman 2010, and Rosenstock et al. 2017). To contribute
to this debate from a logical perspective, this paper introduces an epis-
temic logical framework of observation, interaction and belief revision in
scientific communities. The presented sound and complete system pro-
vides the formal tools for qualitative analysis of the social dynamics of
scientific inquiry. Furthermore, this paper includes detailed suggestions
for future applications of the framework.
Keywords Dynamic epistemic logic · Social interaction · Belief revision ·
Scientific inquiry · Observation · Network structure
1 Introduction
One of the main goals of scientists is to approach the truth [30]. In the pursuit
of approaching the truth, evidence is collected, interpreted and processed.
In the empirical sciences, such collection of evidence is done through obser-
vation.1 Ideally, a scientific observation is made with unproblematic and
transparent techniques so that it objectively tests the theory under study.
Unfortunately, it is extremely hard to perform an observation that satisfies
these requirements. Scientists have to deal with technical difficulties when
conducting an experiment and collecting data, while being also subject to
psychological mechanisms that may influence their work through e.g. con-
firmation bias or financial interests. As a result of these difficulties, scientists
1In the social sciences, collection of evidence may also be done through experience. We focus
here on the collection of evidence through observation.
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may overlook crucial factors of the phenomenon under study and come to
false conclusions.
Before and after performing an experiment in isolation (by a single re-
searcher or a single research team), scientists interact with their peers through
research articles, books and conferences. The mode of interaction (its fre-
quency, content, the people involved, etc.) may influence individual beliefs
and choices and thereby affect the behavior of the entire community. Some-
times, due to unfortunate circumstances, interaction may cause false beliefs
to spread through a scientific community. In the following examples, inter-
action led the respective scientific communities to collectively support the
wrong theory for a considerably long period of time: In 1915, Einstein and
de Haas published a paper on the Einstein-de Haas effect that was falsely be-
lieved to be true by the scientists in their field for the following ten years
(see [21] for a detailed description). In another example, Palmer published
a paper on the later-to-be-proven-false cause of the Peptic Ulcer Disease in
the 1950s [32]. During the following twenty years, the entire research com-
munity believed in his theory while nobody tried to challenge it (see [42] for
details).
There have been a number of formal analyses that study the interaction of
scientific communities. Such studies may help to prevent collective failures
such as the Einstein-de Haas case or the Palmer case in the future. For exam-
ple, Bala and Goyal [2] argue that all agents in a connected network who base
their belief on a combination of their private experimental findings and re-
sults obtained by their colleagues will necessarily converge to the same belief
in the long run. They claim that it depends on the distribution of prior beliefs,
the structure of networks and the informativeness of all actions whether or
not this belief is optimal. Furthermore, Zollman [41, 42, 43] compares the ef-
fects of different network structures on the truth-tracking ability of epistemic
communities. He claims that an epistemic community with less interaction
will outperform an epistemic community with more interaction. That is, be-
cause false beliefs spread more quickly in dense communication networks,
leading the entire community to collectively believe in the wrong theory. By
generalizing the assumptions made by Zollman, the authors of [37] argue
that Zollman’s hypothesis is not robust across changes in parameter values.
Argumentative agent-based models in [17] endorse this conclusion by show-
ing that, under their assumptions, the epistemic achievements of scientists in
fact improve as the connectedness of the network increases. Other theoret-
ical studies investigate the effects of interaction on non-scientific epistemic
groups. For example, simulations of the social phenomenon wisdom of the
crowds in [29] suggest that the average estimates of a group of communicat-
ing individuals is closer to the truth than the estimates of individuals alone,
which may imply that increased interaction has indeed a positive effect on
the epistemic reliability of a group, as opposed to Zollman’s claim. The ab-
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sence of consensus on the effect of different modes of interaction on the per-
formance of a scientific community shows a need for more investigation.
In the current paper, we introduce a dynamic epistemic logic for obser-
vation and interaction in scientific communities: Multi-agent Epistemic Obser-
vation Logic (MEOL). This logic is designed for modeling a group of agents
that make observations, share their results and revise their beliefs based on
their knowledge of the observations of others. The framework is suitable for
studying the belief formation in scientific communities with respect to spe-
cific parameters such as group size, network structure, distribution of prior
beliefs, and frequency of communication.
This paper relates to two lines of research. First, it relates to the current
debate on formal models of scientific inquiry mentioned above. These exist-
ing formal studies are typically based on probabilistic Bayesian models and
simulations of scientific endeavor. In contrast, our non-probabilistic logical
framework is of a qualitative nature and focuses mainly on the structural
properties that can enhance the epistemic reliability of scientific communi-
ties. Moreover, the existing Bayesian models do not explicitly model the
agents’ higher-order reasoning, whereas higher-order reasoning may play
an essential role in scientific inquiry, as argued in [3].2 Our logical models
do include higher-order reasoning and may therefore provide novel insights
on scientists’ behavior. In Section 4.1 we discuss the relation between our
models and the existing formal models of scientific inquiry in further detail.
Second, we build further on known techniques for agent-based reason-
ing and belief change in logic and apply these techniques to the context of
philosophy of science. Models of standard Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL,
see [7] or [19] for an overview) are used for the analysis of information up-
dates (e.g. [6, 12, 20]) and belief revision (e.g. [10, 11]) in social networks
(e.g. [3, 18]). Instead of standard belief revision, agents in MEOL update
their beliefs by counting and comparing observational evidence of a selected
group of agents. As such, our belief update has similarities with the thresh-
old models of [4]. Furthermore, our system relates to the epistemic logics
that have been developed to account for evidence-based reasoning of indi-
vidual agents (for example [8, 14, 36]). In contrast to these evidence-based
logical systems, our frameworks are more suitable for scientific reasoning as
we model the dynamics of multiple agents as well as actions for adding and
comparing evidence. Rather than the notions of ‘common knowledge’ and
‘group knowledge’ as defined in classical multi-agent epistemic logic,3 the
2For example, suppose some agent a learns that some other agent b believes that some medicine
A is effective, while agent a knows that agent b herself has observed that medicine A is not
effective. Agent a might then reason about agent b’s knowledge of the observations of agent
b’s peers, which may have been reason for agent b to believe that A is in fact effective. See
Section 3.4 for an illustration of this situation in our framework.
3For results in this direction we refer to [6, 24].
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focal point of this paper is individual attitudes based on observations of the
group.
Sections 2 and 3 introduce the Multi-agent Epistemic Observation Logic,
providing the formal tools for informative analysis of the social dynamics of
scientific inquiry. Section 4 gives some hints on possible applications of the
framework and discusses the relation between our formal framework and
the existing Bayesian frameworks of social scientific inquiry. The last section
summarizes and gives suggestions for extensions of the framework.
2 Observation and plausibility
We will build MEOL in two steps: the static language, plausibility models,
semantics and a sound and complete proof system are presented in this sec-
tion. Dynamic operators and action models will be introduced in Section 3 to
allow for dynamic updates of the epistemic models. As standard in DEL, the
epistemic models of our logic are local representations of the state of affairs
at a given time.
The static part of the logic, MEOLs, may be used to reason about the ob-
servations an agent i has made (denoted byOi), the structure of her scientific
network (denoted N(i)), her knowledge (i and Ki) and her beliefs (Bi).
2.1 Syntax
Definition 1. (Language MEOLs) Given a set Φ of atomic propositions, a
finite set of agents A and a limit L ∈ N+, the language L s = (Ψ,F s) is
defined for ψ ∈ Ψ and ϕ ∈ F s:
ψ ::= p | ¬ψ
ϕ ::= > | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Oi(oψ, n) | Nij | iϕ | Kiϕ
with p ∈ Φ, i, j ∈ A and 0 < n ≤ L+ 1
The formulas >, p ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ϕ are classic logical formulas. The logical
operators ∨ and→ are defined as standard in propositional logic.
The expression Oi(oψ, n) says that “agent i has observed ψ at least n
times”.4 Observations are restricted to ψ ∈ Ψ for ψ an atomic proposition
p or its negation ¬p.5 As such, the framework is suitable for contexts where
researchers test single, unrelated theories p or q and not compounded the-
ories such as p ∧ q nor epistemic sentences such as Kip. The limit L is a
4In the ensuing, the construct oψ is interpreted as a single observation. Alternatively, oψ may
be interpreted as a conclusion on a collection of observations.
5Note that our formal constructs for observations are structurally simpler than the evidence
terms in existing evidence logics and justification logics, cf. [1, 8].
· 54 ·
The Logic of Observation and Belief Revision in Scientific Communities 5
non-zero natural number that is imposed for technical reasons.6 As n > 0,
the expression Oi(op, 0) that intuitively says “agent i has not observed p”
cannot be constructed. However, as will be shown in Sections 2.2 and 2.4,
the formula ¬Oi(op, 1) may be used to express exactly that.
Furthermore, Nij denotes that j is a neighbor of i in the scientific net-
work. As we will see further on in the dynamic setting, agents will revise
their beliefs by counting and comparing the observations of their neighbors.
The two modal operators iϕ and Kiϕ express respectively “agent i de-
feasibly knows ϕ” and “agent i infallibly knows ϕ”.7 Axiomatic interpreta-
tions of these two types of knowledge can be found in Section 2.4.
Following the ideas in [8] and [10], tracing back to [38], we introduce the
following abbreviation for “agent i believes ϕ”:8
Biϕ := ¬i¬iϕ
2.2 Semantics
To study the effects of different network structures on the development of
beliefs in scientific communities, we define a neighborhood mapping.9
Definition 2. (Neighborhood) The neighborhood of an agent is defined as the
mapping N : A → P(A) such that N is reflexive and symmetric: for all
i, j ∈ A, it holds that i ∈ N(i) and j ∈ N(i) ↔ i ∈ N(j). We generally write
Nij for j ∈ N(i).
We introduce plausibility models to study the informational dynamics of
communities. The construction of a plausibility model is common within
the literature on DEL. We refer to [10] for more background information.
Definition 3. (Observational constructs) Let O := {oψ | ψ ∈ Ψ} be the set of
all observational constructs based on Φ.
6With a finite limit, the disjunction
∨
n≤LOi(op, n) (appearing in the action model for revising
beliefs, Definition 16) is a finite formula. Furthermore, by imposing a limit on n, the action
model for observing (Def. 12) will necessarily be finite. To maintain flexibility, the exact value
of L is open.
7While Ki expresses a much stronger notion of knowledge, satisfying the S5 properties, i is
much weaker and satisfies the S4 properties. We refer the reader to [10] for more details about
the differences and use of these epistemic attitudes.
8Note that Stalnaker in [38] defined a notion of belief based on knowledge; In particular he
interprets belief as the ‘epistemic possibility of knowledge’. Our definition of belief in this
paper can be interpreted in exactly the same spirit.
9The restriction that N be reflexive and symmetric is chosen in accordance to existing studies
on the relation between epistemic reliability and network structure (e.g. [42]). Therefore, the
logic presented in this paper only captures the class of models with reflexive and symmetric
neighborhood mappings N . When investigating different network restrictions, Def. 2 may be
changed accordingly.
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Definition 4. (Plausibility model for MEOL) Given a set of atomic sentences
Φ, a non-empty set of agentsA, a limit L ∈ N+ and a neighborhood mapping
N , a plausibility modelM = (W,V, Oi,≤i,∼i)i∈A is a structure consisting of
a non-empty set of possible worldsW , valuation maps for atomic propositions
V : W → P(Φ) and observations Oi : W → P(〈O,mL〉) and binary relations
for relative plausibility≤i: A → P(W×W ) and epistemically indistinguishability
∼i: A → P(W ×W) satisfying the following conditions for all i ∈ A:
1. ≤i is a preorder (i.e., reflexive and transitive)
2. ∼i is an equivalence relation (i.e., reflexive, symmetric and transitive)
3. Indefeasibility: w ≤i v → w ∼i v
4. Local Connectedness: w ∼i v → (w ≤i v ∨ v ≤i w)
5. Observation Introspection: w ∼i v → (Oi(w) = Oi(v))
Definition 5. (Pointed model) A pointed model is a pair (M, w) consisting of
a modelM and a designated world w ∈ W called the ‘actual world’.
Definition 6. (Standard model) Let the strict plausibility relation ‘w <i v’ be
short for ‘w ≤i v and notw ≥i v’. A plausibility modelM = (W,V, Oi,≤i,∼i
)i∈A is standard if each strict plausibility relation <i is ∼i-locally conversed
well-founded.10
Property 1. (Best world assumption) By ∼i-locally conversed
well-foundedness of <i and ∼i-local connectedness of ≤i the following
holds: For any standard model M, for all i ∈ A and all w ∈ W the set
max≤i{w′ : w ∼i w′} is non-empty. That is, there exists a unique set of i’s
most plausible worlds over every set of ∼i-connected worlds.
A plausibility model is a graph with possible worlds as nodes, propositional
truths assigned to these worlds, and two types of relations as edges. The
expression w ≤i v expresses that v is at least as plausible as w according to
agent i; and w ∼i v expresses that agent i cannot distinguish between w or
v, i.e., when considering w possible she also considers v possible, and vice
versa.
Observation sets are unusual to models of standard DEL. However, ob-
servation sets of MEOL are similar (but not identical) to the evidence sets of
[8]. The observation set Oi(w) is a positive multiset 〈O,m+〉 for O ⊆ O de-
noting the amount of observations agent i has made of every observational
construct oψ ∈ O with respect to world w.11 In a multiset, as opposed to a
regular set, it holds that {op, op, oq} 6= {op, oq}. We use multisets instead of
10That<i is∼i-locally conversed well-founded means that given anyw ∈ W , every non-empty
subset of {v ∈ W | w ∼i v} has a <i-maximal element v∗ such that there is no v′ ∈ {v ∈ W |
w ∼i v} such that v∗ < v′.
11To be more explicit: the valuation Oi maps a world w ∈ W to an element of P(〈O,mL〉),
where mL is a special multiplicity function that maps every oψ ∈ O to the limit L. See
Appendix A for details on multisets.
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regular sets to be able to count the number of observations made. An obser-
vation can fail or be misleading, hence it might often occur that op as well as
o¬p occur in a single observation set.
The fact that the limit L and the neighborhood mapping N are given in
the model captures that the limit and the network structure are commonly
known among all agents.
Definition 7. (Truth for MEOLs) The satisfaction relation (M, w)  ϕ, writing
w  ϕ whenM is fixed, is defined as follows:
w  > always
w  p iff p ∈ V(w)
w  ¬ϕ iff w 6 ϕ
w  ϕ ∧ γ iff w  ϕ and w  γ
w  Oi(oψ, n) iff (oψ, n) ⊆ Oi(w)
w  Nij iff Nij
w  iϕ iff v  ϕ for all v ≥i w
w  Kiϕ iff v  ϕ for all v ∼i w
The expression (oψ, n) ⊆ Oi reads “there are at least n occurences of oψ in
Oi”.
Property 2. (Multisets) By construction of multisets, (oψ, n) ⊆ Oi implies
that (oψ, n′) ⊆ Oi for all 0 < n′ ≤ n. Furthermore, (oψ, n) 6⊆ Oi implies
(oψ, n
′) 6⊆ Oi for all n′ ≥ n.
It follows from Property 2 that (oψ, 1) 6⊆ Oi expresses that there are no occur-
rences of oψ in Oi.
Definition 8. (Belief) In a standard modelM, ‘belief’ is interpreted as ‘truth
in the most plausible worlds’:
(M, w) |= Biϕ iff (M, w′) |= ϕ for all w′ ∈ max≤i{w′ ∈W | w ∼i w′}
2.3 Example
Consider the plausibility model (M1, w1) in Fig. 1. Let A = {a, b, c, d} and
the network structure be N(a) = {a, d}, N(b) = {b, c, d}, N(c) = {b, c, d} and
N(d) = A. The set of atomic sentences and the limit are irrelevant to this
example and therefore left unspecified. In (M1, w1), p is true in the actual
world labeled w1. An arrow from w to v labelled i denotes that w ≤i v, i.e.,
agent i believes v to be more plausible than w. Because all arrows go both
directions, no agent in the model has a preference over the worlds she deems
possible. In the current and all following plausibility models, reflexive and
transitive arrows for relative plausibility are omitted, as well as arrows for
epistemic indistinguishability; the latter because they can be derived from
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the arrows for relative plausibility. The arrow labelled A from w1 to w2 im-
plies that nobody in A knows whether p or ¬p is true. The arrows labeled a
from w1 to w3 and from w2 to w4 imply that agent a does not know whether
agent d has observed ¬p or not, while all other agents do know that agent d
has actually observed nothing. Note that the observation sets of the agents
are unrelated to the truths of p or ¬p and that agents can have conflicting
observations (see agent c’s observation set). A higher-order expression such
as “agent b knows that agent a does not know that agent d has observed
nothing” can be verified by noting that in all worlds that agent b considers
possible in the actual world (i.e., w1 and w2) it is the case that a does not
know whether Od = ∅ or Od = {o¬p}.
p
Od = ∅
w1
¬p
Od = ∅
w2
p
Od = {o¬p}
w3
¬p
Od = {o¬p}
w4
For all w ∈ W , letOa = {op},
Ob = {o¬p} andOc = {op, op, o¬p}
A
A
a a
Figure 1: Plausibility model (M1, w1).
2.4 Proof system
Definition 9. (Theory MEOLs) Given a set of atomic sentences Φ, a non-
empty set of agents A, a limit L ∈ N+ and a neighborhood mapping N ,
define the theory for MEOLs:
AXIOM SCHEMES
Axioms for Classical Propositional Logic
S4 axioms defeasible knowledge: ` i(ϕ→ γ)→ (iϕ→ iγ)
` iϕ→ ϕ
` iϕ→ iiϕ
S5 axioms infallible knowledge: ` Ki(ϕ→ γ)→ (Kiϕ→ Kiγ)
` Kiϕ→ ϕ
` Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ
` ¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ
Indefeasibility: ` Kiϕ→ iϕ
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Local Connectedness: ` (Ki(ϕ ∨iγ) ∧Ki(γ ∨iϕ))
` → (Kiϕ ∨Kiγ)
Observation Introspection: ` Oi(oψ, n)→ KiOi(oψ, n)
Multisets: ` Oi(oψ, n)→
∧
0<n′≤n
Oi(oψ, n
′)
` ∧ ¬Oi(oψ, n)→
∧
n<n′≤L
¬Oi(oψ, n′)
Neighborhood: ` Nij iff Nij
RULES
ϕ→ γ ϕ
γ (MP )
ϕ
iϕ
(iN)
ϕ
Kiϕ
(KiN)
Theorem 1 (Soundness of MEOLs). MEOLs is sound: for all ϕ ∈ F s and all
Φ ⊆ F s it holds that
if Φ ` ϕ then Φ |= ϕ
Proof. We prove soundness by induction on the length k of derivation. De-
tails can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 2 (Completeness ofMEOLs). The logicMEOLs is strongly complete.
That is, for all ϕ ∈ F s and Φ ⊆ F s it holds that
if Φ |= ϕ then Φ ` ϕ.
Proof. Completeness is proven by way of a canonical model construction as
standard (see e.g. [16]). Details can be found in Appendix B.
3 Multi-agent Epistemic Observation Logic
When studying the truth-tracking abilities of scientific communities, we are
interested in the scientific knowledge (here, defeasible knowledge) that a
community obtains as a result of combining observational evidence and ev-
idence obtained through communication. In this section, three kinds of ac-
tions will be introduced to simulate the dynamics in a scientific group: i)
scientists make observations in a private setting; ii) scientists report their ob-
servations to other scientists; and iii) scientists upgrade their beliefs based
on the observations of a selected group in their network. The effect of these
actions on a given plausibility model are represented following the standard
tools and techniques of DEL, using action models and update operations de-
fined below (see [5, 6, 10] for details).
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3.1 Syntax
Definition 10. (Language MEOL) L is the extension of the static language
L s (see Def. 4) obtained by adding modal operators [α, σ] to the formulas
in F s for epistemic action models α ∈ {oψ+i, Oi(oψ, n)!i,¬Oi(oψ, 1)!i, ψ ⇑i}
for every ψ ∈ Ψ and i ∈ A.
3.2 Action models
Following the terminology in [10], action models are used to add factual,
epistemic and doxastic changes to static plausibility models. For simplicity,
the binary relation≤i for plausibility of action points cf. [10] is left out, but it
can be added when needed. The factual changes are restricted to changes in
the observation sets and captured by the postcondition of action model oψ+i
(Def. 12) cf. [20].
Definition 11. (Action model) Given a set of agents A, an action model is a
structure α = (Σ,∼i, pre, post)i∈A consisting of a set of action points σ ∈ Σ,
a binary relation ∼i: A → P(Σ × Σ) representing the agents’ knowledge
over action points, pre : Σ → F and post : Σ → F assigning respectively
preconditions and postconditions to each action point.
The result of executing a pointed action model on a standard plausibility
model is given in Def. 16. First, the four different action models are defined,
assuming a set of agentsA, a set of atomic propositions Φ and a limit L ∈ N+.
3.2.1 Observation
Definition 12. (Action model oψ+i) Given i ∈ A and ψ ∈ Ψ, define the action
model oψ+i = (Σ,∼i, pre, post, σ):
Σ := {σk | 0 < k ≤ L} ∪ {>}
∼i := {(σ, σ) | σ ∈ Σ}
∼j 6=i := Σ× Σ
preσ1 := ¬Oi(oψ, 1)
preσk≥2 := Oi(oψ, k − 1) ∧ ¬Oi(oψ, k)
postσk := Oi(oψ, k) ∧ ¬Oi(oψ, k + 1)
pre> = post> := >
Let some σ ∈ Σ \ {>} denote the actual action point.
In the action model for oψ+i, an agent privately observes ψ. Recall that ob-
serving ψ does not entail that ψ is in fact true, because observations can be
deceiving. Action points σk denote that ψ is observed for the kth time. The
actual action point σ determines the actual k, but only agent i herself knows
which k this is. The action point> reflects the action where nothing happens,
cf. [10]. As all agents j 6= i (‘the outsiders’) cannot distinguish between any
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σk and >, they do not know whether agent i actually observed ψ or not. By
performing product update (see Def. 16) on the original plausibility model,
the outsiders will only consider those observation sets of agent i possible
in the updated model that match their knowledge of the observation set of
agent i in the original model. Suppose for example that agent b knows that
agent a has not made any observations of p. Then, after action op+a, agent
b will consider it possible that still ¬Oa(op, 1) or that Oa(op, 1), but not that
Oa(op, 2). See Fig. 2 for an illustration. Here, dashed lines represent inde-
feasible knowledge and as ∼i of op+i (see Def. 12) is symmetric for every
i ∈ A, the lines are undirectional. Furthermore, in Fig. 2 and 3, reflexive and
transitive arrows are omitted and no actual action points are specified.
pre : ¬Oi(op, 1)
post : Oi(op, 1) ∧ ¬Oi(op, 2)
σ1
pre : Oi(op, 1) ∧ ¬Oi(op, 2)
post : Oi(op, 2) ∧ ¬Oi(op, 3)
σ2
pre : >
post : >
>
...
Let all dashed lines be labeledA \ {i}
Figure 2: Action model op+i for some agent i ∈ A. The model extends for all k ≤ L
in the same way as the two depicted action points σ1 and σ2.
3.2.2 Communication
We use standard definition for public announcements ϕ! cf. [22] with index
i. Instead of defining public announcements of any formula, we restrict our-
selves to the announcements of the form Oi(oψ, n)!i and ¬Oi(oψ, 1)!i defined
below.
Definition 13. (Action modelOi(oψ, n)!i) Given i ∈ A, ψ ∈ Ψ, and o < n ≤ L,
define the pointed action model Oi(oψ, n)!i = (Σ,∼i, pre, post, σn):
Σ := {σk | 0 < k ≤ L}
∼j∈A := {(σk, σk) | σk ∈ Σ}
preσk := Oi(oψ, k)!i ∧ ¬Oi(oψ, k + 1)!i
postσ := >
Let σn ∈ Σ denote the actual action point.
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Definition 14. (Action model ¬Oi(oψ, 1)!i) Given i ∈ A and ψ ∈ Ψ, define
the pointed action model ¬Oi(oψ, 1)!i = (Σ,∼i, pre, post, σ):
Σ := {σ}
∼j∈A := {(σ, σ)}
preσ := ¬Oi(oψ, 1)
postσ := >
Let the unique σ ∈ Σ denote the actual action point.
The action model Oi(oψ, n)!i captures that agent i publicly announces that
she has made exactly k observations of ψ. Where the expression Oi(oψ, k)
means that i has made at least k observations of ψ, the precondition of σk
assures that the exact amount of i’s observations of ψ is announced. In con-
trast to an observation, an announcement is assumed to be truthful. The
action Oi(oψ, n)!i is a public action, which means that everybody knows
what is communicated. The result of privately conducted experiments are
announced publicly to avoid unnecessary explosion of the models.
The action model ¬Oi(oψ, 1)!i captures that agent i publicly announces
that she has not made any observations of ψ. Figure 3 depicts the pointed
action models Oi(oψ, n)!i and ¬Oi(oψ, 1)!i.
pre : Oi(oψ, 1) ∧ ¬Oi(oψ, 2)
post : >
σ1
pre : Oi(oψ, 2) ∧ ¬Oi(oψ, 3)
post : >
σ2
...
pre : ¬Oi(oψ, 1)
post : >
σ
Figure 3: Action models Oi(oψ, n)!i and ¬Oi(oψ, 1)!i. The action model for
Oi(oψ, n)!i extends for all k ≤ L.
3.2.3 Belief upgrade
Agents upgrade their belief according to their knowledge of observations
made by members of a selected group. Let
oψ,i > oψ′,i :=
∨
o<m≤L
Oi(oψ,m) ∧ ¬Oi(oψ′ ,m)
In words this expression captures “agent i has observed ψ more often than
ψ′”.
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Definition 15. (Action model ψ ⇑i) Given i ∈ A, ψ ∈ Ψ, N and a threshold
θ ∈ [ 12 , 1], define the pointed action model ψ ⇑i= (Σ,∼i, pre, post, σ):
Σ := {σ}
∼j∈A := {(σ, σ) | σ ∈ Σ}
preσ :=
∨
G⊆N(i)
( | G |
| N(i) | > θ ∧
∧
j∈G
Ki (oψ,j > o¬ψ,j)
)
postσ := >
The action model ψ ⇑i captures that agent i upgrades her beliefs with ψ by
upgrading her plausibility order ≤i such that all worlds satisfying ψ become
more plausible than all other worlds, cf. lexiographic update [10]. See Def.
16 for details on this upgrade. The threshold θ determines under what con-
dition agents change their beliefs, comparable to the threshold models of e.g.
[4].
The precondition captures that agent i performs an upgrade of oψ only
if she infallibly knows that strictly more than θ of her neighbors (possibly
including herself, possibly not) have observed oψ more often than o¬ψ .12 As
the action model for ψ ⇑i consists of exactly one action point, the structure is
similar to that of ¬Oi(op, 1)!i in Fig. 3, so an illustration is omitted.13
Recall that the network structure is known among all agents, but the con-
tent of agent i’s observation set is not necessarily known by all agents. As the
belief upgrade is a public action,14 agents can derive some knowledge about
the observation sets of others by observing how their neighbors in the net-
work upgrade. Although the upgrade action only directly models first-order
reasoning by considering only agent i’s direct neighbors, the knowledge of
the agents in our models does automatically include such higher-order in-
ferences. It are exactly these higher-order dynamics that are captured by a
logical model and not by a Bayesian model. See Footnote 2 and Section 3.4
for an illustration.
3.3 Product update
To model the dynamics of scientific inquiry, the previously defined pointed
action models must be executed on pointed plausibility models defined in
12In alterations of the framework, one could argue for a weaker condition for upgrading that is
based on defeasible knowledge.
13One could additionally propose a contraction action cf. [28] for the case where agent i knows
that exactly θ of agent i’s neighbors have observed p more often than ¬p and exactly 1− θ of
agent i’s neighbors have observed ¬p more often than p. A contraction action would make
the p-worlds and ¬p-worlds equi-plausible. The current precondition says that in this case,
the agent does not upgrade her beliefs.
14In a more complex framework, one could define belief upgrade as a private action. As this is
beyond the scope of this paper, we opt for the simpler public version.
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Def. 4. This is done through product update as standard in DEL.
Definition 16. (Product Update) Let a pointed plausibility model (M, w)
and a pointed action model (α, σ) be given. The result of the product update
⊗ is the updated pointed plausibility model (M, w)⊗(α, σ)=(Wα,Vα, Oαi ,≤αi ,
∼αi , (w, σ)) such that:
Wα :={(w, σ) | w |= preσ}
Vα(w, σ) :={p ∈ Φ | p ∈ V(w)}
Oαi (w, σ) :={(oψ, n) |w |= Oi(oψ, n)}∪{(oψ, n) |w |= postσ→Oi(oψ, n)}
≤αi :={(w, σ), (w′, σ′) | w ≤i w′ and σ ∼i σ′} for α 6= ψ ⇑i
≤αi :={((w, σ), (v, σ)) | (w 6|= ψ and v |= ψ and w ∼i v) or
(w 6|= ψ and w ≤i v) or (v |= ψ and w ≤i v)} for α = ψ ⇑i
∼αi :={(w, σ), (w′, σ′) | w ∼i w′ and σ ∼i σ′}
and (w, σ) is the new actual world. IfWα is empty or if for the actual world
w it holds that w 6|= preσ , then (M, w)⊗ (α, σ) is undefined.
The new worlds in Wα are updated versions of those worlds that satisfy
the precondition of each σ ∈ Σ. The atomic facts that hold at w are carried
on to the new worlds (w, σ) and observation sets are updated according to
the postconditions of σ. The relation ≤αi is described according to the in-
terpretation of ψ ⇑i and the relation ∼αi captures the evolution of infallible
knowledge.
Definition 17. (Truth for MEOL) Truth for formulas ϕ ∈ F s are as defined
for MEOLs in Def. 7. Furthermore,
M, w |= [α, σ]ϕ iffM, w |= preσ impliesM⊗ α, (w, σ) |= ϕ
withM⊗ α defined as in Def. 16.
3.4 Example
Recall model (M1, w1) in Fig. 1 on p. 8. We will now use this model as the
initial model on which some action models will be executed. Firstly, suppose
that agent d observes p. The result of updating (M1, w1) with (op+d, σ1)
is model (M2, w′1) depicted in Fig. 4. Recall that op+d is a private action.
That is, all agents i 6= d do not know whether d added observation op to her
observation set or not. Hence, in Fig. 4, worlds w′1-w′4 depict the worlds as if
agent d has added op to Od and worlds w′5-w′8 depict the worlds as if nothing
has happened.
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p
Od = {op}
w′1
¬p
Od = {op}
w′2
p
Od = {op, o¬p}
w′3
¬p
Od = {op, o¬p}
w′4
p
Od = ∅
w′5
¬p
Od = ∅
w′6
p
Od = {o¬p}
w′7
¬p
Od = {o¬p}
w′8
For all w ∈ W , letOa = {op},
Ob = {o¬p} andOc = {op, op, o¬p}
A
A
A
A
a, b, c
a, b, c
a, b, c
a, b, c
a a
a a
Figure 4: Plausibility model (M2, w′1).
Secondly, suppose agent d publicly announces that she has in fact ob-
served p exactly once. The result of (M2, w′1) ⊗ (Od(op, 1)!d, σ1) is (M3, w′′1 )
in Fig. 5 where everybody learned that op ∈ Od, while agent a still does not
know whether agent d has observed ¬p or not.
p
Od = {op}
w′′1
¬p
Od = {op}
w′′2
p
Od = {op, o¬p}
w′′3
¬p
Od = {op, o¬p}
w′′4
For all w ∈ W , letOa = {op},
Ob = {o¬p} andOc = {op, op, o¬p}
A
A
a a
Figure 5: Plausibility model (M3, w′′1 ).
Finally, suppose agent b upgrades her belief: p ⇑b. As a result, agent
b now believes that p. Additionally, agent a can infer some higher-order
knowledge from this action. Recall that the network structure is assumed
to be common knowledge. Then, by preconditions of the action model and
the fact that belief upgrade is a public action, agent a learned from this up-
grade that op,d > o¬p,d and thus that Od = {op}. See Fig. 6 for the resulting
plausibility model (M4, w′′′1 ).
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p
Od = {op}
w′′′1
¬p
Od = {op}
w′′′2
For all w ∈ W , letOa = {op},
Ob = {o¬p} andOc = {op, op, o¬p}
a, c, d
b
Figure 6: Plausibility model (M4, w′′′1 ) where agent b believes that p and there is
common knowledge of observation sets.
3.5 Proof system
Definition 18. (Theory MEOL) Given a set of atomic sentences Φ, a non-
empty set of agents A, a limit L ∈ N+ and a neighborhood mapping N ,
define the theory for MEOL:
Axioms and rules of MEOLs
REDUCTION AXIOMS
Persistence of facts: [α, σ]p↔ (preσ → p)
Functionality: [α, σ]¬ϕ↔ (preσ → ¬[α, σ]ϕ)
Conjunction Distributivity: [α, σ](ϕ ∧ γ)↔ ([α, σ]ϕ ∧ [α, σ]γ)
Observation Dynamics: [α, σ]Oi(oψ, n)↔(preσ→(postσ→Oi(oψ, n)))
Neighborhood dynamics: [α, σ]Nij ↔ (preσ → Nij)
Knowledge Dynamics I: [α, σ]iϕ↔(preσ→i[α, σ]ϕ) for α 6= ψ⇑i
Knowledge Dynamics II: [α, σ]iϕ↔ (preσ → (i(oψ → [α, σ]ϕ)∧
¬oψ → (i[α, σ]ϕ ∧Ki(oψ → [α, σ]ϕ))))
for α = ψ ⇑i
Knowledge Dynamics III: [α, σ]Kiϕ↔ (preσ → Ki[α, σ]ϕ)
Theorem 3 (Soundness and completeness of MEOL). For all ϕ ∈ F and Φ ⊆
F it holds that:
Φ |= ϕ iff Φ ` ϕ
Proof. We prove soundness and completeness by showing that the reduction
axioms hold in all models of MEOL. By Theorem 1 and 2 it follows that MEOL
is also sound and complete. Details can be found in Appendix B.
4 Examining scientific inquiry
4.1 Relation to existing formal studies
As briefly discussed in the introduction, previous formal studies aimed at
determining how to organize the interaction of scientists during a research
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project in order to enhance their truth-tracking abilities. In this subsection,
we will discuss these findings in more detail and relate them to the logical
framework presented in this paper.
Various studies argue that cognitive diversity15 may help communities
choose the true theory in the long run as it protects the group against hasty
adaptations of a single belief, e.g. [25, 33, 40]. In [42], Zollman argues that
there are two ways to achieve cognitive diversity of labor by means of net-
work management: i) by limiting the communication between agents, or ii)
by incorporating new scientists with strong prior beliefs. As a consequence,
it will take longer for a single belief to spread across the network. In [41],
Zollman shows that there is a trade-off between the speed at which beliefs
spread in a community and the truth-tracking ability of the community. This
implies that, when choosing the ideal network configurations, one should
realize whether a ‘quick but less truthful’ or a ‘reliable but time consuming’
research method is preferred in the concerning context.
Taking cognitive diversity into account, it should be noted that scientists
who are not at all receptive for new ideas may also lead to undesired sit-
uations, as illustrated by the following example. In 1912, Wegener intro-
duced the idea that all continents were once joined as one, before breaking
up and drifting to their current positions on the Earth’s surface [39]. After
Wegener’s publication on the continental drift theory, his colleagues rejected
the hypothesis and ignored the evidence. Only 50 years later in the 1960s and
1970s, due to new evidence that supported the theory, the belief in the drift
theory slowly started to spread. If the community had been more receptive
and the theory was not directly rejected by the majority, new supporting ev-
idence could have maybe been found sooner.16 Zollman solves this potential
problem by aiming for transient diversity [42]. He explains: when a group has
few network connections as well as high priors, then cognitive diversity is
maintained indefinitely and agents fail to converge to the truth.
Some recent formal studies have suggested that Zollman’s conclusions
are not robust under a larger parameter space, creating a debate on the ef-
fect of network configurations on epistemic reliability (see e.g. [37, 17]). The
introduction of Multi-agent Epistemic Observation Logic may contribute to
this debate because of the different nature of the logical framework MEOL.
That is, models of MEOL may be used for qualitative analysis of the impact of
the network structure and priors on the performance of scientific communi-
ties, supplementing existing quantitative conclusions, and potentially even
bridging seemingly contradictions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
15Cognitive diversity of a scientific community entails that as many different possible theories
are investigated by at least one individual.
16There are many theories that try to account for this delay, such as [31]. More generally, Kuhn’s
paradigm shift accounts for such collective failures as well [27].
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execute such analysis.17
A more quantitative analysis of scientific inquiry in social settings could
also be made, by studying the outcomes of simulations on models of MEOL.
This would however require formalized protocols, such that simulations can
be run on different initial plausibility models. See the subsection below for
more details on protocols. As such, results of simulations based on models of
MEOL may be compared to those of Bayesian models in e.g. [41, 42, 37, 17].
4.2 Suggestion for future analysis
To facilitate analysis on scientific inquiry in social settings, the framework of
MEOL includes a number of parameters that have been previously analyzed
in e.g. [2, 41, 42] as well as some parameters that are standard to logical
models of knowledge and belief: most importantly, the size of the group,
network structure, distribution of initial beliefs and knowledge, and recep-
tivity towards evidence from others. In this subsection we suggest how to
study the relation between the parameters and the epistemic performances
of a scientific community.
To construct a plausibility model, the modeler should specify the set of
atomic sentences Φ, the set of agents A and it’s network structure N .18 Un-
17To obtain a close comparison between models of MEOL and Zollman’s models, it must be
noted that Zollman’s models are in particular suitable for studying variations of a particular
informational dilemma, often referred to as a bandit problem. In such a scenario, agents are
faced with a dilemma to gain information by performing a combination of different actions or
to choose the one action with the highest expected payoff (for detailed explanation, see [41]).
If an agent facing a bandit problem chooses to optimize her payoffs, she will not gain informa-
tion about the suboptimal actions. As a consequence, her knowledge development will rely on
the choices and communication of other agents. Translating this scenario into our models in a
similar way as Zollman did may be done as follows. Imagine an agent a that wants to know
which of two medicines is more successful. Let p1 be the expression that some medicine A is
successful with a 70 percent chance (which is in fact true); q1 express that medicine B is suc-
cessful with a 60 percent chance; and q2 that medicineB is successful with a 80 percent chance
(which is in fact also true). Suppose agent a believes p1 and q1. Note that this implies that
agent a believes that medicine A is more successful than medicine B. A bandit problem will
be formed by restricting the agents’ possible observations by protocols or by strengthening
the precondition of the action model oψ+i (see Section 4.2 for details protocols) to only allow
for observations involving medicine A when an agent believes medicine A to be superior to
medicine B. That is, because in the sketched scenario, agent a can then only find out that q2
is true if other scientists observe q2 and communicate this with her. Note that this scenario
involves probabilistic propositions that are semantically related (e.g., q1 ∧ q2 → ⊥). Such
interrelations may be formalized in standard DEL, but it may be more clear to use variations
of DEL that do include probabilities, such as presented in [9, 13, 26]. As Zollman’s analyses
are based on probabilistic propositions, a close comparison to his conclusion is quite unnatu-
ral to non-probabilistic logical frameworks. Rather, we encourage to use our logic for a more
general comparison on the structural properties of belief formation in scientific communities.
18And for technical reasons, the modeler should also specify a limit L. The limit should be high
enough to let the agents in the model make as least as many observations as needed for the
case under study.
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less the logic is used to model a concrete example where the theory under
study is known, the set of atomic sentences may be kept abstract. That is, in-
stead of referring to a specific theory, the atomic propositions p, q, etc. can be
left unspecified. The size and connections of the network, that also have to
be specified by the modeler, are of greater importance to analyses of scientific
inquiry. They may be used to compare the effect of different network struc-
tures on the truth-tracking abilities of the community. As explained above,
the existing literature suggests that the network structure is a significant pa-
rameter for predicting a community’s scientific achievements.
Moreover, the modeler must specify what the initial knowledge, beliefs
and observation sets of the agents in the model are. These may be called
the agents’ priors with respect to the dynamics to be modeled. As explained
above, the literature also suggests that these parameters may influence the
belief formation of a scientific communication.
Furthermore, to construct the action model ψ ⇑i, the threshold θ should
be specified. This threshold determines how quickly an agent is persuaded
to adopt the belief of her peers (see Def. 16). A natural threshold may be 12 ,
but the agents can also be made less receptive to the evidence of their peers
with a higher threshold.
Moreover, given an initial model, the modeler must decide in what order
the action models will be executed. That is, the modeler must specify which
and when atomic propositions are observed, how often agents communicate
and how often they revise their beliefs. This may be specified informally
by a natural language protocol, or formally by use of extensional (as e.g. in
[15]) or intensional protocols (as e.g. in [35]). For example, the modeler may
specify the frequency and content of communication or the rate at which
agents observe the truth. By using protocols, different sequences of actions
may be structurally compared such that new insights on belief formation
in scientific communities may be obtained. Exploring and internalizing the
details of such protocols is future work.
5 Summary and extensions
Examples from history of science, such as delayed acceptance of the conti-
nental drift theory, wrong choices in Peptic Ulcer Disease research and false
belief in the Einstein-de Haas effect, show that scientific communities some-
times collectively fail to track the truth. As scientists use private experiments
as well as information from their peers to form their beliefs, it is useful to
study social interaction and belief revision in scientific settings. In this paper
we introduced a logic for observation and interaction to facilitate such anal-
yses. A logical analysis gives the ability to include higher-order beliefs and
stress different parameters than those from Bayesian studies, supplementing
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the already existing studies on social networks in science. Conducting such
qualitative analysis and structurally comparing conclusions based on these
analyses to those of existing literature is future work.
To conclude, we will discuss some extensions of the framework for fu-
ture directions. Currently, each piece of observation in our framework has
equal value, no matter whether it is obtained by a skilled professor or an
untrained student, or whether it is obtained by the scientist herself or by
someone else. Nor is a distinction made between the evidence of a scientists
with 10 observations and a scientists with 100 pieces of data. To account for
these differences, numerical weights could be added to the observation sets
of all agents to increase or decrease the degree of influence on their neigh-
bors’ belief upgrade, cf. [28]. With the obtained framework different degrees
of receptivity to external information could be studied, and the impact of one
very important scientist in the field could be analyzed.
The logical framework proposed in this paper could be further extended
to account for a wider range of applications in social epistemology. Among
such applications are interacting political communities, citizens in a public
space, traders in the stock market, participants on social media, etc. (see [23]
for suggestions). In association with the new target group, the meaning of an
observation can be changed: scientific observation could become everyday
observation (which is, compared to scientific observation, even less reliable),
predictions of the financial market, gossip, etc.19 To match new contexts,
the action models of MEOL could also be redesigned. For example, the ac-
tion for upgrading belief could be made private, one could add actions for
contracting evidence, for reweighing evidence, updates of ontic facts, a plau-
sibility order can be added to action models, more structure can be given to
the observational constructs cf. [10], etc. All of this is inspiration for further
research.
Finally the debate on the optimal configurations for scientific commu-
nities will be enriched by empirical data, coming from actual episodes of
collective failure or success as well as empirical data from lab experiments.
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Appendices
A Multisets
Here, some definitions on multisets are presented. This may be helpful to
understand the nature of observation sets Oi.
Definition A.1. (Multiset) A multiset A is a pair 〈A , f〉 where A is a regular
set and f : A → N a function, giving the multiplicity of each a ∈ A . That is,
f will tell how often a is included in the multiset. Unlike for regular sets, in
multisets it holds that {a, a} 6= {a}.
Definition A.2. (Sub-multiset) Suppose A = 〈A , f〉 and B = 〈B, g〉 are mul-
tisets. A is a sub-multiset ofB,A ⊆ B, if for all a ∈ A it holds that f(a) ≤ g(a)
(and < for proper sub-multiset A ⊂ B).
Definition A.3. (Multi-powerset) Suppose A = 〈A , f〉 is a multiset. The
multi-powerset of A, P(〈A , f〉), is defined by taking all sub-multiplicities.
Consider as an example multiset A = {a, b, b}. Its power set is given by
{∅, {a}, {b}, {a, b}, {a, b}, {b, b}, {a, b, b}}.
Definition A.4. (Support) Suppose A = 〈A , f〉 is a multiset. The subset A
of A is called the support of A if a ∈ A iff f(a) > 0.
Definition A.5. (Positive multiset) Suppose A = 〈A , f〉 is a multiset. The
positive multiset A+ of A is defined as 〈A, f+〉 such thatA is the support of A
and f+(a) := f(a).
For construction of the canonical model in the completeness proof of MEOLs
(see Appendix B), define the union of two multisets:
Definition A.6. (Union multisets) Suppose A = 〈A, f〉 and B = 〈A, g〉 are
multisets. Their union,A ∪B, is C = 〈A, h〉 where for all a ∈ A it holds that
h(a) = max(f(a), g(a)).
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B Proofs
Theorem 1 (Soundness of MEOLs). MEOLs is sound: for all ϕ ∈ F s and all
Φ ⊆ F s it holds that
if Φ ` ϕ then Φ |= ϕ
Proof. We prove soundness by induction on the length k of derivation. For
the base case, ϕmust be an axiom of MEOLs. As most axioms of MEOLs (Def.
9) match with the semantic conditions (Def. 4), it follows directly for those
axioms that |= ϕ. Additionally, Multiset follows semantically by Property
2 and Neighborhood holds semantically by truth definition of Nij (Def. 7).
For the induction step, suppose that for ϕ derived at step k, it holds that if
Φ ` ϕ then Φ |= ϕ. Consider γ that is derived by applying one of the rules at
the k + 1-step. For each rule it follows by the induction hypothesis and the
truth definitions of→, i and Ki (Def. 7) that respectively |= γ, |= iϕ and
|= Kiϕ.
Theorem 2 (Completeness of MEOLs). MEOLs is strongly complete. That is,
for all ϕ ∈ F s and all Φ ⊆ F s it holds that
if Φ |= ϕ then Φ ` ϕ
Proof. We prove by way of a canonical model construction. Given sets of
atomic propostions Φ, agents A, and a limit L, define the canonical model
Ω := (WΩ,V, Oi,≤i,∼i) by setting
WΩ := {Γ ⊆ F s | Γ is maximal consistent}
V(Γ) := {p ∈ Φ | p ∈ Γ}
Oi(Γ) :=
⋃
Oi(oψ,n)∈Γ
(oψ, n)
Γ ≤i ∆ iff {ϕ | iϕ ∈ Γ} ⊆ ∆
Γ ∼i ∆ iff {ϕ | Kiϕ ∈ Γ} ⊆ ∆
We will first prove that Ω is a model for MEOLs, by showing that it satisfies all
semantic properties. We use standard methods to show that ≤i is a preorder
and that ∼i is an equivalence relation.
To prove indefeasibility we show Γ ≤i ∆→ Γ ∼i ∆ for all i ∈ A. Suppose
not. Then there exists i,Γ,∆ such that Γ ≤i ∆ while Γ 6∼i ∆. This implies
that there is a ϕ such that Kiϕ ∈ Γ while ϕ 6∈ ∆. By the axiom Indefeasibility,
it follows that iϕ ∈ Γ. Since Γ ≤i ∆ this implies ϕ ∈ ∆. By contradiction
we conclude that indefeasibility holds.
To prove local connectedness we show Γ ∼i ∆ → (Γ ≤i ∆ ∨ ∆ ≤i Γ)
for all i ∈ A. Suppose not. Then there exists i,Γ,∆ such that Γ ∼i ∆ while
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Γ 6≤i ∆ and ∆ 6≤i Γ. This implies that there are γ, ϕ such that iγ ∈ Γ
(∗) while γ 6∈ ∆, and iϕ ∈ ∆ while ϕ 6∈ Γ. As γ 6∈ ∆: ¬γ ∈ ∆ and
hence ¬Kiϕ ∈ Γ. As ϕ 6∈ Γ: ¬ϕ ∈ Γ and hence ¬Kiγ ∈ Γ (because ∼i
is reflexive). Hence, ¬(Kiϕ ∨ Kiγ) ∈ Γ. By axiom Local Connectedness, it
follows that either i) ¬Ki(ϕ ∨ iγ) ∈ Γ or ii) ¬Ki(γ ∨ iϕ) ∈ Γ. In case i),
then Ki(¬ϕ ∧ ¬iγ) ∈ Γ which implies ¬iγ ∈ Γ. This contradicts to (∗). In
case ii), Ki(¬γ ∧ ¬iϕ) ∈ Γ which implies ¬γ ∈ Γ. So ¬iγ ∈ Γ (because ≤i
is reflexive). This contradicts to (∗). Thus, local connectedness holds in the
model.
Now we will prove observation introspection: Γ ∼i ∆ → Oi(Γ) = Oi(∆)
for all i ∈ A. Suppose not, then there exists i,Γ,∆ such that Γ ∼i ∆ although
there is a pair (oψ, n) such that either (oψ, n) ⊆ Oi(Γ) but (oψ, n) 6⊆ Oi(∆),
or (oψ, n) 6⊆ Oi(Γ) and (oψ, n) ⊆ Oi(∆). Suppose the former holds. Then
Oi(oψ, n) ∈ Γ. By axiom Observation Introspection: KiOi(oψ, n) ∈ Γ. Since
Γ ∼i ∆ it follows that Oi(oψ, n) ∈ ∆ and thus (oψ, n) ⊆ Oi(∆). By contradic-
tion and similar argument for the other case, we conclude that observation
introspection holds.
To finish the proof, we need to show that the Truth Lemma holds: for
each Γ ∈ WΩ and each ϕ ∈ F , we have ϕ ∈ Γ iff Γ |=Ω ϕ. We prove this
by induction on the construction of ϕ. For the base cases, i) ϕ = > or ii)
ϕ = p. Since Γ is a maximal consistent set, > ∈ Γ is always true, so by truth
definition, it follows that Γ |=Ω >. Likewise, p ∈ Γ iff p ∈ V(Γ) iff Γ |=Ω p.
Then for the induction steps, assume the induction hypothesis: for all γ, χ of
less complexity than ϕ the Truth Lemma holds. For case i) ϕ = ¬γ it holds
that ¬γ ∈ Γ iff γ 6∈ Γ iff Γ 6|=Ω γ iff Γ |=Ω ¬γ. For case ii) ϕ = γ ∧ χ,
γ ∧ χ ∈ Γ iff γ ∈ Γ and χ ∈ Γ iff Γ |=Ω γ and Γ |=Ω χ iff Γ |= γ ∧ χ.
For case iii) ϕ = Oi(oψ, n) it holds that Oi(oψ, n) ∈ Γ iff (oψ, n) ⊆ Oi(Γ) iff
Γ |=Ω Oi(oψ, n). We continue with case iv) ϕ = Nij: Nij ∈ Γ iff Γ ` Nij iff
Nij (by Neighborhood axiom) iff Γ |=Ω Nij. For case v) ϕ = iγ, iγ ∈ Γ
iff for all ∆ ≥i Γ it holds that γ ∈ ∆ (by definition of canonical model) iff
∆ |=Ω γ for all ∆ ≥i Γ iff Γ |=Ω iγ (by truth definition). Finally for case
vii) ϕ = Kiγ, Kiγ ∈ Γ iff γ ∈ Γ for all ∆ ∼i Γ iff ∆ |=Ω γ for all ∆ ∼i Γ iff
Γ |=Ω Kiγ.
Theorem 3 (Soundness and completeness of MEOL). For all ϕ ∈ F it holds
that:
|= ϕ iff ` ϕ
Proof. The proof system of MEOL contains reduction axioms such that for
each ϕ ∈ F , there is a reduced ϕ† ∈ F s such that
` ϕ↔ ϕ†
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We will prove that the reduction axioms hold also semantically in the models
of MEOL:
|= ϕ↔ ϕ†
We will demonstrate the proof only for some of the more complex for-
mulas, as the techniques are standard. We show Observation Dynam-
ics: |= [α, σ]Oi(oψ, n) ↔ (preσ → (postσ → Oi(oψ, n))). First from left
to right: assume for an arbitrary (M, w) that (M, w) |= [α, σ]Oi(oψ, n).We
know that either (M, w) 6|= preσ or (M, w) |= preσ . Suppose the former
holds, then it directly follows that (M, w) |= preσ → (postσ → Oi(oψ, n)).
Now suppose the latter holds. Assume for contradiction that (M, w) 6|=
preσ → (postσ → Oi(oψ, n)). Then (M, w) |= preσ ∧ postσ ∧ ¬Oi(oψ, n))
(?). We know by truth definition of MEOL that since (M, w) |= preσ and
(M, w) |= [α, σ]Oi(oψ, n), it holds that M ⊗ α, (w, σ) |= Oi(oψ, n). Hence
(oψ, n) ∈ Oαi (w, σ). This implies by definition of Oαi that either (i) (M, w) |=
postσ → Oi(oψ, n), which contradicts to (?), or (ii) not (M, w) 6|= postσ →
Oi(oψ, n), and (M, w) |= Oi(oψ, n). This again contradicts to (?). Hence,
(M, w) |= preσ → (postσ → Oi(oψ, n)). Now from right to left, by contra-
position: assume that (M, w) 6|= [α, σ]Oi(oψ, n). Then (M, w) |= preσ and
not M ⊗ α, (w, σ) |= Oi(oψ, n). This implies that (w, σ) 6∈ [[Oi(oψ, n)]]α.
Now assume for contradiction that (M, w) |= post(σ) → Oi(oψ, n). By
(M, w) |= preσ and by definition of Oαi , (oψ, n) ∈ Oαi (w, σ). Contradiction.
Hence, (M, w) |= ¬(postσ → Oi(oψ, n). And therefore, (M, w) 6|= preσ →
(postσ → Oi(oψ, n)).
We continue proving the Knowledge Dynamics I: |= [α, σ]iϕ↔ (preσ →
i[α, σ]ϕ) for α ∈ {oψ+i, Oi(oψ, n)!i,¬Oi(oψ, 1)!i} for every ψ ∈ Ψ. From
left to right: suppose (M, w) |= [α, σ]iϕ. ThenM⊗ α, (w, σ) |= iϕ. This
means that for all (v, σ) ≥i (w, σ):M⊗α, (w, σ) |= ϕ. By definition ofM⊗α,
for all v ≥i w: (M, v) |= [α, σ]ϕ. Hence (M, w) |= i[α, σ]ϕ, which implies
(M, w) |= preσ → i[α, σ]ϕ. From right to left, suppose (M, w) |= preσ →
i[α, σ]ϕ. Now if (M, w) |= preσ , then (M, w) |= i[α, σ]ϕ. By same steps as
above, but inversed, it follows thatM⊗ α, (w, σ) |= iϕ which implies that
(M, w) |= [α, σ]iϕ. If (M, w) 6|= preσ , then we follow the usual steps.
Next, we prove Knowledge Dynamics II: |= [α, σ]iϕ↔ (preσ → (i(γ →
[α, σ]ϕ)∧¬γ → (i[α, σ]ϕ∧Ki(γ → [α, σ]ϕ)))). First, from left to right. Sup-
pose (M, w) |= [α, σ]iϕ (∗). As before, when (M, w) 6|= preσ then we’re
done. Suppose (M, w) |= preσ and for contradiction, suppose (M, w) 6|=
(i(γ → [α, σ]ϕ) ∧ ¬γ → (i[α, σ]ϕ ∧Ki(γ → [α, σ]ϕ))). Suppose (M, w) 6|=
i(γ → [α, σ]ϕ). Then there is a v such that w ≤i v and (M, v) |= γ while
(M, v) 6|= [α, σ]ϕ, thusM⊗ α, (v, σ) 6|= ϕ. However, by our assumption (∗),
we know thatM⊗ α, (w, σ) |= iϕ. Note that (w, σ) ≤i (v, σ) (by definition
of ≤αi ), soM⊗ α, (v, σ) |= ϕ. Contradiction. Now suppose (M, w) 6|= ¬γ →
(i[α, σ]ϕ ∧Ki(γ → [α, σ]ϕ)). Then (M, w) |= ¬γ but (M, w) 6|= i[α, σ]ϕ or
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(M, w) 6|= Ki(γ → [α, σ]ϕ)). In the first case, there must be some v ≥i w
such that (M, v) 6|= [α, σ]ϕ and thus M ⊗ α, (v, σ) 6|= ϕ. Note that again
(w, σ) ≤i (v, σ), which implies together with (∗) thatM⊗α, (v, σ) |= ϕ. Con-
tradiction. In the second case, there must be a v ∼i w such that (M, v) |= γ
and (M, v) 6|= [α, σ]ϕ. Hence M ⊗ α, (v, σ) 6|= ϕ. As (M, w) |= ¬γ and
(M, v) |= γ andw ∼i v, it follows that (w, σ) ≤i (v, σ). In the same way as be-
fore, this leads to a contradiction. Hence (M, w) |= (i(γ → [α, σ]ϕ) ∧ ¬γ →
(i[α, σ]ϕ ∧Ki(γ → [α, σ]ϕ))). For right to left, suppose the right side of the
equivalence relation holds at (M, w). For purpose of contradiction, suppose
(M, w) 6|= [α, σ]iϕ. This implies (M, w) |= preσ andM⊗ α, (w, σ) 6|= iϕ.
So there is a (v, σ) such that (w, σ) ≤i (v, σ) while M⊗ α, (v, σ) 6|= ϕ. By
definition of (w, σ) ≤i (v, σ), it follows that either i) γ 6∈ V(w) and γ ∈ V(v)
and w ∼i v, or ii) γ 6∈ V(w) and w ∼i v, or iii) γ ∈ V(v) and w ∼i v.
In case of i), then (M, w) |= ¬γ, so (M, w) |= Ki(γ → [α, σ]ϕ). Since
w ∼i v and (M, v) |= γ, this implies that (M, w) |= [α, σ]ϕ and thus that
M ⊗ α, (v, σ) |= ϕ. Contradiction. In case of ii), then w ≤i v and thus
(M, v) |= [α, σ]ϕ. Again this implies that M ⊗ α, (v, σ) |= ϕ. Contradic-
tion. In case of iii), it also follows that (M, v) |= [α, σ]ϕ and hence that
M⊗ α, (v, σ) |= ϕ. So we get a contradiction once again. This proves that
(M, w) |= [α, σ]iϕ and thereby finishes the proof for Knowledge Dynamics
II.
Finally, we prove Knowledge Dynamics III: |= [α, σ]Kiϕ ↔ (preσ →
Ki[α, σ]ϕ). Left to right: suppose (M, w) |= [α, σ]Kiϕ, so M⊗ α, (w, σ) |=
Kiϕ. By definition ofM[α, σ], this implies that for all (v, σ) such that (w, σ) ∼i
(v, σ) it holds thatM⊗α, (v, σ) |= ϕ. Then, for all v such that w ∼i v it holds
that (M, w) |= [α, σ]ϕ and thus (M, w) |= Ki[α, σ]ϕ. From right to left: sup-
pose (M, w) |= preσ → Ki[α, σ]ϕ. If (M, w) |= preσ , then (M, w) |= Ki[α, σ]ϕ.
Thus, for all v such that w ∼i v it holds that (M, w) |= [α, σ]ϕ. So for all (v, σ)
s.t. (w, σ) ∼i (v, σ): M⊗ α, (v, σ) |= ϕ, which impliesM⊗ α, (w, σ) |= Kiϕ.
Therefore, (M, w) |= [α, σ]Kiϕ. If (M, w) 6|= preσ , then the proof continues
as before.
By Theorems 1 and 2, this implies soundness and completeness of MEOL.
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A Formalization of the Greater Fools
Theory with Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Hanna S. van Lee
Abstract
The greater fools explanation of financial bubbles says that traders
are willing to pay more for an asset than they deem it worth, because
they anticipate they might be able to sell it to someone else for an even
higher price. As agents’ beliefs about other agents’ beliefs are at the
heart of the greater fools theory, this paper comes to formal terms with
the theory by translating the phenomenon into the language and
models of dynamic epistemic logic. By presenting a formalization of
greater fools reasoning, epistemic conditions for a greater fools bubble
are obtained.1
Keywords Greater fools theory · Dynamic epistemic logic · Financial
bubbles · Rationality · Higher-order reasoning
1 Introduction
A financial bubble describes specific scenarios in which asset prices rise way
beyond the asset’s fundamental value and in which eventually the market
crashes. Such scenarios are unwelcome because they make the market un-
predictable and uncontrollable, and because they create inequality at the
risk of ruining individuals, firms and even nations. To understand the cir-
cumstances under which prices may deviate from their fundamental value
to subsequently prevent the occurence of bubbles—or at least limit their
consequences—financial bubbles have been extensively studied both theo-
retically and empirically. See [7] for an extensive overview of studies of fi-
nancial bubbles.
Nevertheless, there are contrasting explanations for the occurrence of fi-
nancial bubbles. Some explain the sudden rise of prices by irrational or
1This paper is a modification of a published version appearing in Logic, Rationality, and Interac-
tion: 6th International Workshop, LORI 2017. Proceedings. Alexandru Baltag and Jeremy Seligman
and Tomoyuki Yamada (editors). Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2017).
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noise traders [10]; others suggest that traders’ herding behavior lead the
price astray from the asset’s fundamental value [16]; yet others point to
traders who are rationally willing to pay more for an asset than they deem it
worth, because they anticipate they might be able to sell it to someone else
for an even higher price, known as the greater fools explanation for bubbles
[1, 8, 14]. The greater fools theory sounds like a crisp and clear explanation
for a mismatch between price and value, but the variety of results on the
theory shows that it is a surprisingly difficult theory to model and analyze.
This paper aims for a better understanding of the greater fools theory by fo-
cussing on micro-economic epistemic features as investor information and
behavior rather than on the macro-economic perspective of regulation and
market conditions.
The following describes a greater fools scenario that will be repeatedly
referred to in this paper: Imagine a market with one orange tree and a boy
called Arthur interested in buying the tree. Based on certain predictions of
the tree’s harvest, Arthur believes that ownership of the orange tree is worth
2 dollars. Would it be rational for him to pay 3 dollars for the orange tree?
Not if he is buying the orange tree exclusively for the tree’s harvest. How-
ever, imagine that instead of owning the orange tree, Arthur is interested in
reselling the orange tree for 4 dollars to his friend Barbara, making a profit
of 1 dollar. The story continues with Barbara, who agrees that the orange
tree is worth 2 dollars but is willing to pay 4 dollars because she expects to
sell the orange tree for 5 dollars to her friend Chris. When the orange tree
is traded further based on similar reasoning, the price may rise far beyond
it’s assumed value of 2 dollars. In this story, Arthur seems to act like a fool
by paying more for the tree than he deems it worth, but his behavior is jus-
tified by his belief in a greater fool named Barbara, who believes in the even
greater fool Chris, etc.
A proper understanding of investors’ reasoning about the market and
about each other potentially plays a key role in preventing future crises.
Although agents’ beliefs about other agents’ beliefs are at the heart of the
greater fools theory, existing studies typically do not explicitly model higher-
order reasoning. As an epistemic approach is currently lacking from the liter-
ature, epistemic (and doxastic) logic seems to be a suitable candidate frame-
work for obtaining a novel understanding of the theory. On top of the frame-
work’s language and model representation appropriate for studying higher-
order epistemic structures, dynamic epistemic logic introduces action models
to describe changes due to interaction between agents. This paper comes to
formal terms with the greater fools theory by translating the phenomenon
into the language and models of public announcement logic, thereby un-
folding the higher-order content of the theory. By presenting an epistemic
formalization of greater fools reasoning, structural insights are obtained per-
taining to the epistemic conditions of a greater fools bubble and the role of
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common knowledge in the burst.
The ambition to apply dynamic epistemic logics to strategic reasoning in
finance is still quite young. In 2012 [9] and 2014 [11], probabilistic dynamic
epistemic logics are used to model Aumann’s agreement theorem of trade. In
a broader sense, the current paper adds to the application of dynamic epis-
temic logics to social interaction and rationality in general and in specific to
studies of the bubble-fueling herding behavior, such as models of informa-
tional cascades [3, 17].2
The next section discusses essential concepts of the greater fools theory,
while at the same time motivating the abstractions made in this paper. Sec-
tion 3 introduces a semantic formalization of greater fools bubbles by means
of a public announcement logic, illustrated by three cases of greater fools rea-
soning. In Section 4 some primitive results on greater fools bubbles are ob-
tained. The final section concludes and mentions directions for further work.
2 Central Concepts
The following four concepts are central to the greater fools theory and there-
fore require a brief explanation.
Market Place Theoretical models of finance offer a great variety of descrip-
tions of highly complex market places. As models of dynamic epistemic logic
focus on interacting individuals, rather than on the crowd as a whole, a mar-
ket in this paper is a place where individuals sequentially trade one asset at
a time with each other.
Traders in a market may have different motivations for buying and sell-
ing. For instance, agents may choose to trade to spread risks, to stimulate
liquidity in the market, to mislead others, to profit by speculation, or to en-
joy dividend pay out. As only the last two motivations are relevant to greater
fools reasoning, agents are in the forthcoming assumed to only trade in order
to speculate or to enjoy dividend pay out.
Furthermore, in this paper the price is a variable on which agents’ atti-
tudes are defined, as will be shown in Section 3. When a seller and a buyer
agree on the price the trade may take place, thereby letting the price be de-
termined by supply and demand only on an individual level.
Fundamental Value A bubble is typically defined by referring to the devia-
tion of the price from the so-called fundamental value, also instrinsic or natural
2The greater fools explanation of a bubble must not be confused with herding phenomena as
the two are fundamentally different: where in a herding bubble investors act the same because
of an incentive to follow the crowd, investors in a greater fools bubble simply act the same as a
result of similar reasoning, as will be elaborately discussed in this paper.
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value. As the concept of fundamental value often gives rise to many ques-
tions - e.g. when confused for the asset’s value on the market and in discus-
sions related to the efficient market hypothesis - a few notes on it’s nature
must be given.
The fundamental value is derived from expected (discounted) cash flows
that the asset pays out to owners of the asset, such as it’s future dividend.
See [19] for a more eleborate definition of the fundamentals that influence
the fundamental value. This value is objective in the sense that given the
same information about the asset, all agents would agree on the fundamen-
tal value. To ensure the existence of an objective fundamental value in the
most simple way, it is here assumed that resources are efficiently allocated,
such that traders expect to profit exclusively at the expense of others. As a
consequence, the fundamental value is never based on personal preferences
or needs. This eliminates the situation where Arthur, who owns an apple
tree, and Barbara, who owns an orange tree, trade apples for oranges and
mutually benefit from the trade.
Reasoning under Uncertainty In practise, though, agents typically do not
agree on the fundamental value. That is, because agents have access to dif-
ferent information about an asset’s fundamentals. As will be shown in Sec-
tion 4, the possibility of a disagreement about the asset’s value is essential
to the rise of greater fools bubbles: As soon as all uncertainties about other
traders’ beliefs are eliminated, the price will fall back to the fundamental
value (Proposition 2).
A distinction must be made here between uncertainty about the funda-
mental value of the asset on one hand and uncertainty about the (future) be-
liefs and behavior of other traders on the other hand. Having no crucial role
in the reasoning driving a greater fools bubble, the models in the forthcom-
ing formalization do not include informative updates on the asset’s value
itself: That is, agents are not directly informed about the asset’s fundamen-
tals, nor is information about the asset somehow indirectly revealed through
prices or actions that traders take. To include such information updates is
future work.
Rational Bubbles As said before, there is no consensus about the circum-
stances under which a bubble may occur. There is one topic in particular that
nourishes much debate: the relation between rational traders and the possi-
bility of a bubble, see e.g. [6]. Some claim that under specific assumptions,
rational bubbles will not form: As traders are immediately aware that they
are being exploited, they will refuse to buy an overpriced asset, even un-
der presence of asymmetric information [18]. Others suggest that enough
rational traders will guarantee that any potential mispricing induced by be-
havioral traders (or noise) will be corrected [12]. Contrarily to those two the-
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ories, others argue that rational traders will not necessarily prevent a greater
fools bubble from occurring, because rational traders prefer to ride the bub-
ble rather than attack it [2, 8]. That is, because they can profit from less in-
formed traders only if they exit the market just prior to the crash, which
seems to capture aspects of what often happens during real episodes of bub-
bles [1].
The next sections try to answer the question under which epistemic cir-
cumstances greater fools reasoning may lead to overpricing of the asset and
what may cause the bubble to crash.
3 A Formalization of the Greater Fools Theory
Even though the intuition behind the greater fools theory is simple, com-
ing to formal terms with the idea it represents reveals some obscurities. To
focus on the epistemic structures of the greater fools theory, only the nec-
essary ingredients are used in the presented formal framework: a finite set
of traders,3 an asset (an orange tree), traders’ attitudes towards trading the
asset, and communication that reveals traders’ first- and higher-order beliefs
about the value of the asset. For simplicity, the agents are assumed to never
be short on financial resources. Further, when agents are indifferent with
respect to trading or not, it is assumed that agents refrain from trading.
3.1 Language and Plausibility Models
The semantic formalization of the greater fools theory comes down to un-
folding the meaning of being willing to buy an asset for a price that is higher
than the assumed value of the asset. To construct a translation of this mean-
ing in epistemic logic, the following language is used:
Definition 1. (Language)
ϕ ::= v=n | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Kiϕ | Biϕ | CKϕ | selli(p) | buyi(p) | [!ϕ]ϕ
for 0 ≤ n, p ≤ L ∈ N and i ∈ A
Here, v=n says “the value of the orange tree is n”, ¬ and ∨ translate to “not”
and “or”,Kiϕ expresses that agent i knows ϕwhileBiϕ expresses that agent
i believes ϕ. Furthermore, CKϕ says “it is common knowledge among all
agents that ϕ”. The expression selli(p) says: “agent i wants to sell the asset
for price p” and similarly, buyi(p): “agent i wants to buy the asset for p”.
The dynamic sentence [!ϕ]ψ means “after a public announcement of ϕ, ψ is
3Although the models are a representation of the epistemic states of a few individuals, these
individuals can be interpreted to represent a group of homogeneous traders.
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true”. The set A is the set of agents, in the examples in this paper defined as
{a, b, c, f} existing of Arthur, Barbara, Chris and a farmer called Flora. Due
to technical constructions, n and p are limited to an unspecified large finite
natural number L. Furthermore, let v < n (“v is strictly lower than n”) be
short for
∨
n′<n v=n
′ and let v > n (“v is strictly higher than n”) be short for
¬(v=n) ∧ ¬(v < n). Finally, let 〈!ϕ〉ψ := ¬[!ϕ]¬ψ.
The language is intepreted on standard plausibility models, cf. [5]:
Definition 2. (Plausibility model) Given a set of agents A and a limit L ∈ N,
a plausibility model is a tuple M = 〈W,V,〉 with W a set of worlds,
V :W → {v=n}0≤n≤L a valuation map assigning a value of the asset to each
world, and : A →P(W ×W) a plausibility relation such that for all i ∈ A,
the relation (i) is reflexive, transitive, conversely well-founded and locally
connected.4 A pointed plausibility model (M, w) designates one real world
w ∈ W .
Note that by definition of the valuation map, at every world w ∈ W the asset
is assigned exactly one value n, while there may be values that are assigned
to none or more worlds. The expression (w, u) ∈ (i) is usually written
w i u and says “u is at least as plausible as w”. Because i is conversely
well-founded there exists necessarily a set of worlds that are considered most
plausible. Let the indistinguishability relation∼: A →P(W×W) be defined
by w ∼i u only if w i u or u i w. This implies that ∼i is an equivalence
relation. Finally, let∼A:=
⋃
i∈A ∼i. See Figure 1 at the end of the next section
for an illustration of a plausibility model.
3.2 A Meaningful Translation
In order to characterize the reasoning used in a greater fools episode, the
meaning of selli(p) and buyi(p) need introduction. The most generalized jus-
tification for selling an asset for a certain price is to believe that the asset is
worth less than that price. For a price equal or lower than the value of the
asset, an agent rather keeps the asset to enjoy the dividend cash flow that
corresponds to the value. In addition, a rational agent wants to sell the asset
for at least the highest price she believes she can get for it. The later implies
that when an agent believes she can sell the asset for 10, and then learns that
in fact no other agent wants to buy the asset for 10, she will lower the price
for which she offers to sell. As such, she will continue to drop the price until
she either has an agreement to trade, or the agent realizes she cannot sell the
asset for more than the value she deems it worth.
4The relation i being conversely well-founded means that there is no infinite sequence of
worlds such that w i w′ i w′′ i .... The relation i being locally connected means
that for all w, u ∈ W whenever they are related by the symmetric closure of i, then w i u
or u i w.
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A greater fools trader may have two different kinds of motivation for
buying the orange tree for price p: either the agent believes the tree is worth
more than the price, or the agent believes she can sell the asset to another
trader j ∈ A for a higher price p′ > p. Formalizing such motivation to buy
for i, buyi(p), thus comprises the motivation of another agent j to buy for a
higher price p′: buyj(p′). Iterating this interpretation of buying, the meaning
of buyj(p′) is that agent j either believes v > p′, or that she can sell the asset
for p′′ > p′ to another agent j′: buyj′(p′′), etc. Hence an unfolding of buyi(p)
creates higher-order beliefs Bibuyj(p′), BiBjbuyj′(p′′), BiBjBj′buyj′′(p′′′),
etc., with respect to prices that rise at each unfolding: p < p′ < p′′ < ... < p′′′.
Through the dynamic operator [!ϕ] agents as well as third person model-
ers may reason about what will happen after an announcement of ϕ, cf. [13].
The models to follow will specifically reason about announcements of an
agent’s (un)willingness to buy or sell. To facilitate such information update,
a public announcement may be executed on a plausibility model:
Definition 3. (Information update) Given a plausibility modelM and a pub-
lic announcement ϕ, the updated model Mϕ is the restriction of M to all
worlds where ϕ is true, i.e. 〈Wϕ,Vϕ,ϕ〉 such that Wϕ := {w ∈ W |
(M, w) |= ϕ} and Vϕ and ϕ are defined as V and  restricted to w ∈ Wϕ.
WhenWϕ is empty,Mϕ is undefined.
Definition 4. (Truth) Given a plausibility model M and a world w ∈ W ,
truth is defined:
(M, w) |= > always
(M, w) |= v=n iff v=n ∈ V(w)
(M, w) |= ¬ϕ iff (M, w) 6|= ϕ
(M, w) |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff (M, w) |= ϕ or (M, w) |= ψ
(M, w) |= Kiϕ iff (M, w′) |= ϕ for all w′ ∼i w
(M, w) |= Biϕ iff (M, w′) |= ϕ for all w′∈maxi{u∈W |u∼iw}
(M, w) |= CKϕ iff (M, w′) |= ϕ for all w′ ∼A w
(M, w) |= selli(p) iff (M, w) |= Bi(v < p) and
(M, w) |= Bi¬
∨
j 6=i
∨
p′>p
buyj(p
′)
(M, w) |= buyi(p) iff (M, w) |= Bi(v > p) or there exists a k ≥ 1,
prices p < p1 < ... < pk and agents j1, ..., jk
such that (M, w) |= BiBj1 ...Bjk(v > pk)
(M, w) |= [!ϕ]ψ iff (Mϕ, w) is defined impliesMϕ, w |= ψ
where maxiU := {u ∈ U | w i u for all w ∈ U}.
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v=2
w
v=3
x
v=2
y
v=3
z
(M, w) :
b
aa a
a, b
v=3
x
v=4
y
v=2
w
v=5
z
(M′, w) :
a
b
a, b b
Figure 1: Two examples of plausibility models
The meaning of belief thus refers to the most plausible states that are consis-
tent with the agent’s knowledge. This implies that belief (and also selli(p) and
buyi(p)) is universally true within an agent’s knowledge set: If (M, w) |= Biϕ
then also (M, u) |= Biϕ for all u such that u ∼i w.
Figure 1 presents two different pointed plausibility models where the true
world is denoted by a bold contour and w →i w′ represents that w i w′. Re-
flexive, transitive and locally connected arrows are omitted from all figures.
In the left model, both Arthur (a) and Barbara (b) know that the orange tree is
worth either 2 or 3 dollars. Barbara believes the asset is worth 2 dollars while
Arthur believes it is worth 3 dollars, as (M, w) |= v=2 and (M, z) |= v=3.
Furthermore, note that Barbara knows what Arthur believes, while Arthur
(incorrectly) believes that Barbara believes that v=3.
In the right model, Arthur believes that v < 3 as (M′, w) |= v=2. Fur-
thermore, Arthur (correctly) believes that buyb(4), as (M′, w) |= Bb(v=5). So,
although (M′, w) |= Ba(v < 3), Arthur does not want to sell for 3 dollars.
That is, because Arthur believes he can get more than 3 dollars for the asset
from Barbara: e.g. (M′, w) |= sella(4) and (M′, w) |= sella(5) (and any higher
amount of money).
3.3 Three Cases of Greater Fools Reasoning
Inspired by reality and theoretical models of trade, the following protocol for
trading is chosen: First the agent holding the orange tree publicly announces
that she wants to sell it for price p (given that she wants to). Then, if possible,
another agent publicly replies that he is willing to buy the tree for that price
and only if two agents publicly agree on a price, a trade will take place. If
this is not possible, all agents will announce that they are not willing to buy
the tree for that price. In that case the selling agent lowers the price of her
offer, unless the new price is equal to her believed fundamental value. Fol-
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v=2
y
v=4
z
v=2
w
v=4
x
(M1, w) :
a
b
a a
a, b v=2
w′
v=4
x′
v=2
y
v=4
z
(M′1, w′) :
a, b
b
v=2
w1
v=5
x1
v=2
w2
v=5
x2
v=2
w3
v=5
x3
(M2, w2) :
a, b
a a
a, b
b b
b
a
v=2
w′2
v=5
x′2
v=2
w2
v=5
x2
v=2
w2
v=5
x2
(M′2, w′2) :
a, b
b
Figure 2: Models of Scenario 1 and 2. In model M′2, worlds w′1 and x′1 are
redundant by their bisimulation to worldsw1 and x1 respectively, so they are
omitted from the figure.
lowing this simple protocol, it is assumd that communication precedes trade.
To semi-formalize this protocol restriction in a simple way (that is, without
introducing action models cf. [4]), a trade between i and j is interpreted as
an announcement that requires common knowledge of selli(p) ∧ buyj(p). As
a consequence, the event of the trade does not envoke any epistemic change:5
!tradei,j(p) :=!CK
(
selli(p) ∧ buyj(p)
)
To get a better intuition of the formal interpretation of buying, three dif-
ferent scenarios will now be modeled, each with a different justification for
Arthur buying the orange tree for 2 dollars. To focus on the mismatch be-
tween traders’ beliefs about value of the asset and the price it is traded for,
all agents in the examples correctly agree that the value is 2. This is gener-
alised in Section 4.
5It is future work to formalize the event of a trade in a more intuitive way, e.g. by formally
keeping track of who owns the tree and having the event of a trade update this information.
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Scenario 1: BaBb(v > 3) Suppose farmer Flora (whose epistemic and dox-
astic relations are not represented in the models for sake of simplicity) has
offered to sell the orange tree for 2 dollars. Consider pointed plausibilty
model (M1, u1) in Figure 2, representing Arthur’s and Barbara’s epistemic
and doxastic attitudes. As (M1, w |= BaBb(v > 3), Arthur wants to buy
the tree for 2 dollars (by truth definition of buyi(p)). After Arthur’s an-
nouncement !buya(2) the trade takes place: !tradef,a(2). Unfortunately for
Arthur, his belief about Barbara is wrong: (M1, w) 6|= Bb(v > 3) because
(M1, w) |= Bb(v=2). Thus, after Arthur announces he wants to sell the tree
for 3 dollars, Barbara rejects his offer by announcing ¬buyb(3), resulting in
model (M′1, w′).
This scenario demonstrates a miniature bubble where Arthur bought the
orange tree for a price higher than he believed it was worth because he ex-
pected to sell the tree to Barbara for even more. As his expectation turned
out to be false, he could not sell the tree and the bubble crashed softly in the
sense of leaving Arthur with the unsellable asset.
Scenario 2: BaBbBa(v > 4) Again, suppose farmer Flora offers to sell the
orange tree for 2 dollars. Even though Arthur believes himself that the tree
is worth 2 dollars and he now also knows that Bb(v=2), Arthur still wants
to buy the tree for 2 dollars: (M2, w2 |= BaBbBa(v > 4). That is, because
(M2, w3) |= Ba(v > 4), and therefore (M2, w2) |= BbBa(v > 4)). Like in Sce-
nario 1, announcements of !buya(2) and !tradef,a(2) will be executed. Note
that this time, Arthur is right about Barbara: BbBa(v > 4) is true at w2.
However, when Arthur announces to sell the orange tree for 3 dollars (see
the resulting model (M′2, w′2)), Barbara learns that Arthur believes the value
is less than 3 such that no longer BbBa(v > 4) holds. As a consequence, Bar-
bara does not want to buy the orange tree for 3 dollars in (M′2, w′2), because
she knows she will not be able to sell it back to Arthur for 4 dollars. As in the
previous scenario, Arthur is left with the unsellable asset.
This series of events raises the question whether Arthur could have
foreseen this unfortunate outcome. Under the current definition of buyi(p),
agents do not look forward in time when considering to buy or not.
However, Arthur has the ability to reason about the effects of the
announcement sella(3): (M2, w2) |= Ka[!sella(3)]Kb¬Ba(v > 4).
Alternative to Definition 4, a trader that is willing to buy an asset for price
p because she believes in the existence of a greater fool may be restricted to
not being able to predict that the trader she anticipates to resell the asset
to will refrain from buying at some point in the expected future. Under this
dynamic interpretation of rationality, the meaning of buying may to be altered
as following:
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v=2
w1
v=5
x1
v=2
w2
v=5
x2
v=2
w3
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(M3, w2) :
a, b, c
a a
a, b, c
b b
a, b
c
v=2
w′2
v=5
x′2
v=2
w′3
v=5
x′3
v=2
w1
v=5
x1
(M′3, w′2) :
a, b, c
b b
a, b
c
Figure 3: The first two models of Scenario 3
Definition 5. (Truth predictive rationality)
(M, w) |= buyi(p) iff (M, w) |= Bi(v > p) or there exists a k ≥ 1,
prices p < p1 < ... < pk and agents j1, ..., jk such that
(M, w) |= Bi〈!selli(p1)〉...Bjk−1〈!selljk−1(pk)〉Bjk(v > pk)
This definition is essentially a model restriction revealing agents’ predictive
abilities. In Scenario 2, this means that Arthur initially does not want to buy
the orange tree for 2 from farmer Flora, because he can predict that Barbara
will learn that she cannot resell the tree to Arthur for 4 dollars.
Notice the difference between Arthur’s predictive abilities in Scenario 1
and Scenario 2. In the former, Arthur’s justification for buying was Barbara’s
belief pertaining to the value—which he can only learn after he bought the
asset and announces to Barbara that he wants to sell it. In the latter, his
justification for buying was Barbara’s belief about his belief—which he could
predict to change before she would buy the asset.
Scenario 3: BaBbBc(v > 4) Consider plausibility model (M3, w2) in Figure
3 where once again farmer Flora offered to sell the orange tree for 2 dollars.
In this case, Arthur is willing to buy the tree because (M3, w2 |= BaBbBc(v >
4). Suppose Arthur buys the orange tree for 2 dollars from farmer Flora. As
Barbara indeed believes that Bc(v > 4), Barbara is willing to buy the tree
for 3 dollars from Arthur. The announcements !buyb(3) and !tradea,b(3) re-
sult in (M′3, w′2) in Figure 3. Notice that this model resembles (M1, w) from
Scenario 1, where in this case Barbara offers to sell the orange tree for 4 dol-
lars and Chris (c) will reply that he does not want to buy the tree, resulting
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in a model similar to (M′1, w′) in Figure 2. This time, Barbara is left with a
tree she can only sell for 1 dollar. Note that by same reasoning as Arthur’s
in Scenario 1, Barbara could not have foreseen the bubble to crash in her
hands. Given her beliefs about Chris, Barbara was rational to buy the tree
from Arthur for 3 dollars.
4 Results
The examples from the previous section practically show that a greater fools
bubbles may occur. This is not evident, as e.g. [1] merely shows—by sim-
ulating a growing bubble with a price that runs up automatically in every
period—that if a bubble exists, people are willing to ride the bubble. Note
that the examples are simplistic, but that they can easily be extended with
more agents following the same or similar patterns. To be able to formally
show that the existence of greater fools traders is sufficient for the rise of a
bubble, some concepts need to be translated into the formal language:
Definition 6 (Highest Fundamental Value). Given a (M, w), let the unique
highest believed value vBmax be such that there exists an agent i ∈ A and a world
w′ ∈ maxi such that (M, w′) |= v=vBmax and there is no agent i ∈ A and a
world w′ ∈ maxi where (M, w′) |= v > vBmax.
Definition 7 (Overpricing). An asset is overpriced in (M, w) when
(M, w) |= ∨i,j∈A∨L≥p>vBmax〈!tradei,j(p)〉>
Definition 8 (Bubble). A sequence of events α1, ..., αn of type !selli(p),
!buyi(p), !¬buyi(p) or !tradei,j(p) is called a bubble if for some (M, w) and l <
n it holds that (M, w) |= 〈α1〉...〈αl〉
∨
i,j∈A
∨
L≥p>vBmax〈!tradei,j(p)〉> while
(M, w) |= 〈α1〉...〈αl〉...〈αn〉¬
∨
i∈A
∨
L≥p>vBmax buyi(p).
That is, a bubble describes a sequence of events in which the asset can be
traded for a price that is mutually believed to be too high; And after some
time the price falls back to the fundamental value: the crash. Note that while
a bubble is typically described by referring to an extreme overpricing, this
definition allows for a minimal overpricing of vBmax + 1. It is here chosen
to refrain from an ad hoc specification of “extreme”, but the definition and
examples may easily be adjusted.
Proposition 1. A bubble may form under the current greater fools encoding
of buying and selling, even when all agents agree about the value of the asset.
Proof. The scenarios in Section 3.3 constitute proof by example.
Firstly, note that Proposition 1 is proven for both the static and dynamic in-
terpretation of buying (Definition 4 versus 5). The difference between the
· 92 ·
A Formalization of the Greater Fools Theory 13
two is that under the dynamic interpretation an asset can only be traded at
most as many times as there are agents in the model. Secondly, note that
greater fools bubbles are thus robust under symmetric atomic information.
Higher-order uncertainty sustains the asset to be traded for prices exceed-
ing the fundamental value. It follows that the price drops to vBmax when it is
common knowledge that nobody believes the asset is worth more than vBmax:
Proposition 2. Given (M, w), (M, w) |= CK¬∨i∈ABi(v > vBmax) implies
(M, w) |= ¬∨i∈A∨p>vBmax buyi(p)
Proof. Suppose (M, w) |= CK¬∨i∈ABi(v > p). This means that there is no
sequence of agents j1, ..., jk such that Bj1 ...Bjk(v > v
B
max). By definition of
buyi(p) this implies that nobody wants to buy the asset for p > vBmax.
Proposition 2 demonstrates the informational transparancy of common
knowledge that leads to the burst of a bubble. As illustrated in the three
scenarios, the beliefs of all traders are sequentially revealed by all traders
offering to sell the asset for a gradually rising price and finally all traders
reject to buy. This conclusion is in line with Conlon [8] who presents a finite
horizon “nth order” asset price bubble, where greater fools bubbles can
only grow when there is a higher order possibility of a trader who does not
believe the asset is overpriced.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
The greater fools explanation of an asset bubble is a theory that explains
why an asset may be traded at prices far exceeding the fundamental value
of an asset, even when all traders are rational. This paper provided a formal
epistemic interpretation of being willing to sell or buy during greater fools
bubbles, which shows that epistemic logic is a natural setting in which to
formalize the greater fools theory. It has been shown that under two different
interpretations of rationality a greater fools bubble may arise even though
all agents agree about the value. It has finally been shown that common
knowledge, which is achieved through communication, is an informational
bubble buster.
This first formalization of greater fools bubbles creates multiple venues
for future research in persuit of a deep understanding and detailed descrip-
tion of the informational dynamics in the financial market. Firstly, it should
be noted that the models rely on the assumption that all trade is publicly
executed and all traders know each others’ identity. Opening the model
to anonymous traders and belief upgrades about the fundamental value—
thereby shifting focus slighty away from purely greater fools reasoning—is
an interesting direction for future research as it may change the conditions
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for a greater fools bubble. Furthermore, the used framework of standard
epistemic logic can be enriched with for example probabilities (cf. [15]) to
specify the risk of actions or the deeper justifications of agents’ beliefs. The
protocol can be further explored by formalizing the natural language proto-
col cf. e.g. transition rules in [17]. Furthermore, it would be interesting to
study the interplay of different types of agents (based on e.g. strategy, level
of rationality, mutual trust, expertise) in a greater fools bubble.
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Abstract
This paper studies the epistemic conditions for trade between two types
of traders: simple traders, who trade exclusively based on their
personal belief about the value of the asset, and greater fools traders,
who also base their willingness to trade on what they believe others are
willing to pay. The paper studies the conditions under which there is a
trading opportunity: when one trader is willing to sell the asset at price
n, and another trader is willing to buy the asset at the same price. Of
particular interest are overpriced trade opportunities that happen at
prices above what any trader in the community believes the asset is
worth. Further, the paper explores the effect of traders’ announcements
of willingness to sell or buy on the possibility of a trade.
Keywords Dynamic epistemic logic · Trade · Higher-order reasoning ·
Greater fools theory · Financial bubbles
1 Introduction
People get involved in a trade only if they believe they are better off after
the trade than they were before the trade (at least if they are strictly rational
about their trades, and have no non-financial reasons to trade). For exam-
ple, imagine Ann who is willing to sell some asset1 for 3 dollars, while she
believes the asset is actually worth only 2 dollars. Ann believes it is benefi-
cial for her to sell the asset for 3 dollars, because she believes she will gain
1 dollar from the trade. However, Ann’s friend Bob does not want to buy
the asset for 3 dollars, because he too believes that the asset is worth only 2
dollars. Buying the asset for 3 dollars is disadvantageous for Bob, because
he believes he will loose 1 dollar from such trade. Additionally, imagine
1An asset can be anything that can be owned and traded, such as a piano, an orange tree or a
share of a company. To avoid certain conceptual complications that are involved in concrete
examples, such as the difference between two persons’ appreciation of a piano, we use the
neutral “asset” instead.
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their friend Claire who is willing to buy the asset for 3 dollars, because she
believes the asset is actually worth 5 dollars.
v=2 v=5
a, b
c
Figure 1: Traders a and b (Alice and Bob) believe the asset is worth 2 dollars,
while trader c (Claire) believes the asset is worth 5 dollars. The actual value
of the asset is ignored.
Example 1. Figure 1 represents this situation as a graph, where v=n means
that the asset is worth n dollars and labeled directional edges represent the
traders’ beliefs. The model in the figure has two possible worlds, one in which
the asset is worth 2 dollars and one in which it is worth 5 dollars. The a, b-
edge from the 5 dollars world to the 2 dollars world means that both Ann
and Bob consider it more plausible that the asset is worth 2 than 5. The c-edge
in the opposite direction means that Claire considers it more plausible that
the asset is worth 5. In such models, what is believed is what is considered
most plausible. So Ann and Bob both believe the asset is worth 2 and Claire
believes it is worth 5 (though they realize they could be mistaken).
If Ann sells the asset to Claire for 3 dollars, both Ann and Claire will be
happy: Ann believes that she has gained 1 dollars and Claire believes she has
gained 2 dollars from the trade. So both traders are willing to engage in this
trade. In this paper we will investigate, more generally, how differing beliefs
about asset prices affect the willingness to engage in trades. Of particular
interest is how higher-order beliefs affect the willingness to trade.
Values and beliefs We will not, in this paper, investigate the source of the
discrepancies between the beliefs of the traders, but just assume them given
by a model like the one of Figure 1. If the asset that Ann sells to Claire is a
company share, the differing beliefs about the value of the company share
could e.g. have resulted from receiving different pieces of information about
the company, or it could be due to interpreting the same information about
the company in different ways (as positive or negative news).
The value of an asset here refers to the monetary utility obtained when
owning the asset. For example, the value of a stock is based on the dividend
pay-out by the company to the stockholders. Then, a trader’s belief of the
value of an asset is the money she believes she would obtain when forced to
keep the asset forever [13]. This thereby ignores the potential money a trader
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can earn when having the option to resell the asset (in economic terms, to
speculate).
For sake of simplicity, we ignore the effect of discount over time on the
value. That is, the asset has a fixed value over time with an infinite lifetime
and traders are aware of this. Furthermore, we assume that traders have
no non-financial reasons to trade (such as selling stocks to obtain liquidity).
Assuming further that the value of money is equal to all traders, the actual
value of an asset is equal to everybody. That is, if everybody would be given
the same information and would interpret the information in the same way,
everybody would assign the same value to the asset. However, as traders
may have different information or different ways to process the same infor-
mation, they may end up having different beliefs about the value of an asset.
Since the asset has a fixed true value, when Ann and Claire disagree on
this value, at least one of them must have a false belief.
Greater fools The above example describes three traders with simple con-
ditions for their willingness to trade: They decide to trade or not to trade
based exclusively on what they personally believe the asset is worth. Alter-
natively, traders may have more complex conditions for their willingness to
trade, for instance involving also higher-order beliefs about the value of the
asset. Above, Bob does not want to buy the asset for 3 dollars, since he be-
lieves it is worth less. However, he also knows that Claire believes the value
of the asset to be 5 dollars, so he should expect her to be willing to buy it for 4
dollars as well. In that case, it could be considered rational for him to buy the
asset for 3 dollars and then attempt to sell it on to Claire for 4 dollars. This
would give him a profit of 1 dollar (assuming, for simplicity, that trading it-
self poses no cost). Bob’s motivation to buy the asset at a price higher than
he deems it worth is called greater fools reasoning: While Bob may look like a
fool paying 3 dollars for an asset he only values at 2 dollars, his behavior is
rationalized by the fact that he believes in the existence of a greater fool who
is willing to pay even more [1, 14].
Traders and trader types In this paper, we study the epistemic conditions
for trade between various types of traders. Traders are agents who can form
beliefs about the value of assets, including beliefs about other traders in the
market. In addition, traders can offer to sell or buy an asset at a particular
price, based on their first- and higher-order beliefs about the value of the as-
set. Different traders can have different conditions for buying and selling,
and we capture these conditions in what we call trader types. In particular,
we are interested in two trader types: simple traders, who trade exclusively
based on their personal belief about the value of the asset (as Ann and Claire
above); and greater fools traders, who also base their willingness to trade on
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what they believe others are willing to pay (like Bob if he decided to buy the
asset for 3 dollars with the intent of reselling it for 4). Given two traders of
particular type, we study the conditions under which there is a trading op-
portunity of an asset: when one of the traders is willing to sell the asset at
price n, and the other is willing to buy it at price n. Of particular interest
is overpriced trades that happen at prices above what any trader in the com-
munity believes the asset is worth. Such trades can happen in communities
with greater fools traders, since the buyers believe they can sell it on for a
higher price. Overpriced trades is characteristic to financial bubbles, and one of
the theories about financial bubbles is that they may specifically be due to
greater fools traders [1, 10, 14].
To formally study trader types and their trading opportunities, we need
a formal framework that allows the specification of both first- and higher-
order beliefs. This naturally leads us to consider frameworks of epistemic
(doxastic) logic. It is however not enough to be able to formalize the static be-
liefs of the traders; We also need to be able to formalize their dynamics. For
instance, if Bob initially believes that Ann believes the asset to be worth 3
dollars, but she then refuses to buy it for 2 dollars, Bob should revise his be-
liefs about Ann’s beliefs. Epistemic logics that also allow the formalization of
the dynamics of knowledge and belief are called dynamic epistemic (doxastic)
logics (see [6, 11]).
2 The Formal Framework
The formal framework used in this paper is doxastic-epistemic logic based
on plausibility models and public announcements. The logic and the corre-
sponding models were originally introduced in [12] and [7]. In this paper, we
introduce the framework using most of the conventions from [3]. However,
we modify the formal framework to suit our needs. Since we are here only
interested in reasoning about asset values and trades, our atomic formulas
are going to be restricted to the following two types:
1. Atoms expressing that an asset has a certain value. To make things
simple, we are only considering the existence of a single asset, and all
reasoning and trade then concern this particular asset. Alternative, we
can think of there being any number of assets, but they are all identical
(e.g. shares of a particular stock or units of some particular currency),
and hence are valued equally. The atom v=n, where n ∈ N, expresses
that the asset (or asset type) has value n.
2. Atoms sellti(n) expressing that a trader i of type t is willing to sell the
asset at price n, and atoms buyti(n) expressing the same for buying.
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2.1 Syntax and Semantics
Definition 1. (Syntax) Given a finite sets of traders (agents) A, a finite set of
trader types T and a specific trader type t ∈ T , a language L(t) is defined
by:
ϕ ::= v=n | ¬ϕ | ϕ∨ϕ | Kiϕ | Biϕ | CKϕ | CBϕ | sellti(n) | buyti(n) | 〈!ϕ〉ϕ
where n ∈ N and i ∈ A.
The modal operators Kiϕ and Biϕ are intended to express, respectively,
that “i knows ϕ” and “i believes ϕ”. Their counterparts CKϕ and CBϕ
stand for, respectively, common knowledge of ϕ and common belief of ϕ.
The dynamic operator 〈!ϕ〉ψ expresses “after public announcement of ϕ, the
formula ψ holds”.
We introduce ⊥ and the additional logical connectives ∧, → and ↔ by
standard abbreviation. Also, we introduce Bˆiϕ as an abbreviation for¬Bi¬ϕ,
and read Bˆiϕ as “trader i deems ϕ plausible.” Additionally, we introduce the
following abbreviations specific to our framework:
v < n :=
∨
n′<n
v=n′
v ≤ n := v=n ∨ v < n
v > n := ¬v ≤ n
v ≥ n := v=n ∨ v > n
A well-preorder on a set X is a reflexive and transitive binary relation 
on X such that every non-empty subset has -maximal elements. The set
of maximal elements of some Y ⊆ X is the set maxY defined as {y ∈ Y |
y′  y for all y′ ∈ Y }. Since maximal elements are -greater than any other
elements, they are in most of mathematics more often referred to as great-
est elements, but here we stick to the naming conventions of [7]. If  is a
well-preorder, then any two-element subset Y = {x, y} of X will also have
maximal elements, so we must have either x  y or y  x. Thus any two
elements of a well-preorder are comparable.
Definition 2. (Plausibility model) Given a set of traders A, a plausibility
model is a tupleM = 〈W,V,〉with
• W a finite set of worlds,
• V : W → {v=n | n ∈ N} a valuation assigning a value of the asset to
each world, and
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• : A → P(W ×W) a plausibility function such that for all i ∈ A, the
relation  (i) is a set of mutually disjoint well-preorders covering W .
Each relation  (i) is called a plausibility relation (for trader i), and we
usually abbreviate it by i.
A pointed plausibility model is a pair (M, w) consisting of a plausibility model
M and a designated actual world w ∈ W .
The valuation map V assigns exactly one value n (of the asset) to each
world w ∈ W , while the same value can be assigned to multiple worlds. The
fact that each world makes exactly one atom v=n true is similar to the P ′-
complete L′-models introduced by Aucher [4], though he uses the conven-
tion for different purposes: Aucher’s propositions represent events, where
the condition ensures that each world represents exactly one event. Our rea-
son to require having exactly one atom per world is that each world repre-
sents exactly one possible value of the asset as introduced in [15].
When w i v, the world v is at least as plausible as w (for trader i). For
the symmetric closure of i we write ∼i: This is an equivalence relation on
W called the epistemic relation (for trader i). The equivalence class of a world
w with respect to the equivalence relation ∼i is standardly denoted [w]∼i ,
which we sometimes abbreviate [w]i. We also call this set the information set
of trader i at w: It is all those worlds that trader i consider possible given
that the true world is w. The most plausible worlds to trader i in a world w are
those worlds of the information set that the trader consider most plausible:
maxi [w]i. Due to the assumptions on plausibility models, the set of most
plausible worlds is always non-empty. Further, let ∼A:=
⋃
i∈A ∼i be the
joint epistemic relation for A. Finally, let w A w′ iff w′ ∈ maxi [w] for some
i ∈ A and let∗A be the transitive closure ofA.
Formulas of the language are given meaning by their truth in plausibility
models. Most formulas are defined below. Truth definitions of sellti(n) and
buyti(n) for various trader types t are given in Subsection 2.2.
Definition 3. (Semantics) The satisfaction relation (M, w) |= ϕ is defined as
follows, with the standard clauses for ¬ and ∨:
(M, w) |= v=n iff V(w) is v=n
(M, w) |= Kiϕ iff (M, w′) |= ϕ for all w′ ∼i w
(M, w) |= Biϕ iff (M, w′) |= ϕ for all w′ ∈ maxi [w]i
(M, w) |= CKϕ iff (M, w′) |= ϕ for all w′ ∼A w
(M, w) |= CBϕ iff (M, w′) |= ϕ for all w ∗A w′
(M, w) |= 〈!ϕ〉ψ iff (M, w) |= ϕ and (Mϕ, w) |= ψ
whereMϕ is defined as the plausibility model 〈Wϕ,Vϕ,ϕ〉 such thatWϕ :=
{w ∈ W | (M, w) |= ϕ} and Vϕ and ϕ are defined as V and  restricted to
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w ∈ Wϕ. When (M, w) |= ¬ϕ, (Mϕ, w) is undefined. WhenM is clear from
the context, we write w |= ϕ instead of (M, w) |= ϕ.
Example 2. We already provided an example of a plausibility model in Fig-
ure 1 in the introduction. Figure 2 illustrates another, slightly more compli-
cated, example.
v=4
w1
v=5
w2
v=6
w3
v=7
w4
a
b
a
b
b
Figure 2: Pointed plausibility modelM with actual world w1. Reflexive and
transitive arrows are omitted. The actual world is highlighted in boldface.
This is the first example of a designated model, which we call M, and
where the designated actual world is w1. Hence, the actual value of the asset
is 4. Looking at the model, we can conclude e.g. (M, w1) |= Ka(v ≤ 6) ∧
Ba(v=4): Trader a knows that the value of the asset is at most 6 and (correctly)
believes its value to be 4. At the same time, w1 |= ¬Kb(v ≤ 6) ∧ Bb(v = 7):
Trader b does not know that the value is at most 6, in fact, trader b (wrongly)
believes the value to be 7. Even though trader a and b have differing beliefs
on the value of the asset, at least they have a common belief that the value is
either 4 or 7: w1 |= CB(v=4 ∨ v=7). Further, they have common knowledge
that the value is at least 4: w1 |= CK(v ≥ 4).
Suppose a announces that she believes the value is less than 6, that is,
she announces the truth of Ba(v < 6). We will later look at such announce-
ments as a consequence of willingness to trade: If a expresses willingness
to sell at 6, she must believe it is worth less. This announcement results in
the updated modelMBa(v<6) restricted to the worlds in which Ba(v < 6) is
true. Since Ba(v < 6) is true in all worlds except w4 of the original model (in
which a believes the value to be 7), the updated model becomes the one de-
picted in Figure 3. Inspecting this model, we can conclude (MBa(v<6), w1) |=
KbBa(v < 6). Thus we get
(M, w1) |= ¬KbBa(v < 6) ∧ 〈!Ba(v < 6)〉KbBa(v < 6)
expressing that in the original model trader b does not know that a believes
the value to be less than 6, but after trader a announces her belief, trader b
will know.
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v=4
w1
v=5
w2
v=6
w3
a
b
a
b
Figure 3: The result of updating model (M, w1) of Figure 2 with public an-
nouncement !Ba(v < 6).
For technical reasons that will later become clear, we need to define the
maximum value of a model relative to a world w. This is the maximum value
among those that the traders consider possible, and those that the traders
consider possible that other traders consider possible, etc. It is simply the
maximum value of any world accessible by any trader sequence from w.
Definition 4. (Maximum value) Let a plausibility model M be given. The
maximum value relative to a world w ofM, denoted vmax(w), is defined as:
vmax(w) := max{n ∈ N | there exists a w′ ∼A w such that w′ |= v=n}.
2.2 Semantics of Simple Traders and Greater Fools Traders
As briefly discussed in the introduction, one can consider different trader
types t. We focus in this paper on two trader types: simple traders (denoted
S) and greater fools traders (denoted GF ). When we say that a model M
is a simple trade market, we interpret formulas of the language L(S) in M,
and when we say that a modelM is a greater fools (trade) market, we interpret
formulas of the language L(GF ) inM. So in a simple trade market, we only
have have atoms of the form v=n, sellSi (n) and buy
S
i (n), where sell
S
i (n) means
that trader i is willing to sell for n acting as a simple trader and buyti(n) means
trader i is willing to buy for n acting as a simple trader. Similarly for the greater
fools markets. We will now define the semantics of sellti(n) and buy
t
i(n) for t
a simple trader or greater fools trader.
A simple trader is willing to sell the asset for some price n ∈ N if she be-
lieves the asset is worth strictly less than n, and willing to buy if she believes
the asset is worth strictly more than n. This implies that if she deems it plau-
sible that the asset is worth exactly n, she does not want to take any action.
We could have chosen to make one or both of these strict orders inclusive,
but it would not make any essential difference to the results we are going to
show.
Definition 5. (Semantics of simple trade markets) For L(S), we extend the
semantics with the following conditions for simple traders, for all i ∈ A and
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all n ∈ N:
w |= sellSi (n) iff w |= Bi(v < n)
w |= buySi (n) iff w |= Bi(v > n)
Example 3. Let the model in Figure 2 be a simple trade market. Observe that
simple trader a is willing to sell for 5 and buy for 3: w1 |= sellSa (5) ∧ buySa (3).
In fact, trader a is willing to sell for any price strictly above 4 and is willing
to buy for any price strictly below 4.
Note that a simple trader does not reason about the beliefs of other
traders. A greater fools trader, however, does reason about other traders’
beliefs. In terms of buying, a greater fools trader does not only want to buy
if she believes the asset is worth more, but also in case she believes she can
resell the asset to another trader for a higher price. In terms of selling,
however, greater fools traders and simple traders are the same: They are
willing to sell for any price strictly higher than what they believe the asset is
worth. This leads to the following semantic definitions.
Definition 6. (Semantics of greater fools trade markets) For L(GF ), we ex-
tend the semantics with the following conditions for greater fools traders, for
all i ∈ A and all n ∈ N:
w |= sellGFi (n) iff w |= Bi(v < n)
w |= buyGFi (n) iff n ≤ vmax(w) and w |= Bi(v > n) ∨Bi
∨
j∈A
buyGFj (n+ 1)
First note the recursion in the clause for buyGFi (n): The truth condition
for buyGFi (n) is defined in terms of the truth condition for buy
GF
j (n + 1) for
all j. To see that this is well-defined, note that buyGFi (n) is only defined in
terms of buyGFj (n + 1) for n ≤ vmax(w). For all larger n, buyGFi (n) is sim-
ply defined to be false. Second, we need to make sure that the definition is
also consistent with the intended semantics. At first it might seem unnec-
essary restrictive: Shouldn’t a trader i be willing to buy the asset at a price
m > vmax(w) if there exists another trader j who would be willing to buy
it at an even higher price l > m? Well, yes, but no such trader j can exist,
since by definition of vmax(w) (Definition 4) and the semantics of the com-
mon belief knowledge operator CK (Definition 3), we immediately get, for
any world w, w |= CK(v ≤ vmax(w)). This statement expresses that it is com-
mon knowledge that the value of the asset is at most vmax(w), which implies
that it is impossible for a trader to believe that another trader believes the
asset is worth more than vmax(w).
The semantic condition for buyGFi (n) implies that a greater fools trader is
willing to buy an asset for n if she either believes it is worth more (Bi(v >
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n)) or if she believes she can resell it for at least n + 1 to some other trader
(Bi
∨
j∈A buy
GF
j (n+ 1)).
Example 4. Let the model of Figure 2 be a greater fools trade market. From
w1 |= Bb(v > 6) it then follows that w1 |= buyGFb (6). Since w1 is the (only)
world considered most plausible by trader a, we then get w1 |= BabuyGFb (6).
This implies that w1 |= buyGFa (5). In words, trader a being a greater fools
trader is willing to buy the asset for 5 (although a believes it is worth only 4),
because she believes she can resell it to trader b for 6.
Given the semantics above, we can do a basic sanity check and prove
some validities of the logic that are to be expected: 1) If you are willing to
sell at a particular price, you are also willing to sell at a higher price; 2) If
you are not willing to sell a particular price, you are also not willing to sell
at a lower price; 3) If you are willing to buy at a particular price, you are
also willing to buy at any lower price; 4) If you are not willing to buy at a
particular price, you are also not willing to buy at any higher price. This
holds not only for simple traders, for which it is trivial, but also greater fools
traders.
Proposition 1. For L(t), t ∈ {S,GF}, the following formulas are validities
(hold in any world of any plausibility model):
sellti(n)→
∧
n′≥n
sellti(n
′) (1)
¬sellti(n)→
∧
n′≤n
¬sellti(n′) (2)
buyti(n)→
∧
n′≤n
buyti(n
′) (3)
¬buyti(n)→
∧
n′≥n
¬buyti(n′) (4)
Proof. The proofs for t = S are straightforward, and so are the proofs of (1)
and (2) for t = GF . Consider the case of (3) for t = GF . Note that the
formula trivially holds in any world w of any modelM when n > vmax(w)
(since in that case the antecedent will be trivially false). We can therefore
limit our attention to worlds w and values n with n ≤ vmax(w). Given
world w of a model M, we are going to prove that w′ |= buyGFi (n) →∧
n′≤n buy
GF
i (n
′) holds for all w′ ∼A w, all i ∈ A and all n ≤ vmax(w)
by induction on vmax(w) − n. The base case is n = vmax(w). We need to
prove w′ |= buyGFi (n) →
∧
n′≤n buy
GF
i (n
′) for arbitrary i ∈ A and w′ ∼A
w. The antecedent of this formula is by definition logically equivalent to
· 108 ·
Higher-order Reasoning and Overpricing in Trade Markets 11
Bi(v > n) ∨ Bi
∨
j∈A buy
GF
j (n + 1). Now note that none of these disjunc-
tions can be true in w′: Bi(v > n) is false in w′, since there is common be-
lief (even common knowledge) in w′ that the value is at most vmax(w) = n;
the other disjunct is false since n + 1 > vmax(w), and hence buyGFi (n + 1)
can not be true. Since the antecedent of the implication is false, the en-
tire formula is true. This concludes the base case. For the induction step,
we assume the required holds for n and consider n − 1. We then assume
w′ |= buyti(n− 1) and need to prove that w′ |= buyGFi (n′ − 1) for any n′ ≤ n.
By assumption, either w′ |= Bi(v > n − 1) or w′ |= Bi
∨
j∈A buy
GF
j (n). If
w′ |= Bi(v > n − 1), then also w |= Bi(v > n′ − 1), since n′ ≤ n. But
then we immediately get w′ |= buyGFi (n′ − 1), by definition. Assume instead
w′ |= Bi
∨
j∈A buy
GF
j (n). This assumption implies w′′ |=
∨
j∈A buy
GF
j (n) for
all w′′ ∈ maxi [w′]i. Hence there must for each such w′′ exist a jw′′ ∈ A such
that w′′ |= buyGFjw′′ (n). By induction hypothesis we then get w′′ |= buy
GF
jw′′ (n
′).
Since this holds for all w′′ ∈ maxi [w′]i, we get w′ |= Bi
∨
j∈A buy
GF
j (n
′), and
hence w′ |= buyGFi (n′ − 1), as required. Validity of (4) for t = GF is proved
similarly. It is essentially the contrapositive of (3).
2.3 Belief Intervals
Traders’ beliefs of the value of the asset are central to formalizing trade. In
our setting, the beliefs about values concern the atoms of the form v=n. The
beliefs of a trader might not necessarily determine a unique believed value of
the asset, as the trader might consider several possible values equally plau-
sible (a trader might for instance believe the asset to be worth somewhere
between 5 and 10, but have no reason to believe that any value in that in-
terval is more plausible than any other). This leads us to consider a trader’s
belief interval: the interval of values that the trader deems plausible. More
precisely, we define the belief interval of trader i in a world w as
[min{n′ | w |= Bˆi(v=n′)},max{n′ | w |= Bˆi(v=n′)}]
Example 5. In the plausibility model in Figure 4, trader a believes that the
value is either 2 or 5: w2 |= Ba(v=2 ∨ v=5). So a’s belief interval in w2 is
[2, 5]. Further, w2 |= Bb(v=7∨ v=8), so b’s belief interval in w2 is [7, 8]. Finally,
w2 |= Bc(v=5 ∨ v=6), so c’s belief interval in w2 is [5, 6]. These belief intervals
are depicted on the axis below the model.
Note that representing trader a’s belief as an interval of natural numbers
in this case omits the information that a believes the value to be neither 3 nor
4: w1 |= Ba¬(v=3 ∨ v=4). However, this loss of information is irrelevant for
studying trade opportunities: Only the minimum and maximum value the
trader deems plausible are required to characterize a trader’s willingness to
sell and buy the asset for certain prices (shown in Propositon 2).
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v=2
w1
v=5
w2
v=6
w5
v=7
w3
v=8
w4
a b b
c
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 . . .
a’s belief
interval
b’s belief
interval
c’s belief
interval
Figure 4: A plausibility model (above) and the traders’ belief intervals in
world w2 of the model (below).
Using belief intervals, we can give a complete characterization of willing-
ness to buy or sell in simple trade markets:
Proposition 2. Let model M be a simple trade market, and let world w of
M and trader i be given. Let [n,m] denote the belief interval of trader i in w.
Then the following holds:
(1) w |= sellSi (l) iff l > m. In words: Trader i is willing to sell for l iff l > m.
(2) w |= buySi (l) iff l < n. In words: Trader i is willing to buy for l iff l < n.
Proof. Item (1), left to right: Suppose w |= sellSi (l). By definition of belief
intervals, and given that the belief interval of i in w is [n,m], we have w |=
Bˆi(v=m). This implies the existence of a worldw′ ∈ maxi [w]i such thatw′ |=
v=m. From the assumption w |= sellSi (l) we get, by definition, w |= Bi(v < l).
Since w′ ∈ maxi [w]i, we then get w′ |= v < l. This implies that w′ |= v=l′
for some l′ < l. Since we already know that w′ |= v=m, and since only one
value atom is true at each world, we get m = l′ < l, as required. Item (1),
right to left: Suppose l > m. By definition of belief intervals, and given that
the belief interval of i at w is [n,m], we get w |= Bi(v ≤ m). This implies
w |= sellSi (m + 1), and hence by (1) of Proposition 1, we get w |= sellSi (l) for
any l ≥ m+ 1, as required. The proof of item (2) is similar.
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n m. . . . . .
a’s belief
interval
buySa (l) sell
S
a (l)no action
Figure 5: An illustration of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 shows that a simple trader’s willingness to trade is com-
pletely characterized by the belief interval: Below the interval the trader is
willing to buy, and above the interval the trader is willing to sell; inside the
interval, there is no willingness to act (neither buy nor sell). The proposi-
tion is illustrated in Figure 5. Note that Proposition 2 implies that no simple
trader is willing to both buy and sell at the same price, so the following for-
mula is valid for all n ∈ N: sellSi (n) → ¬buySi (n). This might seem obvious
and not worth mentioning, but it actually does not hold for greater fools
traders. Also note that the opposite implication from ¬buySi (n) to sellSi (n) is
not valid, since if n is inside the belief interval of trader i, trader i is neither
willing to sell nor buy. As we will later see, greater fools traders are some-
times willing to buy inside their belief interval.
In the next section, we will use belief intervals to characterize trade op-
portunities in groups of simple traders.
3 Basic Trade Opportunities
The purpose of formalizing different trader types is to analyze under which
conditions they are willing to trade and how this affects the dynamics of the
market they are in. We first analyze the conditions for a basic trade opportunity
between two traders: when one trader is willing to sell at price n, and another
is willing to buy at the same price.
Given modelM—a t trade market—and a world w inM, there is a basic
trade opportunity from i to j for price nwhen w |= sellti(n)∧buytj(n). This means
that trader i of type t wants to sell for n and trader j of type t wants to buy
for that same price. We introduce the following abbreviation for basic trade
opportunities:
btradeti,j(n) := sell
t
i(n) ∧ buytj(n)
More generally, given modelM—a t trade market—and a world w, there
is a basic trade opportunity when there are two traders i, j ∈ A such that there
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is a basic trade opportunity from i to j for some price n ≤ vmax(w). For this
concept we also introduce an abbreviation:
btradet(w) :=
∨
i,j∈A
∨
n≤vmax(w)
btradeti,j(n)
Note that in this abbreviation, the paramater is not the price n, but the world
w in which the formula is evaluated. This is because we here have a disjunc-
tion over all values less than or equal to the maximum value relative to the
world w, vmax(w). Recall from Section 2.2 that in any world w of any model,
w |= CK(v ≤ vmax(w)). This implies that no trader is willing to buy at any
value greater than vmax(w), independently of whether it is a simple trader or
a greater fools trader. This is what allows us to restrict the disjunction above
to values less than or equal to vmax(w).
3.1 Basic Trade Opportunities in Simple Trade Markets
For two intervals of natural numbersN andN ′,N precedesN ′ iff for all n ∈ N
and all n′ ∈ N ′ it holds that n < n′ [2]. For k > 1, we say that N k-precedes
N ′ iff for all n ∈ N and all n′ ∈ N ′ it holds that n+ k ≤ n′.
Theorem 1. There is a basic trade opportunity in a simple trade market iff
there are two traders such that the belief interval of one 2-precedes the belief
interval of the other.
Proof. Let modelM be a simple trade market. Let world w inM and i, j ∈ A
be given with i’s belief interval in w denoted [n,m] and j’s belief interval in
w denoted [n′,m′]. Left to right: Suppose there is a basic trade opportunity
from i to j for some price l ≤ vmax(w): w |= sellSi (l) ∧ buySj (l). By Proposition
2, l > m and l < n′. Hence, i’s belief interval 2-precedes j’s belief interval.
Right to left: Suppose i’s belief interval 2-precedes j’s belief interval. Then
there is an l such that l > m and l < n′. By Proposition 2, this implies
w |= sellSi (l) ∧ buySj (l), that is, there is a basic trade opportunity.
Example 6. Consider again Figure 4 on page 12 and let the model be a simple
trade market. As w2 |= Ba(v < 6)∧Bb(v > 6), there is a basic trade opportu-
nity from a to b for 6: w2 |= sellSa (6) ∧ buySb (6). In accordance with Theorem
1, the belief interval axis in Figure 4 illustrates that the belief interval of a
indeed 2-precedes the belief interval of b.
Note that the proof of Theorem 1 implies that there can be no basic trade
opportunities between traders i and j unless the belief interval of one of
them 2-precedes the interval of the other. Observe that in Figure 4, none of
a or c’s belief interval 2-precedes the other, and hence there is no basic trade
opportunity between a and c. The same holds between c and b.
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A formula ϕ ∈ L(t) is said to be propositional when it is constructed exclu-
sively from atomic formulas of the form v=n and propositional connectives
(¬ and ∨). Based on [9], for k ≥ 1 we say there is a kth-order false belief in a
world w of a modelM if there exists a sequence i1, . . . , ik ∈ A and a propo-
sitional formula ϕ such that
(M, w) |= ϕ ∧Bi1Bi2 ...Bik¬ϕ.
So there is a first-order false belief iff some true (propositional) formula is be-
lieved false by some trader. There is a second-order false belief iff for some
true (propositional) formula, some trader believes that some other trader be-
lieves it to be false. And so forth. The following corollary shows that for
simple traders, there is no trade opportunity unless one of them has a (first-
order) false belief.
Corollary 1. If there is a basic trade opportunity in a simple trade market,
then some trader has a first-order false belief.
Proof. Let model M—a simple trade market—and world w be given and
suppose that w |= v=o. Let two traders i and j be given with their respec-
tive belief intervals in w denoted [n,m] and [n′,m′]. Suppose there is a basic
trade opportunity: w |= sellSi (l) ∧ buySj (l) for some l. The proof of Theorem
1 implies that i’s belief interval 2-precedes j’s belief interval. Hence, for all
l ∈ [n,m], it holds that l 6∈ [n′,m′]. So, if o ∈ [n,m] then o 6∈ [n′,m′], and if
o ∈ [n′,m′] then o 6∈ [n,m]. Suppose first that o ∈ [n,m]. Then o 6∈ [n′,m′].
This implies w |= ¬Bˆj(v=o) and thus w |= Bj¬(v=o). Thus j has a first-order
false belief in w (concerning the formula v=o), as required. Suppose instead
that o 6∈ [n,m]. Then, similarly, w |= ¬Bˆi(v=o), and hence w |= Bj¬(v=o),
showing that i has a first-order false belief in w.
3.2 Basic Trade Opportunities in Greater Fools Markets
For simple traders, we were able to completely and simply categorize the
conditions for willingness to sell or buy in Proposition 2. This then led to a
similarly complete and simple categorisation of trade opportunities, Theo-
rem 1. As a corollary, we could then prove that trade opportunities can only
exist if one of the involved traders has a false (first-order) belief.
It is natural to search for similar results concerning greater fools traders.
Unfortunately, however, the results for simple traders do not easily general-
ize. Let us see why. Given a trader sequence j1, . . . , jk+1 with k ≥ 0, we can
define the j1, . . . , jk+1-belief interval in world w by:
[min{n′ | w |= Bj1 · · ·BjkBˆjk+1(v=n′)},min{n′ | w |= Bj1 · · ·BjkBˆjk+1(v=n′)}]
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This is the natural higher-order counterpart to the belief intervals introduced
in Section 2.3. Let [n,m] denote the j1, . . . , jk+1-belief interval in w of some
trader sequence with k ≥ 0. Then j1 believes that j2 believes that j3 believes
. . . that jk believes that the belief interval of jk+1 is [n,m]. We can prove that
j1 is willing to buy for l if l < n−k: j1 expects to be able to sell it for l+1 to j2,
who is expected to be able to sell it on for l+2 to j3, who is expected to . . . be
able to sell it on for l+k to jk+1. This works since we have assumed l < n−k,
and hence l + k < n, where n is the minimum value of the j1, . . . , jk+1-belief
interval.
So at first it might seem we can indeed characterize willingness to buy
through such intervals. But the problem is that it only gives a sufficient con-
dition for willingness to buy, not a necessary one. A greater fools trader j1
might expect to be able to sell the asset to an even greater fool, or a se-
quence of such greater fools, but this does not imply that trader j1 knows
the exact sequence of such greater fools. This comes from the disjunction in-
side the scope of the belief operator in the definition of greater fools buying:
Bi
∨
j∈A buy
GF
j (n+ 1). This formula expresses that trader i believes someone
to be willing to buy the asset for n+ 1, but there might not be a single trader
j that trader i believes is willing to buy the asset for n + 1: The formula
Bi
∨
j∈A buy
GF
j (n + 1) can be true, while still the formula Bibuy
GF
j (n + 1)
is false for all j ∈ A. This bears on the classic de dicto/de re distinction in
modal logic [8]. The following example illustrates the issue.
Example 7. Let modelM below be a greater fools trade market. Inw1, trader
a is willing to buy the asset for 4 because she believes that either b wants to
buy the asset for 5 or that c wants to buy the asset for 5, as w1 |= Bc(v=6)
and w2 |= Bb(v=6). We thus have w1 |= buyGFc (5) and w2 |= buyGFb (5), and
hence w1 |= Ba(buyGFb (5) ∨ buyGFc (5)). By definition of greater fools buying,
this implies w1 |= buyGFa (4). However, we also have w1 |= ¬Ba(buyGFb (5)) ∧
¬Ba(buyGFc (5)): Trader a does not have any beliefs about whether it is b or c
who is willing to buy it for 5. Of course trader a does not need this additional
information: It is enough to believe that some greater fool exists.
Also note that in this model, the belief interval of a is [3, 3]. So a is willing
to buy above her belief interval, which could not happen with simple traders.
We also have w1 |= sellGFa (4)∧buyGFb (4), so agent a is both willing to sell and
buy for 4. This should again be contrasted with simple traders, where we
argued that the following principle is valid: sellSi (n)→ ¬buySi (n).
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Figure 6: In this model, w1 |= buyGFa (4).
The issues illustrated above also imply that there is no natural greater
fools counterpart of Corollary 1 using kth-order false beliefs instead of first-
order beliefs. In fact, there can be a trading opportunity between two traders
in a greater fools market even without any of them having any kth-order
false beliefs, for all k ≥ 1. We omit the example for brevity.
4 Overpriced Trade Opportunities
Of particular interest are trades where assets are traded for prices above the
value of the asset. As it is extremely difficult [16, 17] to calculate the actual
value of an asset, traders may have false beliefs of the value of the asset.
Therefore, it is not surprising that assets are traded for prices above the actual
value of the asset. Consider the model in Figure 2 on page 2. In this model,
the actual value is 4, while the asset may be traded for 5 between a and b:
w1 |= v=4 ∧ sellSa (5) ∧ buySb (5). As b believes the asset is worth more than the
actual value 4, w1 |= Bb(v=7), a trade opportunity for 5 is not surprising.
More interesting are markets where assets are traded for prices above
what any trader in the market believes the value of the asset could be. Given
a modelM and a world w, let the highest believed value, denoted vBmax(w), be
the maximum value that any trader deems plausible:
vBmax(w) := max{n ∈ N | there exists i ∈ Awith w |= Bˆi(v=n)}
We call a trade opportunity for a price above the highest believed value
an overpriced trade opportunity. Given a modelM—a t trade market—a world
w in M and traders i, j ∈ A, there is an overpriced basic trade opportunity
from i to j when there is a basic trade opportunity from i to j for some price
n > vBmax(w). We introduce the following abbreviation for overpriced basic
trade opportunities:
obtradeti,j(w) :=
∨
vBmax(w)<n≤vmax(w)
btradeti,j(n)
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Note that the disjunction is limited from above by vmax(w). This does not
create any problems, as we already earlier concluded that there can be no
trade above vmax(w) (since it is common knowledge that the value of the
asset is less than or equal to vmax(w)). More generally, there is an overpriced
basic trade opportunity when there are two traders i, j ∈ A such that there is a
basic trade opportunity from i to j for some price n > vBmax(w):
obtradet(w) :=
∨
i,j∈A
∨
vBmax(w)<n≤vmax(w)
btradeti,j(n)
Proposition 3. In simple trade markets, no overpriced basic trade opportu-
nities exist.
Proof. Let model M and world w be given such that M is a simple trade
market. Assume for contradiction that w |= obtradeS(w). That means that
there are two traders i, j ∈ A such that w |= sellSi (n) ∧ buySj (n) for n >
vBmax(w). However, by definition of vBmax(w), there does not exists an i ∈ A
such that w |= Bˆi(v=n′) for n′ > vBmax(w). This implies w |= ¬Bj(v > n) and
thus w |= ¬buySj (n), which is a contradiction.
The above proposition should be contrasted with the following.
Proposition 4. In some greater fools trade markets, overpriced basic trade
opportunities exist.
Proof. We just need to provide a concrete example. Let the model in Figure
7 below be a greater fools market. While the highest believed value in w1 is
3, vBmax(w1) = 3, there is a greater fools basic trade opportunity for 4: w1 |=
sellGFa (4) ∧ buyGFb (4). That a wants to sell it for 4 follows from believing the
value to be only 3. That b wants to buy the asset for 4 follows from her belief
that c wants to buy the asset for 5: w1 |= BbBc(v > 5).
v=3
w1
v=6
w2
v=3
w3
v=6
w4
a, b, c
b b
a, b
c
Figure 7: A greater fools market with an overpriced basic trade opportunity
from a to b.
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5 Trading Announcements
A basic trade opportunity means that there in principle is a trade opportunity.
In practice there might not be a trade opportunity, since the market may
require that traders announce their willingness to trade before an actual trade
can take place. As we will show in this section, one trader’s announcement
of willingness to sell may make the other trader’s willingness to buy false—
and the other way around.
5.1 Public Trade Opportunities
Given modelM—a t trade market—and world w inM, there is a public trade
opportunity from i to j at price n, denoted ptradeti,j(n), when after the public
announcements of i’s willingness to sell and j’s willingness to buy, there still
is a basic trade opportunity:
ptradeti,j(n) := btrade
t
i,j(n) ∧ 〈!sellti(n)〉〈!buytj(n)〉btradeti,j(n)
The examples in this section are based on a simple trade market. How-
ever, as a basic trade opportunity in a simple trade market is a sufficient
condition for a basic trade opportunity in a greater fools trade market (that
is, sellSi (n) → sellGFi (n) and buySi (n) → buyGFi (n) are valid formulas for any
n ∈ N), the examples in this section also apply to greater fools markets.
Example 8. Let the model below be a simple trade market. Note that there
is a basic trade opportunity from a to b in w1: (M, w1) |= sellSa (4) ∧ buySb (4).
However, when b publicly announces her willingness to buy for 4, a does
not want to sell for 4 anymore. In the updated model (depicted on the right),
worlds w3 and w4 are eliminated with the result that a does not want to buy
for 4 anymore. So, in the original model on the left, a wants to sell for 4, but
after b announces her willingness to buy for 4, a does not want to sell for 4
anymore: (M, w1) |= sellSa (4) ∧ 〈!buySb (4)〉¬sellSa (4).
v=3
w1
v=5
w2
v=3
w3
v=5
w4
a, b
a a
a, b
v=3
w1
v=5
w2
v=3
w3
v=5
w4
a, b
Figure 8: In the model on the left, w1 |= sellSa (4). The model on the right
depicts the updated model after the announcement buySb (4) where sell
S
a (4) is
false.
Similar dynamics as in Example 8 are described by no trade theorems
[5, 18], where any attempt to initiate a trade reveals the initiator’s private
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information and therefore no trade will take place. Although the outcome is
comparable, no trade theorems and the dynamics in Example 8 are based on
different conditions.
5.2 Anonymous Trade Opportunities
Alternative, a trade might take place after announcements of willingness to
trade, but without knowing who the seller or buyer is, e.g. through an anony-
mous trading platform. Given modelM—a t trade market—and world w in
M, there is an anonymous trade opportunity from i to j at price n, denoted
atradeti,j(n), when after it has been publicly announced that someone is will-
ing to sell for n (without specifying who) and it has been publicly announced
that someone is willing to buy for n (without specifying who), there still is a
basic trade opportunity:
atradeti,j(n) := btrade
t
i,j(n) ∧ 〈!
∨
i′∈A
sellti′(n)〉〈!
∨
i′∈A
buyti′(n)〉btradeti,j(n)
Example 9. Let model M in Figure 9 be a simple trade market. We will
show in this example that there is an anonymous trade opportunity from
a to b for 5. To start, note that w1 |= Ba(v < 5) ∧ Bb(v > 5). So, w1 |=
sellSa (5)∧buySb (5): There is a basic trade opportunity for 5 inw1. Now suppose
it is announced that somebody (but we do not know who) is willing to sell for
5: !
∨
i∈A sell
S
i (5). Note that for all w ∈ W it holds that w |= sellSa (5)∨ sellSc (5).
Hence, the update with !
∨
i∈A sell
S
i (5) does not eliminate any world from the
original modelM. Then, suppose that it is announced that somebody (but
we do not know who) wants to buy for 5: !
∨
i∈A buy
S
i (5). As buy
S
i (5) is only
false in w7, the updated model is restricted toW \ {w7}. However, as w7 is
not related tow1 bya orb, this restriction does not change a and b’s beliefs
of the value. Thus, after the announcements
∨
i∈A sell
S
i (5) and
∨
i∈A buy
S
i (5),
it still holds that w1 |= sellSa (5) ∧ buySb (5). So, there is an anonymous trade
opportunity in modelM: (M, w1) |= atradeSa,b(5).
v=5
w1
v=4
w2
v=5
w3
v=6
w4
v=3
w6
v=4
w7
v=6
w5
b b b
a c c c
a
b
a
Figure 9: In this model, denoted M, w1 |= atradeSa,b(5) (Example 9);
w1 |= ¬ptradeSa,b(5) (Example 10); w1 |= ptradeSa,b(4) (Example 11); and
w1 |= ¬atradeSa,b(4) (Example 12).
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Example 10. Again consider modelM in Figure 9 to be a simple trade mar-
ket. Recall that w1 |= btradeSa,b(5). Now, imagine that trader a publicly an-
nounces her willingness to sell for 5: !sellSa (5). In the updated model, worlds
w3 and w4 get eliminated, as in these worlds sellSa (5) is false. See Figure 10
for the updated modelMsellSa (5) (wherew6 is omitted from the figure because
it is not related to w1). In the updated model, b believes the value is less than
5, so she does not want to buy for 5 anymore: (MsellSa (5), w1) |= ¬buySb (5).
Hence, the announcement of !sellSa (5) made btrade
S
a,b(5) false. That means
that there is no public trade opportunity from a to b for 5 in the original
modelM: (M, w1) |= ¬ptradeSa,b(5).
v=5
w1
v=4
w2
v=5
w3
v=6
w4
v=3
w6
v=4
w7
v=6
w5
b
a c
a
b
a
Figure 10: The result of updating modelM in Figure 9 with !sellSa (5) (Exam-
ple 10) or with !
∨
i∈A sell
S
i (4) (Example (12).
The above two examples show that the existence of an anonymous trade
opportunity does not necessarily imply that there is a public trade opportu-
nity. In the following two examples, we will show the opposite: A public
trade opportunity does not necessarily imply that there is an anonymous
trade opportunity.
Example 11. Consider again modelM in Figure 9 to be a simple trade mar-
ket. We will now show that w1 |= ptradeSa,b(4).
To start, observe that w1 |= Ba(v < 4) ∧ Bb(v > 4) and thus that there
is a basic trade opportunity for 4 in w1: w1 |= sellSa (4) ∧ buySb (4). When
a then publicly announces that she wants to sell for 4, the updated model
consists only of worlds w1, w5 and w6. That is, because only in these worlds
sellSa (4) is true. In the resulting model, see Figure 11, b still wants to buy for 4:
(MsellSa (4), w1) |= buySb (4). Then, when b publicly announces that she wants
to buy for 4, no further worlds are eliminated because buySb (4) holds in all
w ∈ {w1, w5, w6}. So, after public announcements of sellSa (4) and buySb (4), it
still holds that there is a basic trade opportunity from a to b for 4. Hence:
(M, w1) |= ptradeSa,b(4).
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v=5
w1
v=4
w2
v=5
w3
v=6
w4
v=3
w6
v=4
w7
v=6
w5
a
a
b
a
Figure 11: In this model, w1 |= btradeSa,b(4).
Example 12. Once again, consider modelM in Figure 9 and assumeM is a
simple trade market. Recall that there is a basic trade opportunity inM from
a to b for 4. In contrast to the announcement !sellSa (4), the announcement
!
∨
i∈A sell
S
i (4) does make btrade
S
a,b(4) false. That is because the announce-
ment that somebody is willing to sell for 4 does not eliminate world w2, as
w2 |= sellSc (4). In the updated model, identical to the model depicted in Fig-
ure 10, b believes that the value is 4 and thus does not want to buy for 4
anymore: (M
∨
i∈A sell
S
i (4), w1) |= ¬buySb (4). Hence: (M, w1) |= ¬atradeSa,b(4).
These examples show that it matters for the possibility of trade whether
or the market requires traders to publicly announce that they are willing to
trade, or whether the announcements may be performed anonymously.
5.3 Overpriced Trading Announcements
The obtained results regarding overpriced basic trade opportunities may be
easily generalized to overpriced public- and overpriced anonymous trade
opportunities. Generalizing the definition for overpriced basic trade oppor-
tunities, let ? ∈ {b, p, a}. Then, an overpriced ? trade opportunity is abbrevi-
ated as follows:
o ? tradet(w) :=
∨
i,j∈A
∨
vBmax(w)<n≤vmax(w)
?tradeti,j(n)
We generally say ‘overpriced basic trade opportunity’ instead of ‘overpriced
b trade opportunity’, and similar for overpriced public (p) and anonymous (a)
trade opportunities.
Proposition 3 showed that there cannot be an overpriced based trade op-
portunity in a simple trade market. As a basic trade opportunity is a neces-
sary condition for public and anonymous trade opportunities, Proposition 3
directly implies that there can neither be an overpriced public- or an over-
priced anonymous trade opportunity in a simple trade market.
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Further, Propositon 4 showed that there may be an overpriced basic trade
opportunity in a greater fools trade market. Figure 7 in the proof of Proposi-
ton 4 may also be used to show that there may be an overpriced public-
and an overpriced anonymous trade opportunity in a greater fools mar-
ket. That is, because a and b’s plausibility relations in model M in Figure
7 are known by all traders. Therefore, public announcements !sellGFa (4) and
!buyGFb (4) do not invoke any changes to model M. For the same reason,
the announcements
∨
i∈A sell
GF
i (4) and
∨
i∈A buy
GF
i (4) do not invoke any
changes either. So, we may conclude that there is an overpriced public-
and an overpriced anonymous trade opportunity in w1 in Figure 7: w1 |=
optradeGFa,b (4) ∧ oatradeGFa,b (4).
6 Summary and Future Directions
In this paper, we have explored conditions for trade opportunities in two
kinds of trade markets: simple trade markets and greater fools trade mar-
kets. Where traders in a simple trade market base their willingness to trade
exclusively on their personal belief of the value of the asset, traders in a
greater fools trade market also base their willingness to trade on what they
believe others are willing to pay. The complexity of a greater fools trader’s
motivation to engage in trade suggests that epistemic logic is a natural and
expressive framework to formalize the higher-order content of greater fools
reasoning.
Further, we have shown that in a greater fools market it may occur that
the asset is traded for a price higher than what any trader in the market be-
lieves the asset to be worth. Finally, we have shown that traders’ announce-
ments of willingness to sell or buy may make the trade opportunity false.
It therefore matters for the possibility of trade whether and how traders are
required to announce their willingness to trade. We will end this paper by
discussing some directions for future work.
Firstly, while the framework in this paper only allows for public
announcements, existing frameworks for dynamic epistemic logic allow for
more complex information dynamics (see e.g. [6] for an overview). For
example, traders may receive defeasible information about the value of the
asset or about other traders and update their beliefs accordingly. Further,
instead of being informed of the same information at the same time, traders
may receive information in a private setting. A framework that allows for
private information update may facilitate the investigation of trade markets
where traders are asymmetrically informed and the possibility of an
overpriced trade opportunity in such markets, cf. [10].
Secondly, in this paper we focus on trade markets with exclusively
traders of one type, but alternatively one could define trade opportunities
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between traders of different types. When trader types are moreover
explicitly modeled in a plausibility model, traders may reason about the
types of the other traders, which in effect may influence their beliefs and
willingness to engage in trade.
Thirdly, the framework of this paper may be used to formalize other types
of traders that employ higher-order reasoning. For example, it may be inter-
esting to include a herding trader to the framework. Intuitively, a herding
trader wants to buy for n if she believes other people want to buy for n. It
may likewise be interesting to include a maximizing trader to the framework.
Intuitively, a maximizing trader only wants to buy the asset if she believes
that it is the “best” deal she can get, that is, if she believes that there is no
trader that wants to sell the asset for less. A framework that includes herd-
ing traders and maximizing traders and that allows for trade markets with
mixed trader types may be used to explore the interaction between these
trader types.
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Intensional Protocols for Dynamic
Epistemic Logic
Hanna S. van Lee, Rasmus K. Rendsvig and Suzanne van Wijk
Abstract
In dynamical multi-agent systems, agents are controlled by
protocols. In choosing a class of formal protocols, an implicit choice is
made concerning the types of agents, actions and dynamics
representable. This paper investigates one such: An intensional
protocol class for agent control in dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), called
‘DEL dynamical systems’. After illustrating how such protocols may be
used in formalizing and analyzing information dynamics, the types of
epistemic temporal models that they may generate are characterized.
This facilitates a formal comparison with the only other formal protocol
framework in dynamic epistemic logic, namely the extensional ‘DEL
protocols’. The paper is concluded with a conceptual comparison,
highlighting modeling tasks where DEL dynamical systems are natural.
Keywords Dynamic epistemic logic · Multi-agent systems · Protocols ·
Dynamical systems · Epistemic temporal logic
1 Introduction
In logically modeling dynamics in multi-agent systems—whether by global-
perspective frameworks like interpreted systems [24] and epistemic tempo-
ral logic [51], or by local-perspective frameworks like dynamic epistemic
logic [6]—the dynamics rely on protocols: control mechanisms that determine
which actions may occur when.
Protocols take a plethora of forms, ranging from natural language de-
scriptions, over pseudo-code renderings, to fully formalized representations.
Moreover, protocol specifications may vary in their fundamental structure.
Specifically, one may distinguish between extensional protocols and inten-
sional protocols.1
1The terms and distinction is adopted from Parikh and Ramanujam, see [51, Sec. 2.2].
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Extensional protocols are temporal: They consult an external clock to spec-
ify which actions are available for execution at a given time of a run of a
system. Roughly speaking, an extensional protocol is a set of sequences of
actions that allows the execution of action a at time t if a is on the tth posi-
tion of a sequence in the protocol. Abstractly, think of a function assigning
to each natural number a set of allowed actions.
Intensional protocols, in contrast, are conditional: They consult the current
state of the system to specify which actions are available for execution now.
Roughly speaking, a conditional protocol is a set of “if ϕ, do a” state-
ments. Such a statement—or rule—allow the execution of action a now if
the current state satisfies the test condition ϕ. Abstractly, think of a function
assigning to each possible state of the system some set of allowed actions.
Both extensional and intensional protocols qua protocols have been inves-
tigated in the epistemic agency literature, but mainly in different paradigms:
Where the interpreted systems literature has favored intensional protocols
[24, 46, 61], the literature on protocols in dynamic epistemic logic has favored
extensional protocols [16, 20, 39, 38, 60, 57].
There is, however, no formal reason to avoid intensional protocols in the
dynamic epistemic logic setting. In fact, such protocols may be both intuitive
and compact in representation. Moreover, the mathematical basis and logical
theory for intensional protocols enjoys established results, albeit not cast as
results concerning protocols (cf. Sec. 1.2 on related literature).
This paper concerns intensional protocols for dynamic epistemic logic
(DEL). In particular, it investigates intensional protocols as represented by
multi-pointed action models applied iteratively. By this, the paper takes a
discrete-time dynamical systems perspective on protocols for information
dynamics. The resulting intensional protocols are referred to as DEL
dynamical systems.
The overarching question of the paper is how such intensional protocols
relate to their closest extensional relative, namely the DEL protocols of van
Benthem, Gerbrandy, Hoshi and Pacuit, [16]. The main motivation for this
question is a wish to clarify similarities and differences in the implicit as-
sumptions and restrictions inherent in the two frameworks. This, in turn, is
motivated by a desire to understand up- and downsides of protocol frame-
works from a design and modeling perspective.
Methodologically, the main comparison is achieved by characterizing the
types of epistemic temporal logic (ETL) models generatable by intensional
protocols coded as DEL dynamical systems, and compare the resulting ETL
properties with those previously obtained for extensional DEL protocols by
van Benthem, Gerbrandy, Hoshi and Pacuit.
This methodology has a two-fold incentive, foremost of which is that ETL
models provide an assumption-free common point of reference between the
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two protocol forms, thus allowing a comparison of induced properties.2 This
is desirable as the fundamental difference between extensional and inten-
sional protocols—that one relies on an external clock whereas the other reacts
to the current state—makes it difficult to compare the protocol frameworks
directly. In particular, then the structure of an extensional protocol is not, in
general, enough to determine whether the resulting sequence of models may
be obtained from an intensional protocol. The second aspect of the motiva-
tion is that the methodology as a by-product relates DEL dynamical systems
to ETL models, thus yielding results illuminating the former, on which there
has been a recent interest, cf. Sec. 1.2 on related literature.
1.1 Structure of the Paper
Section 2 defines core DEL components as well as intensional protocols
(“DEL dynamical systems”) and extensional protocols (“DEL protocols”).
These are informally compared and contrasted by example. Finally, it is
illustrated how DEL dynamics may be seen as producing ETL models.
Section 4 presents ETL models and eight structural properties of key rele-
vance to the paper.
Section 5 formally defines how to generate ETL models from DEL dynamical
systems and contains a first result: For an ETL model to be generatable by a
DEL dynamical system, it must necessarily satisfy specific seven of the eight
structural properties, but not necessarily the eighth.
Section 6 concerns the other direction: Constructing DEL dynamical systems
that will generate a given ETL model. It will be shown that if an ETL model
possesses all eight structural properties, then this is sufficient for a suitable
DEL dynamical system to exist.
Jointly, the results of Sections 5 and 6 almost yield a characterization of
the ETL models generatable by DEL dynamical systems, but not quite.
Section 7 restricts attention to a subclass of DEL dynamical systems and a
subclass of ETL models: When a DEL dynamical system is image-finite and
concluding, it generates an image-finite and concluding ETL model. In this case,
a proper characterization is obtained: The eight properties are both necessary
and sufficient.
Section 8 moves the attention to non-deterministic intensional protocols, im-
plemented by running several (deterministic) DEL dynamical systems in
parallel. The motivation is a tighter correspondence with the methodology
of extensional DEL protocols, of which only special cases are deterministic.
2It is also a point of reference for other frameworks, like interpreted systems or extensive games
with imperfect information, cf. the motivation in [16].
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The section presents weaker, necessary properties of ETL models generated
by families of DEL dynamical systems.
Section 9 contains the main comparison of intensional and extensional proto-
cols for DEL, based on the differences in structural properties of generatable
ETL models. The section thus compares and discusses the present results
with those of van Benthem, Gerbrandy, Hoshi and Pacuit [16].
Section 10 concludes with open questions.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is situated in the literature on epistemic logic in the tradition
of Hintikka [37] with focus on the temporal development of knowledge in
multi-agent systems. In the DEL approach to this topic, a temporal dynam-
ics is a sequence of self-contained models m1,m2,m3, ... where all but the
initial is obtained from the former by some transformation (see e.g. [7, 22]
for introductions). This perspective stands in contrast to models representing
dynamics internally, from the outset offering a full, unfolded view of time.
This is the contrast between the local and global—or Grand Stage—views on
dynamics, in the terms of van Benthem [11]. Grand Stage models may typi-
cally be envisioned as temporal trees or forests with branches connected by
agent-index relations. For illustrations, see the ETL models depicted in Sec-
tions 2, 4.
Grand Stage models have been a go-to in the literature on distributed
computing. ETL models are typically attributed to Parikh and Ramanujam
[50], while an early source on the interpreted systems framework is Halpern
and Moses’ [33] where protocols and the existence of correct protocols are
objects of study (see [24] for an introduction). Several of the properties of
ETL models of interest in this paper (see Sec. 6) have previously been studied
in Grand Stage models, including synchronous/asynchronous agency and
perfect recall, in relation to axiomatizations and complexity [47, 32, 45, 34,
35, 36].
In interpreted systems, intensional protocols are common-place, exempli-
fied by the pioneering knowledge-based programs of Fagin, Halpern, Moses and
Vardi [24]. There, an agent’s possibly non-deterministic behavior is specified
by a set of instructions of the form “if Kiϕ, do a”. From an initial state
of a system, a joint set of instructions for agents and the environment speci-
fies the next state. Over time, the initial state is thus unfolded to produce a
temporal model. As such, knowledge-based programs is a local mechanism
for generating Grand Stage models.
Automata theory provides an alternative approach to generating (and also
classifying) Grand Stage models such as epistemic trees and forests. Taking
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branches as words, a class of forests may possibly correspond to the lan-
guage accepted by a given class of finite-state machines. This approach is
taken by Mohalik and Ramanujam [48] for ETL models (a related work for
interpreted systems is [46]). Mohalik and Ramanujam study agents comput-
ing asynchronously, but with occasional synchronous full and perfect infor-
mation exchange. Each agent is locally modeled by a finite transition system,
from which a product automaton determines global behavior. The authors
show a range of results concerning the language of the class of such product
automata. Mohalik and Ramanujam remark on a connection to generating
ETL models using DEL action models as undertaken in [16] (see below), but
leave the relation an open question. Touching vaguely on such a connection
is [54], where Rendsvig shows that Liu, Seligman, and Girard’s social net-
work belief dynamics induced by transition system agents [44] may be pre-
sented using DEL action models. A direct connection between automata the-
ory, forest generation and DEL may be found in the work of Aucher, Maubert
and Pinchinat [4]. The authors show that iterating a finite action model with
Boolean pre- and postconditions on an initial finite Kripke model produces
a regular structure, admitting representation by a finite-state synchronous
transducer. Several other papers on DEL draw connections to automata the-
ory without direct links to forest generation [3, 18, 40]. As the characteriza-
tion results in Section 7 concern ETL models with finite or repetitive nature,
these may possibly be generated by some finite-state mechanism.3 To ex-
plore the relation between automata theory and the present work is future
work (see Section 10).
More narrowly within the DEL literature, especially two strands of re-
search are of relevance: work on protocols and DEL and work DEL and dy-
namical systems. The first comprises [20, 38, 39, 60, 57, 13] and van Ben-
them, Gerbrandy, Hoshi and Pacuit’s [16]. All papers in this collection use or
study extensional protocols in the style of Parikh and Ramanujam [50, 51],
with various purposes. Of special interest to the present is [16]: In [16], the
authors investigate which classes of ETL models one may generate using
action models, product update and extensional protocols. Their results are
illuminating in elucidating epistemic and logical properties inherent in the
DEL methodology. The methodology and results of [16] are presented and
discussed throughout.
The second strand of DEL research concerns the iterated application of
DEL model transformers on sets of pointed Kripke models. In this strand,
some works casts such iterations exactly as dynamical systems.4 This idea
3We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
4For the interested reader, there also exists a body of literature taking the converse perspective,
using logics to describe qualitative aspects of long-run behavior. On this approach, logic meets
dynamical systems by the latter playing the role of semantics to the former. Papers falling in
this category, detailing logics of dynamical topological systems, include Kremer and Mints’ 2007
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was first explicitly put in play by Sadzik in 2006 [58]; he investigates frame
conditions for action models that guarantee a stabilizing orbit modulo bisim-
ulation, drawing on conceptual ideas from van Benthem, advanced in 2002
[10]. Since, various works have honed in on long-run behavior of iterated
model transformations—with e.g. [1, 9, 30] concerned with aspects of belief
change, and [3, 4, 18, 19] describing epistemic planning—without explicit ties
to dynamical systems. An interesting approach to protocol learning is taken
by van Ditmarsch, Ghosh, Verbrugge and Wang in [21], using a variation of
action models labeled with a protocol specification language. Closer to the
present approach is [53, 55] where information dynamics are modeled us-
ing a DEL intensional protocol format akin to (one-step) planning problems
of Bolander and Birkegaard [18]. In [56], that same protocol format is cast in
dynamical systems terms and shown effectively equivalent with both a DEL-
variant of knowledge-based programs and the multi-pointed action models
of Baltag and Moss [5]. This results motivates the use of multi-pointed ac-
tion models both here and in [40, 41]. In [40, 41], iterated dynamics of multi-
pointed action models are construed in a topological setting, inducing maps
that satisfy the common definition of a dynamical system: A compact, metric
space under the action of a continuous function.5
In none of the mentioned papers is DEL investigated as a dynamical sys-
tem qua its role as protocol defining, and neither have the resulting sequences
been related to the Grand Stage ETL models they generate nor to extensional
protocols.
2 Protocols for DEL
In this section, standard notions from dynamic epistemic logic are intro-
duced together with intensional and extensional DEL protocols. The reader
is referred to the excellent literature on the topic of epistemic logic and DEL
for more information and philosophical interpretation: See e.g. [37, 24, 6, 8,
23, 11, 7, 15, 14, 22].
handbook chapter [43] (on research from 1997 onwards by e.g. Artemov [2] and the authors
of [42]) and several recent papers by Fernandz-Duque [25, 26, 27]; Sarenac’s paper from 2011
[59] exploring modal logical approaches to describing iterated function systems; and finally van
Benthem’s work in [10, 12], outlining various possible logical approaches to fixed points and
limit cycles of dynamical systems by applying fixed-point and oscillation operators galvanized
by modal µ-calculus. The latter two papers additionally provide an excellent bridge between
the high abstraction level approach to logic and dynamical systems of this note and the micro-
perspective literature in the main text.
5This paper omits the topological augmentation as moving between concrete DEL models and
the abstract quotient models of [40, 41] introduce additional steps in the arguments used to
compare sequences of DEL models with ETL models.
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2.1 Pointed Kripke Models and Language
Let a countable, non-empty set of propositional atoms Φ and a finite, non-
empty set of agents I be given. Throughout the paper, it will be assumed
that these sets remain fixed.
A Kripke model is a tuple M = (JMK , R, J·K) where
JMK is a countable, non-empty set of states;
R : I −→ P(JMK × JMK) assigns to each agent i an accessibility
relation R(i), also denoted Ri;
J·K : Φ −→ P(JMK) is a valuation, assigning to each atom an
extension of states.
A pair (M, s) with s ∈ JMK is called a pointed Kripke model with s called
the designated state. Throughout, the pair (M, s) is written Ms.
Where p ∈ Φ and i ∈ I , define a language L(Φ,I) by
ϕ := > | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | iϕ
with non-propositional formulas evaluated over pointed Kripke model Ms
by
Ms |= iϕ iff for all t ∈ JMK, sRit implies Mt |= ϕ,
and standard propositional semantics.
Using standard modal modal logical semantics makes bisimulation the
natural notion of equality between pointed Kripke models (see e.g. [17]).
With M = (JMK , R, J·K) and M ′ = (JM ′K , R′, J·K′) two Kripke models, a bi-
nary relation Z ⊆ JMK× JM ′K is a bisimulation if, for all i ∈ I :
1. If sZs′, then satisfy the same atoms: for all p ∈ Φ, s ∈ JpK iff s′ ∈ JpK′,
2. If sZs′ and sRit, then there exists a t′ ∈ JM ′K such that tZt′ and s′R′it′,
and
3. If sZs′ and s′Rit′, then there exists a t ∈ JMK such that tZt′ and sRit.
When Z is a bisimulation and sZs′, the pointed Kripke models Ms and M ′s′
are bisimilar, denoted Ms -M ′s′.
2.2 Action Models and Product Update
In dynamic epistemic logic, dynamics are introduced by transitioning be-
tween pointed Kripke models from some set X using a possibly partial map
f : X −→ X . Such a map is often referred to as a model transformer. Many
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model transformers have been suggested in the literature, the most well-
known being truthful public announcement, !ϕ [52]. Truthful public announce-
ments are a special case of a rich class of model transformers, here referred
to as the class of clean maps.
In essence, a clean map f is given by f(x) = c(x ⊗ a) with specific term
a, product ⊗ and restricting operation c. The term a is based on a deter-
ministic multi-pointed action model, defined below.6 Intuitively, one may think
of a clean map as a set of program lines, each of the form “If ϕi, do ai”,
where the preconditions ϕi are mutually exclusive. When “run” on a pointed
Kripke model x, the program checks if x satisfies any ϕi. If so, it executes ac-
tion ai (a sub-action of a) on x, obtaining the result x⊗ a. If not, the product
of x and a is undefined. Finally, the operation c removes redundant states.
Their usage is exemplified in Section 3.2.
Define an action model as a tuple Σ = (JΣK ,R, pre, post), sharing lan-
guage L(Φ,I) with models in X , where
JΣK is a countable, non-empty set of actions σ;
R : I −→ P(JΣK × JΣK) assigns an accessibility relation R(i) to
each index i ∈ I , with R(i) denoted Ri;
pre : JΣK −→ L(Φ,I) assigns to each action a precondition, speci-
fying the conditions under which σ is executable;
post : JΣK −→ L(Φ,I) assigns to each action a postcondition (a
conjunctive clause7 over Φ, or >). The postcondition specifies
whether σ changes the values of select atoms.
A pair (Σ,Γ) with ∅ 6= Γ ⊆ JΣK is a multi-pointed action model with Γ
the set of designated actions; (Σ,Γ) is also written ΣΓ. If Γ is a singleton
{σ}, then ΣΓ is called single-pointed and is written Σσ. If X |= pre(σ) ∧
pre(σ′) → ⊥ for each σ 6= σ′ ∈ Γ, then ΣΓ is called deterministic over X ,
for X a set of pointed Kripke models. The term deterministic is used as the
requirement ensures that at most one designated action from Γ updates the
designated state s when ΣΓ is applied to a pointed Kripke model Ms ∈ X
using product update ⊗. The product Ms⊗ ΣΓ is the pointed Kripke model
6Action models and product update was introduced in [6]. The extension to multi-pointed
action models came with [5]. The present version of postconditions is inspired by [23] and
the usage of deterministic models by [56].
7I.e. a conjunction of literals, where a literal is an atomic proposition or a negated atomic propo-
sition.
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(JMΣK , R′, J·K′, s′) with
JMΣK = {(s, σ) ∈ JMK× JΣK : Ms |= pre(σ)}
R′ = {((s, σ), (t, τ)) : (s, t) ∈ Ri and (σ, τ) ∈ Ri} , for all i ∈ IJpK′ = {(s, σ) :s ∈ JpK, post(σ) 2 ¬p} ∪ {(s, σ) :post(σ)p} , for all p∈Φ
s′ = (s, σ) : σ ∈ Γ and Ms |= pre(σ)
If Ms does not satisfy the precondition of any action σ in Γ or if ΣΓ is not
deterministic over {Ms}, then the product is undefined.
In the product Ms ⊗ ΣΓ, there may be states that are not reachable from the
point (s, σ) via any collection of relations. Such states are, for present pur-
poses, superfluous: They neither affect the formulas satisfied at (s, σ) nor the
set of models with which (Ms ⊗ ΣΓ, (s, σ)) is bisimilar. As it is later conve-
nient to work with correspondence between structures up to isomorphism,
in the current paper such superfluous states are always deleted.
Superfluous states are deleted by regarding only the substructure of any
pointed Kripke model Ms that is connected to the actual state s. This sub-
structure is denoted C(Ms) and is defined as follows:
Let R∗ be the reflexive, transitive and symmetric closure of
{Ri}i∈I . Let R∗(s) be the set of states reachable from s via R∗, i.e.,
R∗(s) := {s′ ∈ JMK : (s, s′) ∈ R∗}. Then the connected component of Ms is
the unpointed substructure C(Ms) := (JMK|R∗(s) , R|R∗(s), V|R∗(s)). With
s′ ∈ JC(Ms)K, C(Ms)s′ is thus again a pointed Kripke model. In particular,
C(Ms)s is bisimilar to Ms.8,9
2.3 Intensional Protocols: DEL Dynamical Systems
The most general class of maps—the intensional protocols—of interest in the
following may now be defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Clean Map). Let X be a set of pointed Kripke models. A clean
map on X is any possibly partial model transformer f : X −→ X given by
f(x) = C(x ⊗ ΣΓ)s′, for all x ∈ X , with ΣΓ a multi-pointed action model
deterministic over X .
Defining intensional protocols using mappings, it is required that also
their domain and range be specified:
Definition 2 (DEL dynamical system). A DEL dynamical system is a pair
(X, f) where X is a set of pointed Kripke models and f is a clean map on
8This is not a bisimulation contraction (cf. [31]): C(Ms)s need not be bisimulation minimal.
9The authors apologize for the cumbersome notation: It is useful when later working with con-
nected components in unpointed epistemic, temporal structures.
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X . A pointed DEL dynamical system (X, f, x) is augmented with an initial
model x ∈ X , assumed to be connected.
The orbit of (X, f, x) is the (possibly finite) sequence x, f(x), f(f(x)), ....
Misusing notation if fk(x) is undefined for some k ∈ N, the orbit is denoted
〈fk(x)〉k∈N.
Remark 1. This definition of a DEL dynamical system is restrictive. A
broader definition would allow f to be any bisimulation-preserving map.
2.4 Extensional Protocols: DEL Protocols
In [16], two types of DEL protocols are defined, one allowing the protocol
to vary from state to state of the initial model and one where the protocol is
“common knowledge”:
Definition 3 (DEL Protocol). Let E be the class of all L(Φ,I) single-pointed
action models. Let E∗ be the class of all finite sequences of elements from E.
A set P ⊆ E∗ is a DEL protocol iff P is closed under non-empty prefixes. Let
Ptcl(E) denote the class of all DEL protocols.
Let Ms be a pointed Kripke model. A state-dependent DEL protocol on
Ms is a map
p : JMK −→ Ptcl(E).
If p is constant over JMK, i.e., if for all s, t ∈ JMK, p(s) = p(t), then p is a
uniform DEL protocol.
A DEL protocol specifies which pointed action models may be executed at a
given time—whether they can be executed then again depends on the pre-
conditions of the designated action. Their usage is exemplified in Section
3.2.
2.5 An Initial Comparison
Although DEL protocols and DEL dynamical systems invoke the same rudi-
mentary changes by using action models, they differ vastly in structure. In
particular, where every DEL dynamical systems encodes a deterministic10
protocol—by virtue of being defined as a mapping—DEL protocols may be
non-deterministic. Roughly, DEL dynamical systems may be correlated with
state-dependent and uniform DEL protocols in the following manner:
. A DEL dynamical system is analogous to a deterministic, uniform DEL
protocol: A DEL protocol P ⊆ E∗ for which all sequence ς, ς ′ ∈ P, either
ς is a prefix of ς ′ or vice versa.
10In the sense that given any input state (pointed Kripke model), the protocol outputs at most a
single resulting state.
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. A non-deterministic, uniform DEL protocol is analogous to a family of
DEL dynamical system, executed in parallel on the same pointed Kripke
model.
. A non-deterministic, non-uniform DEL protocol is analogous to a fam-
ily of DEL dynamical systems, executed in parallel on different pointed
Kripke models, all of which are identical up to the choice of designated
state.
In the present, dealing with non-uniform DEL protocols or their DEL dy-
namical systems counterparts will be omitted.
Without going through ETL models, DEL dynamical systems and uni-
form DEL protocols may be related, showing that the orbits obtainable from
DEL dynamical systems is a sub-class of those obtainable using DEL proto-
cols:
Proposition 1. Let (X, f, x) be a pointed DEL dynamical system. Then there
exists a singleton uniform DEL protocol that produces the orbit of f from x.
Proof. At each iteration, the clean map f is—in effect—going to execute a
single-pointed action model. Copying the sequence of the executed action
models provides a uniform DEL protocol. For details, see Appendix on
page 39.
The converse of Proposition 1 does not hold: There exists pointed Kripke
models with associated singleton uniform DEL protocols that produce se-
quences of pointed Kripke models not duplicatable by any DEL dynamical
system.11 This is a consequence of DEL protocols being extensional: Not only
do they consult the information inherent in the present model to determine
ensuing actions, but also the current time, exogenously provided by the se-
quential nature of the protocol. This information is not available to DEL
dynamical systems and can therefore not be used in guiding dynamics.
As remarked in the introduction, this feature makes it difficult to com-
pare DEL protocols and DEL dynamical systems directly: The structure of
the DEL protocol may not be enough to determine whether the resulting
sequence of pointed Kripke models may be obtained as the orbit of a DEL
dynamical system. Hence the current approach, a comparison using ETL
models.
11An example is the following: Let a two-state pointed Kripke model Ms with Ms |= p∧ q and
Mt |= p∧¬q be given. Let p(s) = {(!p), (!p, !p∧q)}with !ϕ the truthful public announcement
of ϕ. Then p on Ms produces the sequence (Ms,Ms,M ′s) with JM ′K = JMK\{t}. No clean
map can duplicate this sequence: As f(Ms) =Ms, the system has reached a fixed point from
which it will never deviate to produce M ′s.
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s : on
Ms :
t : ¬on
Nt :
Figure 1: Two possible states of the light: the pointed Kripke models Ms where the
light is on andNtwhere the light is off. The child knows the state of the light in either
model.
σ :
(on,¬on)
τ :
(¬on, on)
f :
if on, do turnoff
if ¬on, do turnon
Figure 2: Left: An intensional protocol. Right: An implementation of the intensional
protocol. The clean map f is based on a multi-pointed action model ΣΓ with two
actions. The action σ represents turnoff: it can be executed only when the light is on,
and in effect turns it off. The action τ similarly represents turnon. All (both) actions
are designated actions of Σ, i.e., JΣK = {σ, τ} = Γ, as indicated by their bold dotted
boundaries. Which of the designated actions in fact occurs in a given application
depends on the pointed Kripke model ΣΓ is executed on.
3 Examples
To give a flavor of DEL dynamical systems and DEL protocols in use, this
section contains two examples. The examples are simple and do not show-
case the complex agency representable by DEL protocols and DEL dynami-
cal systems, but offer a ground for comparison. For an example of how DEL
dynamical systems may be used to model a complex, multi-agent scenario
with a range of agent types, see [55] where Rendsvig models the information
dynamics of the bystander effect from social psychology.
3.1 Example 1: Blowing the Bulb
A family wishes to switch to LED lighting, but still has an incandescent bulb
they consider a waste to throw out unused. They therefore instruct a child
to perpetually switch the lights on and off, hoping to blow the bulb. The
two possible initial states of the situation are depicted in Fig. 1. One way of
providing instructions to the child, c, is by the intensional protocol of Fig. 2
(left). This protocol may be represented by a DEL dynamical system (X, f),
withX = {Ms,Nt} and f the clean map of the action model in Fig. 2 (right).
Applying f to e.g. Ms will produce Nt: Only the precondition of σ is satis-
fied at s, so (s, σ) is the only surviving state and the postcondition of σ forces
it to satisfy ¬on. Finally, (s, σ) is related to itself by Rc as both s and σ are
self-related for c. An additional application of f returns the system to Ms.
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Executed anywhere on X , f implements the desired protocol.
Alternatively, the instructions may be provided by an extensional proto-
col, e.g., by telling the child to flip between turning on the light and turning
off the light perpetually. With Σ1 and Σ2 the restrictions of Σ to, respectively,
σ and τ , the sequences
P1 = Σ1σ,Σ2τ,Σ1σ,Σ2τ,Σ1σ,Σ2τ,Σ1σ,Σ2τ, ...
P2 = Σ2τ,Σ1σ,Σ2τ,Σ1σ,Σ2τ,Σ1σ,Σ2τ,Σ1σ, ...
instructs to perpetually change between executing the turnon, turnoff actions;
P1 instructs to start with turnoff while P2 instructs to start with turnon. The
uniform DEL protocol p = {P1, P2} will then, when executed anywhere on
X , implement the desired protocol: If e.g. Nt is the initial condition, the
first instruction of P1 will fail to be executed, but the first instruction of P2
will succeed, producing Nt, on which the second instruction of P2 again will
succeed, etc.
Adding scorn to futility, following either protocol, the bulb never blows.
3.2 Example 2: The Muddy Children Puzzle
To illustrate the differences in use of DEL dynamical systems qua intensional
protocols and uniform DEL protocols qua extensional protocols, two such
formal protocols of the classic Muddy Children Puzzle, well-known in the
DEL literature (see e.g. [29, 22]), are presented. As a simplified version of the
puzzle is sufficient for present purposes, attention is restricted to the case
with three children.
The puzzle initiates with a partial description of an epistemic state:
Three brilliant children have been playing outside. During play,
each may have obtained a muddy forehead. Each can tell
whether or not others have muddy foreheads, but cannot tell
this of themselves. Upon returning home from play, an adult of
unspecified gender informs the children that at least one of them
is muddy.
Following standard practice in DEL, this partial description is modeled as
an unpointed Kripke model for a language L(Φ,I) with the set of agents
I = {a, b, c} and the set of atoms Φ = {a, b, c} with i ∈ Φ read “child i
is muddy”. The unpointed model M is illustrated in Figure 3. A pointed
Kripke model results when a designated state is determined: This corre-
sponds to fixing which children became muddy during play. Denote the
set of resulting pointed Kripke models XM .
The puzzle specification continues by the adult detailing a protocol by
which the children should update the initial epistemic state:
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s : abc
t2 : abct1 : abc t3 : abc
t4 : abc t6 : abct5 : abc
M :
c
c c
b
b b
a
aa
Figure 3: Unpointed Kripke model M representing the initial situation of
the Muddy Children Puzzle. Each state specifies which children are muddy,
where for all i ∈ Φ, i := ¬i, that is, “child i is not muddy”. Labeled relations
between states represent indistinguishability for the children. Reflexive rela-
tions are omitted.
“Concurrently with this metronome,” the adult instructs,
“repeatedly and simultaneously announce aloud whether or not
you know whether or not you are muddy.”
By means of a suitable model of this protocol, it is desirable to be able to
answer the main question of the puzzle, namely:
If there are n muddy children, how many times does the
metronome have to tick before all three children know whether
or not they are muddy?
As the uniform DEL protocol and the DEL dynamical systems protocol will
share the same informational actions, these will be introduced first.
3.2.1 Muddy Children: Announcements
As standard, each of the announcements made is treated as a truthful public
announcement, cf. [52]. A truthful public announcement of the formula ϕ
may be modeled using a single-pointed action model with a single action
with ϕ as precondition.
Each epistemic announcement is modeled using the same singleton
single-pointed action model, changing only the precondition. Build the
formulas for the group announcements as follows:
1. Interpret thei modality as reading “child i knows that...”, and denote
the operator by Ki.
2. Let knowi be short for Kii ∨Ki¬i. If knowi is true, then child i knows
whether he or she is muddy or not.
3. Let knowS for S ⊆ I be the formula
∧
i∈S knowi ∧
∧
i 6∈S ¬knowi. Then
knowS states that exactly the children in S know their status.
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s : abc
t2 : abct1 : abc t3 : abc
t4 : abc t6 : abct5 : abc
Ms :
c
c c
b
b b
a
aa
s′ : abc
t′2 : abct′1 : abc t
′
3 : abc
t5 : abc
f1(Ms) :
c
b
a
s′′ : abc
t2 : abc
t5 : abc
f2(Ms) :
Figure 4: The three models of the Muddy Children Puzzle in the case of three muddy
children. For any r′ ∈ qf1(Ms)y, let r′ := (r, σ∅) and let s′′ := ((s, σ∅), σ∅). Points
are distinguished by a thick contour. It can be seen that after two rounds of question
and answers all children know whether or not they are muddy. Furthermore, fk(Ms)
is isomorphic to f2(Ms) for all k ≥ 2.
4. For each S ⊆ I , let ΣSσS = ({σS},RS , preS , postS , σS) be the single-
ton single-pointed action model with pre(σS) = knowS , post(σS) = >
(as the announcement makes no changes to atomic valuations), and
RS(i) = {(σS , σS)} for each i ∈ I . As in the initial Kripke model, the
epistemic relations are thus equivalence relations.
3.2.2 Muddy Children: Intensional Protocol
Notice that the instructions of the parent in the natural language protocol are
already provided in an intensional (conditional) form. Essentially, the parent
instructs the children to follow the rules
“If you know whether you are muddy, then announce
so.”, and
“If you don’t know, then announce so.”
Aggregated to rules for the group, the antecedents in these conditional
rules are exactly the preconditions of the actions in the ΣSσS models. As
these preconditions are pairwise jointly unsatisfiable over any set of pointed
Kripke models and the models are disjoint, their union is a deterministic
multi-pointed action model: Let ΣΓ = (JΣK ,R, pre, post,Γ) with, for B ∈
{JΣK ,R, pre, post, }, B = ∪S⊆IBS and Γ = ∪S⊆I{σS}.
Let X be a superset of the muddy children models XM of Fig. 3, closed
under the operation ⊗ΣΓ. With f the clean map on X based on ΣΓ, (X, f)
is a DEL dynamical system. Moreover, applied to any x ∈ XM ⊆ X , f
implements the desired protocol and produces, tractably and in finite time,
an answer to the puzzle. Figure 4 illustrates this for the case of three muddy
children.
With this implementation, the intensional protocol may
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straightforwardly be applied to pointed models differing in other
respects then the number of muddy children, e.g., with different initial
announcements of the parent.
3.2.3 Muddy Children: Extensional Protocol
Constructing an extensional protocol for the Muddy Children given some
initial Kripke model is straightforward: Simply run the intensional proto-
col above on the initial model, taking note which designated actions’ pre-
conditions were satisfied when and encode this sequence as an extensional
protocol. The resulting extensional protocol will induce the transformations
appropriate for the given initial model. However, the protocol will not be
useful in answering the question of the puzzle: It is a one-off solution for the
given Kripke model only, constructed with knowledge of the answer sought.
A more informative extensional DEL protocol may be constructed, but
it requires a countably infinite representation: Assume to construct an ex-
tensional DEL protocol that will adequately encode the natural language in-
structions, is applicable to any model in XM and presumes no prior knowl-
edge of the developing information dynamics. The set of relevant announce-
ments is, as above, {ΣSσS : S ⊆ I}. For the announcement made at the first
time step, the protocol must allow ΣSσS for each S ⊆ I , seeing that no infor-
mation about the development of the dynamics may be assumed. Similarly,
each possible announcement must be allowed to follow the first, etc. Hence,
only satisfactory extensional protocol is P = {ΣSσS : S ⊆ I}∗. This set is
countably infinite.
This protocol facilitates finding an answer to the Muddy Children Puz-
zle: For a given initial model Ms ∈ XM , find the actions that the protocol
allows to be executed at time 1. These are all the actions models ΣSσS for
which the length 1 sequence 〈ΣSσS〉 is in P (i.e., all the actions the protocol
allows at time 1). For each of these, calculate the product Ms⊗ΣSσS . As the
preconditions are, in the current example, mutually inconsistent, only one
such model will be well-defined. The result is exactly f(Ms), for f the inten-
sional protocol given above. For time 2, take all the models produced at time
1—in this case {f(Ms)}—and execute on each of them all the actions in the
continuations of the sequence from which that model stems. This produces a
second set of pointed Kripke models—in this case {f(f(Ms)}. This process
thus leads to a model in which all children will announce that they know
whether they are muddy.
3.2.4 A Remark on Protocol Size
If one is interested in implementing a DEL protocol to seek computational as-
sistance in puzzle solving, the countably infinite representations required for
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the extensional protocol may prove cumbersome.12 Represented as a count-
ably infinite set of sequences, an implementation will never run through the
first step of all allowed action sequences.13 This problem does not occur
when protocols are implemented as clean maps: They are by construction
finite. Set theoretically, the clean map representation of a protocol may thus
be vastly smaller than its extensional counterpart.
4 Epistemic Temporal Logic
The run of a pointed DEL dynamical system may be recorded as a sequence
of pointed Kripke models. Using information from the action models, an
insight of [16] was that this may naturally be regarded as a temporal, modal
structure, a so called epistemic temporal logic model.
ETL models form a simple and general framework. Such models allow
the representation of epistemic and temporal interplay, and allow doing so in
an assumption-free manner. Hence, in generating ETL models from DEL dy-
namics, any structural properties (e.g., Synchronicity, Perfect Recall) shared
by the generated ETL models are features induced by the DEL operations.
Thus, characterizing the classes of generatable ETL models elucidates as-
sumptions implicit in DEL dynamics about epistemic and temporal inter-
play. This is a main conceptual insight of [16].
An ETL model is a temporal forest with additional modal (epistemic)
relations between nodes. With E∗ the set of all finite sequences of elements
from the set E, an ETL model for the language L(Φ,I) is a tuple
H = (E,H, R, V ) where
E is a set of events e;
H ⊆ E∗ is a set of histories, closed under non-empty prefixes;14
R : I −→ P(H ×H) is a map assigning to each agent an accessi-
bility relation R(i), written Ri;
V : Φ −→ P(H) is a valuation.
In contrast with pointed Kripke models, ETL models are not equipped with
actual states. To obtain a tighter connection between DEL dynamical system
12It was not suggested in [16] that DEL protocols be implementable nor that they are suited for
modeling purposes.
13To produce an implementation, the extensional protocol should at least be represented in a
different manner.
14It is overall assumed that any ETL model contains no redundant events relative to the model’s
set of histories. That is, for any ETL model H, it holds that any event e ∈ E is either a history
(e ∈ H) or part of a history (∃h ∈ H such that he ∈ H).
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e1e8e12 :
abc
C2
e1e8 : abc
e3e10 : abce2e9 : abc e4e11 : abc
c
b
a C1
e1 : abc
e3 : abce2 : abc e4 : abc
e5 : abc e7 : abce6 : abc
c
c c
b
b b
a
aa
e9 e11
e8
e10
e12
...
C0
Figure 5: A saturated ETL model (H, H). Time flows upwards where labeled
dashed lines represent events. Connected components are marked by dotted cir-
cles, points by thick contours. Each pointed connected component is isomorphic to
a pointed Kripke model from Figure 4 on page 15. Moreover, a history h′ is the suc-
cessor of h inH iff the Fig. 4 counterpart of h′ is a state (s, σ) for s the counterpart of
h.
orbits and ETL models, the latter is augmented to include multiple points. Fig-
ure 5 illustrates such an augmented (“saturated”) ETL model and its relation
to the orbit of a DEL dynamical system.
As in Sec. 2.2, let R∗ be the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure
of R, and let R∗(h) := {h′ ∈ H : (h, h′) ∈ R∗}. Then define the connected
component of h ∈ H inH—denoted C(Hh)—as the restriction ofH to R∗(h),
i.e., let C(Hh) := (H|R∗(h), R|R∗(h), V|R∗(h)). If h ∈ H|R∗(h), then C(Hh)h is a
pointed Kripke model.
Finally, define the ETL structures of interest as follows:
Definition 4 (Saturated ETL Model). LetH = (E,H, R, V ) be an ETL model.
Let H ⊆ H be a set of histories closed under prefixes, called points. The
pair (H, H) is saturated iff for all h ∈ H , the connected component C(Hh)
contains a unique point h from H .
Remark 2. The addition of points to ETL models is vital to structurally relate
ETL models to orbits of DEL dynamical systems. When computing the k +
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1th element of an orbit of a DEL dynamical system, its clean map reacts to
information from the designated state of the kth element. The designated
states thus carry information determining the dynamics, and are therefore
structurally essential. However, nothing plays a similar role in ETL models.
Hence, a stronger structural likeness between the two constructions may be
obtained by adding a corresponding notion to ETL models: the points.
4.1 ETL Isomorphism
For simplicity of arguments, saturated ETL models are identified up to iso-
morphism. This allows arguments without repeated references to bisimula-
tion contractions or other specific representatives. In the definition of isomor-
phism between ETL models, note that the temporal structure of the models
is also preserved:
Definition 5 (ETL Isomorphism). Let saturated ETL models
(H, H) = (E,H, R, V,H) and (H′, H ′) = (E′, H ′, R′, V ′, H ′) be given. Let
f : E −→ E′. For h = e0...en ∈ E∗, let f(h) := f(e0)...f(en). The map f is an
ETL isomorphism iff f is a bijection and for all h ∈ H , h′ ∈ H ′
1. h ∈ H iff f(h) ∈ H ′, and h ∈ H iff f(h) ∈ H ′,
2. hRih′ iff f(h)R′if(h
′), for all i ∈ I ,
3. h ∈ V (p) iff f(h) ∈ V ′(p), for all p ∈ Φ.
(H, H) and (H′, H ′) are ETL isomorphic iff there exists an ETL isomorphism
between their domains.
In the remainder, “ETL isomorphism” and “isomorphism” are used inter-
changeably.
4.2 Eight Properties of Saturated ETL Models
When generating an ETL model from a DEL dynamical system, the result-
ing forest will inherit a set of properties. Some stem from the graph theo-
retic nature of action models, product update and the associated pruning to
connected components of clean maps, some from the workings of pre- and
postconditions, and yet some stock from the functional modus operandi of dy-
namical systems. This section defines the eight properties of main relevance
to this paper. In describing their intuitions, the agent relations are interpreted
to represent indistinguishability.
Throughout this section, let H = (E,H, R, V,H) be a saturated ETL
model. Notationally, len(h) denotes the length of history h, he denotes the
sequence extending history h with event e and h v h′ denotes that h is a
prefix of h′. Agent-quantification is suppressed: The stated properties
should all be taken to hold for all agents.
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The first three properties are well-known. First, Synchronicity requires
that agents know the current time: If two histories are indistinguishable for
agent i, then they are of equal length. H satisfies
Synchronicity iff ∀h, h′ ∈ H, if hRih′, then len(h) = len(h′).
Second, Perfect Recall ensures agents never forget what they have learned
(though new uncertainty may be introduced): If agent i cannot distinguish
two histories, then neither can i distinguish their predecessors. H satisfies
Perfect Recall iff ∀h, h′ ∈ H,∀e, e′ ∈ E : he, h′e′ ∈ H , if heRih′e′, then hRih′.
Third, Local No Miracles enforces that events carry the same information
in all states in the same “epistemic context” (connected component): If two
events do not carry distinguishing information in one history of the context,
then they should not miraculously carry information in another history in
the same context. H satisfies
Local No Miracles iff ∀h, h′, h1, h2 ∈ H,∀e, e′ ∈ E : he, h′e′ ∈ H , if hRih′,
h1Rih2, h1eRih2e′ and hR∗h1, then heRih′e′.
Synchronicity, Perfect Recall and Local No Miracles were identified by van
Benthem et al. [16] to be inherited in any ETL model generated using se-
quences of actions models (see Sec. 9 for discussion and comparison).
The fourth property is almost the converse of Synchronicity:
Connected Time-Steps requires that a time-step contains at most one
connected component. ETL models generated by clean maps will satisfy
this property as clean maps delete superfluous states. H satisfies
Connected Time-Steps iff ∀h, h′ ∈ H , if len(h) = len(h′), then hR∗h′.
The next three properties all concern definability issues. Each in their
own way, they ensure that a DEL dynamical system sought to generate H
can invoke the right operation at the right place or time. They are given as
existence requirements without listing criteria that ensure their satisfaction.
First, Precondition Describable ensures the definability of the precondi-
tion of the action σe that will emulate event e in the DEL dynamical system:
The formula δe required to exist describes exactly those histories h in a con-
nected component on which e is executed. H satisfies
Precondition Describable iff ∀e ∈ E, there exists a δe ∈ L(Φ,I) such that if
there is a h′e ∈ H , then for all h ∈ H , if h′R∗h, then C(Hh)h |= δe iff
he ∈ H .
Second, Postcondition Describable ensures the definability of the postcondi-
tion of the action σe that will emulate event e in the DEL dynamical system:
The formula δDe describes the propositional change due to e; the set De con-
tains the atoms made true by e and the negation of the atoms that e makes
false. H satisfies
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Postcondition Describable iff ∀he ∈ H, there exists a δDe ∈ L(Φ,I) such that
δDe |= De for
De = {p ∈ Φ : h 6∈ V (p), he ∈ V (p)}∪{¬q : q ∈ Φ, h ∈ V (q), he 6∈ V (q)}.
Third, Component Collection Describable ensures the definability of an
additional precondition for each point σ ∈ Γ of the multi-pointed action
model ΣΓ of the DEL dynamical system. The additional precondition ϕ is
akin to the test conditions in a “if ϕ, do a” instruction from knowledge-
based programs: It specifies when σ should be the “surviving” designated
action. When the points of (H, H) are suitably describable by such tests, the
tests may be used to control the behavior of the DEL dynamical system. The
right degree of describability of points of (H, H) for such control turns out
to be on the level of collections of connected components. Identifying each
component by its point, a component collection for (H, H) is a set of points
A ⊆ H such that
a) all points in A belong to a common history: h, h′ ∈ A implies
h v h′ or h′ v h, and
b) respecting common histories, A is closed under bisimulation equivalence:
if h v h′ or h′ v h and h - h′, then h ∈ A iff h′ ∈ A.
The property Component Collection Describable then requires the existence
of a formula ϕA which must be true at the points A ⊆ H (the “right times”),
while being false at H\A (excluding “wrong times”), for every component
collection A. H satisfies
Component Collection Describable iff for every component collection A ⊆
H , there exists a ϕA ∈ L(Φ,I) such that C(Hh)h |= ϕA iff h ∈ A.
The final property, Point Bisimulation Invariance, ensures that the tempo-
ral structure of (HH) is mimicable by a mapping: Identical conditions must
be followed by identical effects. Point Bisimulation Invariance reflects this
slogan for two aspects of clean maps. First, that clean maps are mappings:
When applied to identical elements (pointed Kripke models that have bisim-
ilar points), identical images result. Second, the property reflects the slogan
in the workings of the preconditions of action models: If the same action
model is executed on any two pointed Kripke models, then if any points in
those two models are bisimilar, they will be treated equally under the prod-
uct with the action model.15 H satisfies
Point Bisimulation Invariance iff ∀h1, h2, h3, h4 ∈ H , if
C(Hh1)h - C(Hh2)h′ and C(Hh1)h3 - C(Hh2)h4, then h3e ∈ H iff
h4e ∈ H .
15The second aspect is the content of the weaker property Local Bisimulation Invariance of [16],
to which Point Bisimulation Invariance is related in Sec. 9.
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In words: Take two connected components, C(Hh1) and C(Hh2)
from (H, H). Each component will have a single designated point;
let h be the designated point of C(Hh1) and h′ that of C(Hh2).
Point Bisimulation Invariance then states the following: If the points h and
h′ are bisimilar, then if two other histories, say h3 and h4, from respectively
C(Hh1) and C(Hh2) are also bisimilar, then h3 and h4 will be extended by
exactly the same events. Shorter: if the points are bisimilar, then history
bisimilarity implies event effect invariance.
5 Generated ETL Models and their Properties
A saturated ETL model is generated from an initial pointed Kripke models x
and a clean map f by, essentially, recording the orbit of f from x as a temporal
structure: The states of x become histories of length 1 and states of fk(x)
become histories of length k + 1; the actual state in each fk(x) becomes an
ETL model point; epistemic relations and valuations are directly transferred.
Formally:
Definition 6 (Generated Structure). For any pointed DEL dynamical system
(X, f, x), its generated structure is the tuple (E,H, R, V,H) given by
E := {eσ : σ ∈ ∇k for some k ∈ N}
for ∇0 := JxK and ∇k+1 := {σ : (s, σ) ∈ Jfk+1(x)K}
H := {γ(s) : s ∈ Jfk(x)K for some k ∈ N}
with γ :
⋃
k∈N∇k −→ E given by γ(σ) = eσ
and for s = ((σ1, σ2), ..., σn) use γ(s) := γ(σ1)γ(σ2)...γ(σn)
Ri := {(h, h′) ∈ H ×H : γ−1(h)Riγ−1(h′)} for all i ∈ I
V (p) := {h ∈ H : ∃k ∈ N, γ−1(h) ∈ JpKk := {t ∈ Jfk(x)K : t  p}}
H := {h : ∃k ∈ N, fk(x) = Ms and h = γ(s)}
If (E,H, R, V,H) is isomorphic to a saturated ETL model (H′, H ′), then
(X, f, x) generates (H′, H ′).
Property 1. For any DEL dynamical system, the structure generated is a sat-
urated ETL model: H is indeed closed under prefixes and it is saturated as
for all h ∈ H , C(Hh) shares a unique h with H .
The first main result furnishes a set of properties that any DEL dynamical
system generated ETL model will necessarily satisfy:
Proposition 2. If saturated ETL model (H, H) is generated by a
pointed DEL dynamical system, then (H, H) satisfies seven of the
eight properties of Sec. 4.2, namely Synchronicity, Perfect Recall,
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e1e4e5 : pC2
e1e4 : pe1e3 : p, qC1 e1e6 : p e2e7 : C3
e1 : p, r e2 : rC0
e4e3
e5
e6 e7
... ...
Figure 6: An ETL model (H, H) with two saturated component branches. Con-
nected components C0, C1 and C2 form one component branch b. With H1 =
{e1, e1e4, e1e4e5}, (b, H1) is a saturated component branch. The infinite set
consisting of components C0, C3, etc. form another component branch b′.
Notice that for the branch b = {e1, e1e3}, the component branch b is longer than b
itself, as b includes the component C2.
Local No Miracles, Connected Time-Steps, Precondition Describable,
Postcondition Describable, and Point Bisimulation Invariance.
Proof. All proofs may be found in Appendix starting on page 39.
The second result shows that the last property of Sec. 4.2 is indeed only a
contingent feature of some generated ETL models:
Proposition 3. Not all saturated ETL models generated by pointed DEL dy-
namical systems are Component Collection Describable.
Proof. See Appendix on page 41.
6 From ETL Model to Dynamical System
For certain ETL models, there exists DEL dynamical systems that will gener-
ate them. The following result lists sufficient conditions of an ETL model for
it to be generatable by a DEL dynamical system:
Proposition 4. If (H, H) is a saturated ETL model that satisfies all eight prop-
erties of Sec. 4.2, then there exists a pointed DEL dynamical system that
generates (H, H).
The proof, which may be found in the Appendix on page 41, rests on the idea
of regarding an ETL model as a collection of saturated component branches,
illustrated in Figure 6. Each such branch is a sequence of pointed Kripke
models and hence potentially the orbit of a DEL dynamical system.
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To obtain the notion of a saturated component branch, decompose ETL
model into branches, lump these together in connected components and sat-
urate:
Definition 7 (Branches). A branch of an ETL modelH = (E,H, R, V ) is a set
b ⊆ H that
1. has a unique root, i.e., contains a unique history that has length 1;
2. is maximal with unique extension: If h ∈ b and he ∈ H for some e ∈ E,
then |{he′ : he′ ∈ b}| = 1;
3. is closed under finite prefixes.
The component branch of b is the sequence b = b1,b2, ...
of connected components that a) is ordered according to history
length, b) has prefix (C(Hh))h∈b, and c) is extended to be either
maximal in H (∃k ∈ N∀h′ ∈ bk¬∃e ∈ E : h′e ∈ H) or infinite
(∀k ∈ N∃h′ ∈ bk∃e ∈ E : h′e ∈ bk+1). A saturated component branch is a
pair (b, H) with H ⊆ H a set of points closed under finite prefixes such that
every component in b has exactly one point.
Enumerating H by history length, the following link to pointed Kripke
models is obtained:
Property 2. For saturated component branch (b, H), the pair (bk, hk) is a
pointed Kripke model.
Moreover, the construction emphasizes how specific ETL models have a
strong resemblance to DEL dynamical system orbits:
Property 3. If saturated ETL model (H, H) has property Connected Time-
Steps, thenH has a unique component branch b.
Jointly, these two properties allow us to illustrate the proof methodol-
ogy of Proposition 4: Take an ETL model H that has Connected Time-Steps
and is saturated by points H . Envision the model as a component branch
b saturated by H . From this, extract the sequence of pointed Kripke mod-
els (bk, hk)k∈N. For each k, find an action model that transforms (bk, hk)
into (bk+1, hk+1). Join all these action models into a deterministic multi-
pointed action model and construct its clean map f . Then ({(bk, hk) : k ∈
N}, f, (b1, h1)) is a pointed DEL dynamical system that generates (H, H).
Full details may be found in the Appendix on page 41.
The relation between DEL dynamical systems and ETL models that do
not have Connected Time-Steps is discussed in Sec. 8.
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7 Characterization: Image-finite and Concluding
Propositions 2 and 4 do not quite yield a characterization result pertaining to
the ETL model generatable by DEL dynamical systems. This is due to the fact
that Component Collection Describable is not implied for ETL models gen-
erated by an DEL dynamical system when working with a normal, finitary
modal logical language, as shown by Proposition 3.
Imposing two restrictions on ETL models and DEL dynamical systems
yields a characterization result. Both are finiteness assumptions. The first an
assumption of image-finiteness for the modal relations:
A binary relation B ⊆ A × A is image-finite iff the set {y : (x, y) ∈ B} is
finite for all x ∈ A. On sets of image-finite structures, the Hennessy-Milner
Theorem ensures that bisimilarity and modal equivalence relate exactly the
same models, cf. e.g. [17, 31]. The assumption is therefore natural from a
modal logical point of view. The notion may be applied to DEL dynamical
systems and ETL models: Call a pointed DEL dynamical system (X, f, x)
image-finite if both x and the action model of f are image-finite for all I-
indexed relations. This ensures that fk(x) is image-finite for all i ∈ I , all
k ∈ N. An ETL model is image-finite if all its I-indexed relations are image-
finite.
The second restriction concerns the temporal evolution, which is required
to show finite variety:
Definition 8 (Concluding DEL Dynamical System). A pointed DEL dynam-
ical system (X, f, x) is periodic iff fk(x) = fk+m(x) for some k ≥ 0, m > 0.
It terminates iff for some k ∈ N, fk(x) is undefined. If it does either, it is said
to conclude.
Definition 9 (Concluding ETL Model). A point h ∈ H of a saturated ETL
model (H, H) is repeating if there exists points h′, h′′ ∈ H with h v h′ <
h′′ and C(Hh′)h′ - C(Hh′′)h′′. A point h is finite if there exists a point h′
with h v h′ while there is no e ∈ E for which h′e ∈ H . The model (H, H)
concludes if every point in H is either repeating or finite.
Restricting attention to the classes of image-finite and concluding DEL
dynamical systems and ETL models, a proper characterization result exists:
Theorem 1. A saturated ETL model (H, H) is image-finite, concluding and
satisfies all eight properties of Sec. 4.2 if, and only if, it is generatable by an
image-finite and concluding pointed DEL dynamical system.
Proof. Left-to-right: The existence of a generating DEL dynamical system is
guaranteed by Proposition 4. The constructions in the proof of Prop. 4 more-
over ensure that the DEL dynamical system is both image-finite and con-
cluding.
· 151 ·
26 H. S. van Lee, R. K. Rendsvig and S. van Wijk
Right-to-left: Proposition 2 ensures that the model will satisfy all eight
properties, except maybe Component Collection Describable. Lemma 1 en-
sures the model is image-finite and concluding, which by Lemma 2 ensures
that it does satisfy Component Collection Describable. Proofs of both lem-
mas are provided in the Appendix on page 45 and 45.
Lemma 1. If there exists an image-finite and concluding pointed DEL dy-
namical system that generates (H, H), then (H, H) is image-finite and con-
cluding.
Lemma 2. If a saturated ETL model (H, H) is image-finite, concluding and
satisfies Connected Time-Steps, then (H, H) is Component Collection De-
scribable.
Remark 3. The converse of Lemma 2 does not hold, as Component Collec-
tion Describable does not imply image-finiteness.16
8 Non-Deterministic Intensional Protocols
In the previous sections, the ETL models regarded have been limited to sin-
gle component branches as this is a requirement to be generatable from a
DEL dynamical system—or a deterministic extensional DEL protocol. Ex-
tensional DEL protocols are in general non-deterministic and may therefore
generate ETL models with multiple component branches, as e.g. the ETL
model in Fig. 6. To facilitate comparison, this section is dedicated to non-
deterministic intensional protocols, implemented as families of DEL dynam-
ical systems running in parallel.
Definition 10 (Component Branch Sub-Model). Let H = (E,H, R, V ) be an
ETL model and let (b, H) be a saturated component branch obtained fromH.
The component branch sub-model of H given by (b, H) is then (Hb, H) =
(Eb, Hb, R|Hb , V|Hb , H)i∈I such that Eb = {e ∈ E : e ∈ b or ∃h ∈ b, he ∈ b},
Hb = {h ∈ H : h ∈ b} and |Hb denotes restriction.
Property 4. If H is an ETL model and (b, H) a saturated component branch
obtained fromH, then (Hb, H) is a saturated ETL model.
To (re-)produce ETL models that consist of more than one component
branch, a family of dynamical systems each generating a component branch
of the ETL model is used. The complete ETL model is obtained by taking the
union of all ETL component branches.
16Being Component Collection Describable does not imply being image-finite: Let the model
have two components in one component branch. Let the root component b0 be image-infinite
and satisfy p at b0h. Let b1h′ satisfy ¬p. Then the model satisfies Component Collection De-
scribable with ϕ{h} := p, ϕ{h′} := ¬p and ϕ{h,h′} := p ∧ ¬p, but it is not image-finite.
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Definition 11 (ETL Model Union). Given a countable family of saturated
ETL models {(Hj , Hj)}j∈J with each (Hj , Hj) = (Ej , Hj , Rj , Vj , Hj) for
j ∈ J , their (unpointed) union model is UJ = (EJ , HJ , RJ , VJ) with
?J :=
⋃
j∈J ?j for ? ∈ {E,H, R, V }.
An ETL model H is generated by a family of pointed DEL dynami-
cal systems {(Xj , fj , xj)}j∈J iff each (Xj , fj , xj) generates a saturated ETL
model (Hj , Hj) such that H is the union model of{(Hj , Hj)}j∈J . The fam-
ily {(Xj , fj , xj)}j∈J is minimal in generating H iff no proper subset of the
family also generatesH.
Lemma 3. Let {(Xj , fj , xj)}j∈J be minimal in generating H and let
(Xj , fj , xj) generate the saturated ETL model (Hj , Hj). Then (Hj , Hj) is the
component branch sub-model for some saturated component branch (b, H)
ofH.
Proof. See Appendix on page 46.
Theorem 2. Let an image-finite and concluding ETL modelH be given. H is
generatable up to ETL isomorphism by a family of image-finite and conclud-
ing pointed DEL dynamical systems, if, and only if, there exists a saturation
of each component branch b of H such that (Hb, H) satisfies all eight prop-
erties of Sec. 4.2.
Proof. See Appendix on page 46.
8.1 Persistence Under Union
The properties in Theorem 2 are associated with the component branches of
the ETL model, instead of the ETL model itself. However, several of the eight
properties are not inherited from component branches to union model: Some
are not defined for unpointed structures, and some are simply not robust
under union. In the following final set of results linking DEL dynamical
systems and ETL models, properties definable for general, unpointed ETL
models are detailed.
Lemma 4. The saturated ETL model properties Synchronicity, Perfect Re-
call and Postcondition Describable persist under ETL model union. I.e.: Let
{(Hj , Hj)}j∈J be a countable set of saturated ETL models. If all (Hj , Hj) sat-
isfy either of the mentioned properties, then the (unsaturated) union model
UJ satisfies that property.
Proof. See Appendix on page 47.
Property 5. Local No Miracles, Precondition Describable, Point Bisimula-
tion Invariance and Connected Time-Steps do not persist under union.
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Proof. See Appendix on page 48.
Though neither Local No Miracles nor Point Bisimulation Invariance per-
sist under union, weaker versions of each property do recur in the union
model: See Proposition 5 below. Both properties persevere as they are in-
dependent of structure outside a given component. They are therefore not
affected by union. Local Bisimulation Invariance originates from [16] and is
further discussed in Sec. 9.
Definition 12 (ETL Model Properties). An unsaturated ETL model
H = (E,H, R, V ) satisfies
Very Local No Miracles iff ∀h, h′, h1, h2 ∈ H,∀e, e′ ∈ E : he, h′e′ ∈ H , if
hRih
′, h1eRih2e′, heR∗h1e and hR∗h1, then heRih′e′;
Local Bisimulation Invariance iff for all h, h′ ∈ H , e ∈ E, if h and h′ are
bisimilar, hR∗h′ and he ∈ H , then h′e ∈ H .
Proposition 5. If an ETL model H is generated by a family of pointed DEL
dynamical systems (possibly neither image-finite nor concluding), then H
satisfies Synchronicity, Perfect Recall and Postcondition Describable and
Very Local No Miracles and Local Bisimulation Invariance.
Proof. See Appendix on page 48.
9 Protocol Comparison
This paper is in line with the approach of van Benthem et al. [16] in inves-
tigating the generative power of DEL dynamical systems with respect to the
class of ETL models. In this section, the above results are compared to those
obtained in [16] relating DEL protocols to ETL models.
9.1 Generating ETL Models from DEL Protocols
Generating ETL models from DEL protocols is somewhat simpler than from
sets of DEL dynamical systems. Unsaturated ETL forests are generated di-
rectly from a DEL protocol, without e.g. first defining saturated component
branches. For the special case of uniform DEL protocols, an ETL model is
generated from an initial pointed Kripke model as follows, cf. [16]:17
17The method for generating an ETL model from a state-dependent DEL protocol has a slightly
more complex definition. As uniform DEL protocols is the case closest to the cases for DEL
dynamical systems dealt with in this paper, the reader is referred to [16] for the definition for
state-dependent DEL protocols.
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Definition 13 (ETL Model Generated from a Uniform DEL Protocol). Let p be
a uniform DEL protocol for the pointed Kripke model Ms, let ρ = ρ1...ρn ∈
p(s) and let (Ms)ρ := (Ms⊗ρ1)...⊗ρn. The generated ETL model ofMs and
p isH = (E,H, R, V ) with (H, R, V ) = ⋃ρ∈p(Ms)ρ.
Remark 4. Notice that no restriction to connected components is required
posterior to taking products.
9.2 ETL Properties from DEL Protocols
The properties of ETL models generated from DEL protocols [16] results in
a list of properties not identical to that of Sec. 4.2. But there is overlap:
Synchronicity, Perfect Recall and Local No Miracles. The remaining proper-
ties from [16] are Local Bisimulation Invariance, Propositional Stability and
Finite Executions:
Definition 14 (ETL Model Properties of [16]). An ETL model
H = (E,H, R, V ) satisfies
Propositional Stability iff for all propositional formulas p and for all h ∈
H, e ∈ E such that he ∈ H , it holds that h ∈ V (p) iff he ∈ V (p);
Finite Executions iff for each n, for each e ∈ E, the set
{h : he ∈ H and len(h) = n} is finite.
Remark 5. The property Propositional Stability is required as [16] concerns
action models without postconditions.18 There is a comment on the resulting
difference below.
Before relating DEL protocols to DEL dynamical systems and the ETL
model properties they induce, recall the main results of [16].
Theorem (Main Representation Theorem of [16]) 1) If an ETL model is
generated by a uniform DEL protocol, then it satisfies the five properties
Propositional Stability, Local Bisimulation Invariance, Synchronicity,
Perfect Recall and Local No Miracles.
2) If an ETL model satisfies the six properties Finite Executions, Propositional Stabil-
ity, Local Bisimulation Invariance, Synchronicity, Perfect Recall and Local No Mir-
acles, then it is generatable by some uniform DEL protocol.
Theorem (Theorem 2 of [16]) An ETL model is generatable by a
state-dependent DEL protocol iff it satisfies Propositional Stability,
Synchronicity, Perfect Recall and Local No Miracles.
18Equivalently in the current setting would be action models with post(σ) = > for all events σ.
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9.3 Discussion and Comparison of DEL Protocols and DEL
Dynamical Systems
With results established for both DEL dynamical systems and extensional
DEL protocols, these may now be compared, first on a technical level
concerning the induced properties, and second from a modeling
perspective. For both DEL dynamical systems and DEL protocols the
generated ETL model satisfies the core DEL properties Synchronicity,
Perfect Recall and Local No Miracles. This is no surprise, as these
properties—as was mentioned in Sec. 4.2—stem from the very nature of
product update. Beyond these, differences emerge:
Connected Time-Steps:
An ETL model generated using a single DEL dynamical system has con-
nected time-steps as a consequence of the use of the restriction to connected
components. This property does not survive model union, and is therefore
not inherited by ETL models generated by families of DEL dynamical sys-
tems, cf. Remark 5. DEL protocols do not induce the property in generated
ETL models, irrespective of whether such are defined using a restriction to
connected components or not: DEL protocols may contain several sequences
of action models, producing disjoint new time steps.
Conceptually, as an additional requirement on ETL models,
Connected Time-Steps adds nothing not already inherent in the standard
modal logical approach to agency: Using relational semantics, nothing
disconnected from the designated state impacts the satisfaction of formulas,
and hence neither does it affect the modeled agents.
Finite Executions vs. Precondition Describable:
Finite Executions (referred to as “the finiteness assumption” in [16]) is
meant to ensure the existence of the precondition formula of the action
model event σe for each ETL event e. Thus, it shares a role with the abstract
Precondition Describable, but is weaker than this direct existence
requirement. It is conjectured that a compilation error occurred
post-submission of [16], omitting further requirements.19
19Finite Executions is not enough to guarantee the existence of suitable preconditions formulas:
Let a single-agent ETL model H be given with histories of length 1 divided into two discon-
nected R1-components, H1 and H′1 with e ∈ H1, and e′ ∈ H′1. Let the sub-model H1, H′1
be non-image-finite and non-bisimilar but let (H1, e) (H′1, e
′) be modally equivalent. Such
pointed Kripke model exist, cf. e.g. [17, Ex. 2.23, p. 68]. Let the set of histories of length 2
be given by {ee∗} and letH contain no further histories. ThenH satisfies Finite Exe-
cutions (and the other properties), but there exists no suitable precondition formula
for σe∗ as e and e′ are modally equivalent, but e∗ only executed on e. An additional
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Propositional Stability vs. Postcondition Describable:
That the theorems of van Benthem and co-authors include Propositional Sta-
bility is a result of their use of action models without postconditions. DEL
dynamical systems limited to complex model transformers built over the
same class of action models would generate ETL models also satisfying this
property. Conversely, it is hypothesized that any ETL model generated by a
DEL protocol defined over action models with postconditions would satisfy
the abstract requirement of being Postcondition Describable by exhibiting
only finite atomic change between successive histories.
Component Collection Describable:
The Component Collection Describable requirement ensures the existence of
suitable preconditions for the designated actions of the multi-pointed action
model underlying the clean map, which control the temporal flow of the
dynamical system when seeking to build a particular ETL model. This is not
needed when working with DEL protocols, as the temporal occurrence of
events is exogenously given. The requirement is not inherited by every ETL
model build from a DEL dynamical system, but is implied when the system
is aptly finite.
Conceptually, Component Collection Describable may be seen as an in-
ternalization requirement on dynamic development: It requires that any trans-
formation that is executed can be given an “explanation” within the model,
in the sense that there exists a formula describing exactly those connected
components in the ETL model where that transformation occurs. As the ex-
istence of such “explanations” for behavior is a prerequisite for any form of
rationalizability, we find that this additional restriction is, in spirit, implied
by the very idea of working with logical (rational) agents.
Local vs. Point Bisimulation Invariance:
Whether generated by a uniform DEL protocol, single DEL dynamical sys-
tem or a family of DEL dynamical systems, the resulting ETL model satisfies
Local Bisimulation Invariance. This is due to the nature of preconditions in
product update. Any saturated ETL model generated by a single DEL dy-
namical system satisfies the stronger property of Point Bisimulation Invari-
ance, which also involves a temporal component, reflecting that clean maps
are mappings acting on the points of pointed Kripke models, and hence out-
put equivalent values given equivalent inputs. As the temporal invariance
is defined on points, it is lost when moving to unsaturated models, exactly
as these are unpointed. In contrast, as DEL protocols react to an external
requirement of image-finiteness would solve this problem.
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clock rather than to the structure of the current pointed Kripke model, such
protocols do not induce this strong version of bisimulation invariance.
Conceptually, the temporal invariance of Point Bisimulation Invariance
represents a behavioral uniformity assumption: An agent defined by an inten-
sional protocol will perform the same action in any two bisimilar situations.
With bisimilarity implying modal equivalence and agents’ reasoning capa-
bilities given by the modal language used to describe their circumstances, the
uniformity assumption then enforces that agents base their decisions fully
on information they can explicitly reason about. Contraposed: If an agent
varies its action, this must be caused by a change in circumstances perceiv-
able by the agent (i.e., expressible in its language). In modeling agency, we
find that circumstances determine decision is not an unduly strong assump-
tion. Rather, we would argue, the assumption is a prerequisite for categoriz-
ing the resulting behavior as rational.20
10 Conclusion
Logical modeling of dynamics in multi-agent systems relies on protocols as
control mechanisms. With multiple protocol frameworks available, the ques-
tion naturally arises which, if any, is better suited for a given modeling task.
In choosing a class of protocols in which to cast a model, an implicit choice
of agency, actions and dynamics is thus made. In this paper, an implemen-
tation of intensional protocols as DEL dynamical systems have been inves-
tigated. On the technical side, the type of epistemic temporal models that
DEL dynamical systems may generate have been characterized. Conceptu-
ally, DEL dynamical systems qua intensional protocols have been compared
to the main protocol framework in dynamic epistemic logic, namely the ex-
tensional DEL protocols of [16]. In summary, extensional DEL protocols are
convenient for encoding extensional protocols: In case one wishes to answer
a question concerning how a particular sequence of actions will influence
a given initial model, then directly specifying that sequence of actions is a
straightforward formalization. In contrast, it is not possible to run dynam-
ics on an external clock using DEL dynamical systems.21 In case one seeks
to model an intensional protocol, possibly applicable to more than a single
initial model, then DEL dynamical systems enjoys a particular benefit: As
20Compare to extensive games with imperfect information, where it is, as standard, assumed
that agents have knowledge of their own actions, i.e., that if an agent cannot distinguish between
two nodes, the agent will choose the same action in the two nodes. In [49], it is assumed by
definition. For a discussion, see [28] where the requirement is denoted the Ex Interim Condition.
21A clock may however be build into DEL dynamical system: This may be done by working
in an extended language with atomic propositions denoting the current time and using post-
conditions to make time run. For finite time sequences, this may be encoded using a finite
model.
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exemplified, intensional natural language protocols may in a natural way
be encoded as clean maps. Further, as shown by the Muddy Children ex-
ample, a clean map may be a vastly smaller representation of the intended
protocol than any extensional DEL protocol counterpart. Finally, in relation
to ETL model generation, then DEL dynamical systems do not impose re-
strictions over and above what one may expect from an intensional protocol
framework. The new, main conceptual restriction—that circumstances de-
termine decision—may even be desirable when modeling agents that base
their decisions fully on information they can explicitly reason about through
the formal language. Given the popularity of intensional protocols in other
multi-agent paradigms, it is surprising that such have not previously been
systematically investigated for dynamic epistemic logic.
There is a range of open questions that we find highly interesting. The
relation to automata theory (cf. Sec. 1.2) seems a foremost candidate for a
wider and deeper semantic appreciation. Results on when (and how) DEL
dynamical systems can obtain various automata representations could possi-
bly allow for a comparison both to orbit results on topological DEL dynami-
cal systems [40, 41], but also to work on Grand Stage models [46, 48]. As that
branch of literature is rich with results on axiomatizations and complexity
results, a tighter semantic connection may possibly facilitate a partial result
transfer, with one aim being axiomatizations of epistemic temporal logics
for classes of ETL models generated by particular types of DEL dynamical
systems, akin to the result on temporal public announcement logic of [16].
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Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 1. Let (X, f, x) be a pointed DEL dynamical system given by
multi-pointed action model ΣΓ. Then there exists a singleton uniform DEL
protocol that produces the orbit of f from x.
Proof. For each k ∈ N, let σk ∈ Γ be such that fk(x) |= pre(σk). As ΣΓ is
X-deterministic, for each k there is at most one such σk. Define a uniform
DEL protocol p as the smallest protocol for which pk(s) = Σσk (for all s ∈ x)
whenever σk exists. Then when p is sequentially applied to x using product
update, it produces the sequence 〈fk(x)〉k∈N of pointed Kripke models (up
to the deletion of redundant states not connected to the designated states, cf.
Sec. 2).
Proposition 2. If saturated ETL model (H, H) is generated by a pointed
DEL dynamical system, then (H, H) satisfies seven of the eight properties
of Sec. 4.2, namely Synchronicity, Connected Time-Steps, Perfect Recall,
Local No Miracles, Precondition Describable, Postcondition Describable, and
Point Bisimulation Invariance.
Proof. Let (X, f, x) be a pointed DEL dynamical system with orbit
(fk(x))k∈N. The length of a state s in fk(x) is len(s) := k + 1.
Let (H, H) be the saturated ETL model generated by (X, f, x). Given the
construction of γ in Def. 6, there exists a family of isomorphisms {gk}k∈N
with each gk mapping
q
fk(x)
y
to Hk := {h ∈ H : len(h) = k} satisfying
g1(s) = es and gk+1((s, σ)) = gk(s)eσ . Using this family, it is shown that
(H, H) satisfies the listed properties in order:
Synchronicity. Assume for arbitrary h, h′ ∈ H that hRih′. Then by the con-
struction of the generated Ri (Def. 6), ∃k ∈ N : g−1k (h)Rig−1k (h′). Hence
g−1k (h), g
−1
k (h
′) ∈ qfk(x)y. Thus, len(g−1k (h)) = len(g−1k (h′)). Hence, by the
construction of g, len(h) = len(h′).
Perfect Recall. Assume for arbitrary he, h′e′ ∈ H that heRih′e′. Then ∃k ∈
N : g−1k (he)Rig
−1
k (h
′e′). By construction of f , fk(x) = C(fk−1(x)⊗ ΣΓ)s′ for
ΣΓ the multi pointed action model. As g−1k (he)Rig
−1
k (h
′e′), by definition of
⊗ and clean maps, g−1k−1(h)Rig−1k−1(h′). Hence, by definition of Ri, it follows
that hRih′.
Local No Miracles. Assume that 1) hRih′, 2) h1eRih2e′ and 3) hR∗h1 for ar-
bitrary he, h′e′, h1e, h2e′ ∈ H . 1) implies that 1*) g−1k (h)Rig−1k (h′) for k =
len(h). 3) implies that len(h) = len(h1) by Synchronicity. In conjunction
with 2), this implies that 2*) g−1k+1(h1e)Rig
−1
k+1(h2e
′).
By construction of f , fk+1(x) = C(fk(x)⊗ΣΓ)s′. By 2*) and the definition
of ⊗ and clean maps, there must be 4) σe, σe′ ∈ ΣΓ such that σeRiσe′ , for σe
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the σ such that gk+1((s, σ)) = h1e, for some s ∈
q
fk(x)
y
, and σe′ the σ′ such
that gk+1((t, σ′)) = h2e′, for some t ∈
q
fk(x)
y
.
Now assume that (g−1k (h), σe), (g
−1
k (h
′), σe′) ∈
q
fk+1(x)
y
. Then 1*), 4)
and Def. ⊗ jointly imply that (g−1k+1(h), σe)Ri(g−1k+1(h′), σe′). By the definition
of the generated Ri, it thus follows that heRih′e′.
Connected Time-Steps. For arbitrary h, h′ ∈ H assume len(h) = len(h′).
Let k ∈ N such that h, h′ ∈ Hk. Then g−1k (h), g−1k (h′) ∈ Jfk(x)K. By def-
inition of product update ⊗, clean maps and the fact that x is connected,
g−1k (h)R
∗g−1k (h
′). By definition of (H, H) it follows that hR∗h′.
Precondition Describable. For arbitrary e ∈ E, let δe = pre(σe). Recall that
by definition of ⊗, ∀k ∈ N, (g−1k (h), σe) ∈ Jfk+1(x)K iff g−1k (h) |= pre(σe) and
σe ∈ Σk+1 (∗). Assume ∃h′ ∈ H : h′e ∈ H and let h ∈ H such that h′R∗h.
⇒: Assume for some k ∈ N that (Hk, h) |= δe. Then g−1k (h) |= pre(σe).
By assumption, σe ∈ Σk+1. By (∗), thus (g−1k (h), σe) ∈ Jfk+1(x)K. Therefore,
he ∈ H .
⇐: Assume he ∈ H . Then for some k ∈ N, g−1k+1(he) = (g−1k (h), σe) ∈Jfk+1(x)K. By (∗), g−1k (h) |= pre(σe). And thus h |= δe.
Postcondition Describable. For arbitrary he ∈ H (in specific for some k ∈ N,
he ∈ Hk+1) let δDe = post(σe) where De = D1 ∪ D2, for p, q ∈ Φ such that
D1 = {p : h 6∈ V (p), he ∈ V (p)} and D2 = {¬q : h ∈ V (q), he 6∈ V (q)}.
Consider an arbitrary p ∈ D1. Then by definition of the generated ETL
model (H, H), g−1k (h) 6∈ JpKk and g−1k+1(he) ∈ JpKk+1 (∗). By construction,
g−1k+1(he) = (g
−1
k (h), σ) for some σ ∈ ∇k+1 (∗∗). By definitions of (H, H) and
⊗, (g−1k (h), σ) ∈ JpKk+1 iff post(σ) |= p. Then, by (∗) and (∗∗), post(σ) |= p.
As p ∈ D1 was arbitrary, post(σ) |= D1.
The argument for post(σ) |= D2 is identical. Conclude that post(σ) |= De
and thus δDe |= De.
Point Bisimulation Invariance. Let arbitrary C(Hh)h = (Hk, h) and
C(Hh′)h′ = (Hl, h′) be such that (Hk, h) - (Hl, h′). Hence fk(x) - f l(x) (∗).
Further, assume for arbitrary h ∈ Hk and h′ ∈ Hl that (Hk, h) - (Hl, h′).
⇒: Assume he ∈ H . By construction of g and definition of clean maps,
both Hk and Hl are connected components, i.e, ∀h, h′ ∈ Hk : hR∗h′ and
idem for Hl. By the Hennessy-Milner Theorem (see Section 7), it follows
that h and h′ satisfy exactly the same modal formulas. Hence, by construc-
tion of g and the definition of H, g−1k (h) and g−1l (h′) satisfy exactly the same
modal formulas as well. Now as he ∈ H , g−1k+1(he) ∈
q
fk+1(x)
y
and thus
g−1k (h) |= pre(σe). Hence g−1l (h′) |= pre(σe) (∗∗). By (∗) and (∗∗), it follows
that (g−1l (h
′), σe) ∈
q
f l+1(x)
y
. Hence h′e ∈ H .
⇐: By the same argument, h′e ∈ H implies he ∈ H .
This concludes the proof of Proposition 2.
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Proposition 3. Not all saturated ETL models generated by DEL dynamical
systems are Component Collection Describable.
Proof. Let Ms and f be as in Fig. 7 (cf. [56]) and X be the orbit of f from Ms.
Then the ETL model generated by the DEL dynamical system (X, f) from
initial model Ms is not Component Collection Describable.
s : ¬p t : p
Ms :
σ :
(¬p,>)
τ :
(¬p, p)
υ :
(p,>)
f :
Figure 7: Initial Kripke model Ms and pointed action model. The orbit of f from
Ms produces non-bisimilar models forever: the unique state not satisfying p will
split, inserting a new p-state as it’s child with τ ; any other state gets exactly one child:
sσ : ¬p sτ : p tυ : p
f(Ms) :
Consider A = {fn(Ms) : n is even}. There does not exist a ϕ such that for all
x ∈ X , x |= ϕ iff x ∈ A: Assume the modal depth of ϕ is k. Let m > k. Then
fm(Ms) |= ϕ iff fm+1(Ms) |= ϕ as two such models will not differ in the
first m + 1 relational steps from the point. Hence the ETL model generated
by (X, f) from Ms is not Component Collection Describable.
Proposition 4. If (H, H) is a saturated ETL model that satisfies all eight prop-
erties of Sec. 4.2, then there exists a pointed DEL dynamical system that
generates (H, H).
Proof. Proposition 4 is shown by constructing a DEL dynamical system
(X, f) with f the clean map of a X-deterministic multi-pointed action
model ΣΓ and an initial Kripke model x ∈ X such that the saturated ETL
model (H′, H ′) = (E′, H ′, R′, V ′, H ′) generated by (X, f) from x is ETL
isomorphic to (H, H). The latter is shown by induction on len(h) of
h ∈ H for a map γ∗ : E −→ E′. As in Def. 5, for h = e0...en, write
γ∗(h) := γ∗(e0)...γ∗(en).
As (H, H) satisfies property Connected Time-Steps, the ETL model is a
saturated component branch. To emphasize this, in this proof (H, H) is writ-
ten (Hb, H).
1. Initial Kripke model
To obtain a practical and consistent naming of states, the initial Kripke model
x = (JxK, R, J·K, s) is set to be a re-naming of the initial component of b: Let
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JxK = {σe : e ∈ b0h}. For the relations and valuation of the initial model,
simply copy over the relations and valuation from the initial component of
b: For all i ∈ A, let σeRiσe′ iff eRie′, and for all p ∈ Φ, let σe ∈ JpK iff e ∈ V (p).
Finally, let the point of x be the copy of the point of b0h: Let s = σh.
2. Constructing (X, f)
To define the DEL dynamical system (X, f), first construct a
multi-pointed action model ΣΓ = (JΣK ,R, pre, post,Γ). In words, construct
ΣΓ so that for each time-step bk of the component branch b, Γ contains a
designated action σk connected to a set of actions JΣkK ⊆ JΣK such that the
single-pointed action model Σ′{σk} obtained from restricting Σ to JΣkK
produces the equivalent of bk+1h from the Kripke model-equivalent of bkh.
In the precondition of σk, include a formula δbkh characterizing bkh. As
(Hb, H) is Component Collection Describable by assumption, such a
formula exists.
Formally, construct ΣΓ piece-wise as follows: Let bkh and bk+1h be given.
Σk+1σ is constructed such that C(fk(x) ⊗ Σkσ)s′ mirrors the structure of
bk+1h:
Let the single-pointed action model Σk+1σk+1 be
(JΣk+1K ,Rk+1, prek+1, postk+1, σk+1), given by
JΣk+1K = {σe : he ∈ bk+1}with σk+1 = σe such that ∃h : he ∈ bk+1 ∩H .
(σe, σe′) ∈ Ri iff ∃he, h′e′ ∈ bk+1 : (he, h′e′) ∈ Ri.
pre(σe) =
{
δe if σe 6= σk+1
δe ∧ δbkh else
with δe and δbkh given by Precondition Describable and Component Collec-
tion Describable, respectively.
post(σe) = δDe as given Postcondition Describable.
Let the multi-pointed action model ΣΓ = (JΣK ,R, pre, post,Γ) be given
by, for B ∈ {JΣK ,R, pre, post, }, B = ⋃k:bk∈b Bk and Γ = ⋃k:bk∈b{σk}. This
is well-defined: For pre and post, this follows from Precondition Describable
and Postcondition Describable.
LetX be the closure of {x} under the operation⊗ΣΓ. OnX , ΣΓ is guaranteed
to be deterministic as any two characteristic formulas δbkh and δ
′
bk′h′
are not
simultaneously satisfiable. Finally, let f be the clean map of ΣΓ on X . Then
(X, f) is a DEL dynamical system with x ∈ X .
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3. Constructing the Isomorphism
Let (H′, H ′) = (E′, H ′, R′, V ′, H ′) be the saturated ETL model generated by
(X, f) from x. Define the two mappings: γ† : E −→ JΣK with γ†(e) = σe and
γ : JΣK −→ E′ for γ(σ) = eσ cf. Def. 6. From these, define γ∗ : E −→ E′ as
γ∗ := γ ◦ γ†.
Define subsets of E based on history length: For all k ∈ N let E0 = {e :
e ∈ b0} and Ek+1≥1 = {e : h ∈ bk, he ∈ bk+1} ⊆ E. Let E′k, k ∈ N,
be given mutatis mutandis. Let γ†k : Ek −→ JΣkK, γk : JΣkK −→ E′k and γ∗k :
Ek −→ E′k be the restrictions of γ†, γ and γ∗ toEk×JΣkK, JΣkK×E′k andEk×
E′k, respectively. Then, of course, γ
∗ =
⋃
k∈N γ
∗
k , whereby γ
∗(e) = e′σe . By
induction on len(h), h ∈ H, it is now shown that γ∗ is an ETL isomorphism.
Claim: The map γ∗ is a bijection. By the construction of γ† and γ, each
γ∗k is an injection: if e 6= e′, then γ∗k(e) 6= γ∗k(e′). By construction, it is also
guaranteed that γ∗k is a surjection: ∀e′ ∈ E′∃e ∈ E : γ∗k(e) = e′. Hence for
each k ∈ N, γ∗k is a bijection.
Furthermore, γ∗ is a total map: if e ∈ Ek ∩ Em, then γ†k(e) = γ†m(e) (i.e.,
σe ∈ JΣkK ∩ JΣmK) and γk(σe) = γm(σe). Thus γ ◦ γ†(e) is well-defined and
in E′k ∩ E′m.
Finally, γ∗ inherits injectivity and surjectivity from its restrictions. Hence,
the map γ∗ is a bijection.
Claim: The map γ∗ is an ETL isomorphism. The claim is shown by 4 induc-
tive sub-proofs.
1) Domain and Temporal Structure.
Base. Let h ∈ H0. This is the case iff γ†(h) ∈ f0(x) (by construction of initial
Kripke model) iff γ ◦ γ†(h) ∈ H ′0 (by Def. 6).
Step. It is shown that he ∈ Hk+1 iff γ∗(he) ∈ H ′k+1.
⇒: Assume he ∈ Hk+1. Then h ∈ Hk. By the induction hypothesis,
γ†(h) ∈ qfk(x)y. By construction of Σk+1, γ†(e) ∈ JΣk+1K. By the same
construction and Precondition Describable, γ†(h) |= pre(σe). Hence
(γ†(h), γ†(e)) ∈ qfk+1(x)y. By Def. 6, in particular the construction of Hk+1,
γ((γ†(h), γ†(e))) ∈ H ′k+1.
⇐: Assume γ((γ†(h), γ†(e))) ∈ H ′k+1. Then (γ†(h), γ†(e)) ∈
q
fk+1(x)
y
by
Def. 6, so γ†(h) ∈ qfk(x)y and γ†(e) ∈ JΣk+1K. By the induction hypothesis,
h ∈ Hk. If he 6∈ Hk+1, a contradiction is reached: pre(γ†(e)) is satisfied by ex-
actly those γ†(h) ∈ qfk(x)y such that (γ†(h), γ†(e)) ∈ qfk+1(x)y – by the con-
struction of action models in this proof and as (Hb, H) is Precondition De-
scribable. So he ∈ Hk+1.
2) Epistemic relations.
Base. It follows by construction of initial Kripke model and Def. 6.
Step. It is shown that ∀he, h′e′ ∈ bk+1, heRih′e′ iff γ∗(he)R′iγ∗(h′e′).
· 169 ·
44 H. S. van Lee, R. K. Rendsvig and S. van Wijk
⇒: Assume that heRih′e′. By Perfect Recall, hRih′.
By the induction hypothesis, γ†(h)Riγ†(h′). By
construction of Σk+1, γ†(e)Riγ†(e′). By definition of ⊗,
(γ†(h), γ†(e))Ri(γ†(h′), γ†(e′)). By Def. 6,
γ((γ†(h), γ†(e)))Riγ((γ†(h′), γ†(e′))).
⇐: Assume γ((γ†(h), γ†(e)))Riγ((γ†(h′), γ†(e′))). By Def. 6,
(γ†(h), γ†(e))Ri(γ†(h′), γ†(e′)). By definition of ⊗, γ†(h)Riγ†(h′) and
γ†(e)Riγ†(e′). So by construction of Σk+1, ∃h1e, h2e′ ∈ bk+1 : h1eRih2e′. By
the induction hypothesis, hRih′. Further, note that ∀h, h′ ∈ bk : hR∗h′.
Hence, by Local No Miracles, heRih′, e′.
3) Valuation.
Base. It follows by construction of initial Kripke model and Def. 6.
Step. It is shown that ∀he ∈ bk+1, he ∈ V (p) iff γ(he) ∈ V ′(p).
⇒: Assume he ∈ V (p) . Either i) h ∈ V (p) or ii) h 6∈ V (p). If i), then by
the induction hypothesis, γ ◦ γ†(h) ∈ V ′(p). By construction of
Σk+1, post(γ†(e)) 6|= ¬p. Hence (γ†(h), γ†(e)) ∈ JpKk+1. By Def. 6,
γ((γ†(h), γ†(e))) ∈ V ′(p). If ii), then by the induction hypothesis,
γ†(h) 6∈ JpKk. As (Hb, H) is Postcondition Describable, by construction of
Σk+1, post(γ†(e)) |= p. Thus (γ†(h), γ†(e)) ∈ JpKk+1. By Def. 6,
γ((γ†(h), γ†(e))) ∈ V ′(p).
⇐: Assume γ((γ†(h), γ†(e))) ∈ V ′(p). Then (γ†(h), γ†(e)) ∈ JpKk+1 by
Def. 6. Again, either i) γ†(h) ∈ JpKk or ii) γ†(h) 6∈ JpKk. If i), then by the
induction hypothesis, h ∈ V (p). For a contradiction, suppose he 6∈ V (p).
Then post(γ†(e)) |= ¬p. But by construction of Σk+1, post(γ†(e)) 6|= ¬p.
This is a contradiction. Hence he ∈ V (p). If ii), then by the definition of
⊗, post(γ†(e)) |= p. By the induction hypothesis, h 6∈ V (p). If it was the case
that he 6∈ V (p), then post(γ†(e)) 6|= p. Contradiction. Thus he ∈ V (p).
4) Points.
Base. It follows by construction of initial Kripke model and Def. 6.
Step. It is shown that he ∈ Hk+1 iff γ∗(he) ∈ H ′k+1. Let fk(x) = Nt and
fk+1(x) = Ms.
⇒: Assume he ∈ Hk+1. By the induction hypothesis, γ†(h) = t. By satu-
ration of bk, ∃e ∈ E : he ∈ bk+1∩H . By construction of Σk+1, γ†(e) ∈ JΣk+1K
and, as (Hb, H) is Precondition Describable, γ†(h) |= pre(γ†(e)). By construc-
tion of f , fk+1(x) = C(Nt⊗ (Σk+1, γ†(e))) = C(N ⊗ Σk+1, (t, γ†(e))) = Ms.
By Def. 6, γ(s) = γ(γ†(he)) ∈ H ′k+1.
⇐: Assume γ(γ†(he)) ∈ H ′k+1. By Def. 6,
fk+1(x) = (C(N ⊗ Σk+1), (t, γ†(e))). By induction hypothesis,
γ†−1(t) = h ∈ Hk. By construction of the Action Model, γ†(e) = γ−1(e) for e
such that ∃h′ : h′e ∈ Hk+1 and h′ ∈ Hk. As points in Hm are unique for all
m by Def. 7, h′ must be h. Thus he ∈ Hk+1.
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This concludes the proof of Proposition 4.22
Lemma 1. If there exists an image-finite and concluding pointed DEL dy-
namical system that generates (H, H), then (H, H) is image-finite and con-
cluding.
Proof. As the DEL dynamical system is image-finite, for all k ∈ N with
fk(x) = Ms, Ri is image-finite (for all i ∈ I). The construction of the
generated ETL model (see Definition 6) ensures that for all Hk, Ri is
image-finite (for all i ∈ I ,). Hence (H, H) is image-finite.
If the DEL dynamical system terminates, then there is a k ∈ N such that
fk(x) is undefined. Let fk−1(x) = Ms and γ(s) = h. As fk(x) is undefined,
there is no σ such that γ(s)γ(σ) ∈ H . Hence, there is no e such that he ∈ H .
Note that by construction of H , for all h′ ∈ H : h′ v h. Thus, all h′ ∈ H are
finite and hence (H, H) concludes.
If the DEL dynamical system is periodic, fk(x) = fk+m(x) for some k ≥ 0
and m > 0. Let fk(x) = Ms and fk+m(x) = M ′s′, and let γ(s) = h
and γ(s′) = h′. By construction, h v h′. From Ms = M ′s′ it follows that
C(Hh)h - C(Hh′)h′. Thus, all h′′ ∈ H such that h′′ v h are repeating. Fur-
thermore, note that for all n ∈ N, fk+n(x) = fk+m+n(x). Now for arbitrary
n ∈ N, let fk+n(x) = Mnsn and fk+m+n(x) = Mn′sn′, and let γ(sn) = hn and
γ(sn′) = hn′. By same argument as above, hn is repeating. As n is arbitrary,
all h′′ ∈ H such that h′′ w h are repeating. Thus, all h′′ ∈ H are repeating
and hence (H, H) concludes.
Lemma 2. If a saturated ETL model (H, H) is image-finite, concluding and
satisfies Connected Time-Steps, then (H, H) is Component Collection De-
scribable.
Proof. Let (H, H) be an image-finite and concluding saturated ETL model.
Set B := {C(Hh) : h ∈ H}, the set of all connected components in (H, H).
As all C(Hh) ∈ B are image-finite, by the Hennessy-Milner Theorem (see
Sec. 7), for each pair h1, h2 ∈ H if h1 6- h2, there exists a formula ϕh1,h2
distinguishing between h1 and h2: h1 |= ϕh1,h2 while h2 6|= ϕh1,h2 .
Let [C(Hh)h]- be the equivalence class
{C(Hh′)h′ : C(Hh′) ∈ B and h′ - h}. Then, since (H, H) is concluding, the
22When constructing an action model that produces a pointed Kripke model isomorphic to
a particular level in the to-be-generated ETL model, Proposition 3.2 of [23] (which states,
roughly, that for almost any two pointed Kripke models, there exists an action model with
postconditions that will produce one from the other using product update) is not applicable.
The proposition is not applicable as the transforming action model allows only the designated
state to survive, from which the desired Kripke model is unfolded. The resulting generated
ETL models would therefore (most often) not be ETL isomorphic to the original ETL model,
as ETL isomorphisms require that the temporal structure is preserved.
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set B- := {[C(Hh)h]- : h ∈ H,C(Hh) ∈ B} is finite. Therefore, the
conjunction
∧
h2∈{h∈H : h6-h1} ϕh1,h2 is well-defined for any h1 ∈ H . This
conjunction distinguishes h1 from any point in H that is not bisimilar to h1.
Denote this formula ϕh1 .
Moreover, as B- is finite, all sets A ⊆ H for which h ∈ A and h′ - h
implies h′ ∈ A are finite. Hence, for any such A, the disjunction∨h1∈A ϕh1 is
well-defined. This disjunction distinguishes the connected components in A
from those not in A.
Lemma 3. Let {(Xj , fj)}j∈J be minimal in generating H and let (Xj , fj , xj)
generate the saturated ETL model (Hj , Hj). Then (Hj , Hj) is the component
branch sub-model for some saturated component branch (b, H) ofH.
Proof. Let H = (E,H, R, V ) be generated by {(Xj , fj)}j∈J . Let bj be the
sequence of connected components bj,k = C(H, h) for all hk ∈ Hj , ordered
on history length k. Suppose for proof by contradiction that bj is both non-
maximal and finite (cf. Def. 7). As bj is finite, there is a k ∈ N such that
for all h ∈ bj,k there is no e ∈ E such that he ∈ bj,k+1. However, as bj is
non-maximal, there is a h ∈ bj,k and some e ∈ E such that he ∈ H . This
implies that there is an ETL model (Hj′ , Hj′) that extends (Hj , Hj). Hence
there is a DEL dynamical system (Xj′ , fj′), j′ ∈ J , such that fnj (xj) = fnj′(xj)
for all n ≤ k−1. Hence, (Xk, fk) is redundant in generatingH, contradicting
the assumption that {(Xj , fj)}j∈J is minimal. Thus, (bj , Hj) is a saturated
component branch that gives (Hj , Hj).
Theorem 2. Let an image-finite and concluding ETL modelH be given. H is
generatable up to ETL isomorphism by a family of image-finite and conclud-
ing pointed DEL dynamical systems, if, and only if, there exists a saturation
of each component branch b of H such that (Hb, H) satisfies all eight prop-
erties of Sec. 4.2.
Proof. Left-to-right: SupposeH is generatable by a family of image-finite and
concluding DEL dynamical systems {(Xj , fj)}j∈J . Let (Hj , Hj) be the satu-
rated ETL model generated by (Xj , fj) (cf. Def. 6). By Lemma 3, (Hj , Hj) is
a component branch sub-model of H for some saturated component branch
(b, Hk) of H. As (Hj , Hj) was generated by an image-finite and concluding
DEL dynamical system, the saturation Hj of Hj makes (Hj , Hj) satisfy all 8
properties of Sec. 4.2 by Proposition 2 and Lemma 2.
Right-to-left: Let B be the set of all component branches ofH and assume
that for each b ∈ B, there exists a saturation such that (Hb, Hb) satisfies all
eight properties of Sec. 4.2. As H is image-finite and concluding, also each
(Hb, Hb) is image-finite and concluding. By the constructions in the proof of
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Prop. 4, it follows that each (Hb, Hb) is generatable up to ETL isomorphism
by a DEL dynamical system that is image-finite and concluding.
Let (Xb, fb, xb) be the pointed DEL dynamical system that generates
(Hb, Hb) up to isomorphism, as given by the construction in the proof of
Prop. 4. Let (H′b, H ′b) be the specific ETL model generated by (Xb, fb, xb),
as given by Def. 6. It will now be shown that the union structure
UB = (EB, HB, RB,i, VB)i∈I of {(H′b, H ′b)}b∈B is isomorphic to
H = (E,H, Ri, V )i∈I . To this end, the existence of a bijection g : H −→ HB
will be shown.
Let gb be the isomorphism between (Hb, Hb) and (H′b, H ′b), guaranteed
to exist by Prop. 4 and specifically given by 1) the construction of a DEL
dynamical system from a saturated component branch of the proof of Prop.
4 and 2) the construction for generating an ETL model from a DEL dynamical
system of Def. 6. Combining the state-history naming schemes used in these
two constructions yield gb given by
gb(h) =
{
e′σh if len(h) = 1
gb(h
†)e′σe with h = h
†e else
The history names fromHb are hereby carried over as indices to the histories
ofH′b.
Define the mapping g : H −→ HB by g(h) = gb(h) for h ∈ Hb. This
mapping is well-defined as either i) for exactly one b ∈ B, h ∈ Hb (in which
case g(h) is well-defined), or ii) if h ∈ Hb and h ∈ Hb′ , then gb(h) = gb′(h).
The latter is ensured as history names are carried over in exactly the same
way by gb and gb′ , by construction. Hence g =
⋃
b∈B gb is a well-defined
map. It is an injection: For h ∈ H and h′ ∈ H , if h 6= h′, then g(h) 6= g(h′) by
the unique naming convention of the maps gb, b ∈ B. It is also a surjection: it
is well-defined and |H| = |HB| as by construction |H ′b| = |Hb| for all b ∈ B,
and H =
⋃
b∈BHb and HB =
⋃
b∈BH
′
b. Hence g is a bijection.
That g is also the sought ETL isomorphism follows as (Hb, Hb) is isomor-
phic to (H′b, H ′b), for all b ∈ B, cf. Prop. 4. This completes the proof.
Lemma 4. The saturated ETL model properties Synchronicity, Perfect Recall
and Postcondition Describable persist under ETL model union.
I.e.: Let {(Hj , Hj)}j∈J be a countable set of saturated ETL models. If all
(Hj , Hj) satisfy either of the mentioned properties, then the (unsaturated)
union structure UJ satisfies that property.
Proof. Synchronicity, Perfect Recall and Postcondition Describable persist
because they are defined on histories which occur uniquely in the ETL for-
est, which makes them local by nature. Hence these properties are evaluated
locally within a branch to ensure that there will be no conflicts when taking
the union of different ETL sub-models.
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Property 5. Local No Miracles, Precondition Describable, Point Bisimula-
tion Invariance and Connected Time-Steps do not persist under union.
Proof. Local No Miracles does not persist under union: Consider a family of
two DEL dynamical systems (that each individually satisfy property
Local No Miracles.) with multi-pointed action models f and g with equal
initial Kripke model x = {h, h′, h1, h2} where hRih′ and hR∗h1 (by default,
as initial models are connected), but disjoint Kripke models at the next
level: f1(x) = {he, h′e′} and g1(x) = {h1e, h2e′} where h1eRih2e′ while not
heRih
′e′. In this example, Local No Miracles fails because not heR∗h1e.
Precondition Describable does not persist under union: Consider a fam-
ily of two DEL dynamical systems (that each individually satisfy property
Precondition Describable) with multi-pointed action models f and g with
equal initial Kripke model x = {h, h′} with hR∗h′ (by default as initial mod-
els are connected), but disjoint Kripke models at the next level: f1(x) = {he}
and g1(x) = {h′e}. Then it is possible that h′ |= δe while h 6|= δe, which breaks
property Precondition Describable. It is left as an open question whether a
suitably weakened version of Precondition Describable exists.
That Point Bisimulation Invariance is not preserved under union follows
as the property is stated based on a saturation, but the union structure is
unpointed, and hence unsaturated. If the union structure would be pointed
with the set of points chosen as the union of the sets of points from the united
ETL models, then the resulting set of points need not be a saturation, as the
united ETL models may overlap, but have distinct points. In that case, the
union structure would be “oversaturated”.
Connected Time-Steps does not persist under union as histories within
the same time-step are no longer necessarily epistemically connected in a
union of disconnected ETL sub-models.
Proposition 5. If an ETL model H is generated by a family of pointed DEL
dynamical systems (possibly neither image-finite nor concluding), then H
satisfies Synchronicity, Perfect Recall, Postcondition Describable and
Very Local No Miracles and Local Bisimulation Invariance.
Proof. That H satisfies Synchronicity, Perfect Recall and Postcondition De-
scribable follows from Prop. 2 and Lemma 4.
ThatH satisfies Very Local No Miracles follows directly by the additional
requirement compared to Local No Miracles that heR∗h1e.
That H satisfies Local Bisimulation Invariance follows as 1) any ETL
model that satisfies Point Bisimulation Invariance also satisfies
Local Bisimulation Invariance, 2) Local Bisimulation Invariance is a
property local to a connected component, and 3) connected components
remain untouched under union.
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The Role of Epistemic Logic in
Understanding Human Behavior
Ottilia Kasbergen and Hanna S. van Lee
Abstract
Epistemic logic uses formal techniques to study epistemological
concepts, such as knowledge, belief and information flow. Although
one of the aims of epistemic logic is to model real-world concepts, the
notion of knowledge captured by epistemic logic fails to connect to
real-world knowledge in many ways. The extent to which such
deviations from reality (idealizations) are problematic depends on
various factors such as the object of study, research context and
intended aim. While epistemic logic already had many research
contexts, ranging e.g. from philosophical debate to computer science,
recent developments facilitated studies of actual human epistemic
behavior. The emergence of new research directions demands a
re-investigation of the acceptability of idealizations of epistemic logic.
By discussing several possible reactions to the often-mentioned
criticism of epistemic logic’s divergence from reality, we provide a
structural exposition of the current and potential role of epistemic logic
with respect to understanding actual human behavior. In addition, we
give two recommendations for the future of epistemic logic: research
contexts need to be made explicit and more interdisciplinary research is
required. With this paper we aim to encourage dialogue on the
methodology of epistemic logic to increase awareness of both strengths
and limitations of epistemic logic.
Keywords Epistemic logic · Formal epistemology · Idealization · Formal
modeling · Human behavior · Philosophy of science
1 Introduction
Epistemic logic uses formal techniques to study concepts such as knowledge
and inquiry of individual and interacting agents. One of the many possible
aims of epistemic logic is to model the epistemic behavior of humans. How-
ever, the knowledge captured by epistemic logic fails to connect to real-world
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knowledge in many ways and formal agents do not at all closely resemble
real human beings. These deviations from reality are the model’s idealiza-
tions. Whether or not an idealization is conceived of as a problem depends
on many factors, such as the object of study, the research context, and the
intended aim. In particular, as epistemic logic has a broad spectrum of appli-
cations (ranging from traditional philosophical debate to modern computer
science and from abstract technical problems to theories of social interaction),
the justification of its idealizations is a complex matter.
As an illustration of this complexity, consider the solution models of Dy-
namic Epistemic Logic (DEL) to the toy example of the Muddy Children puz-
zle.1 In this example, the DEL model unrealistically assumes that the chil-
dren are smart enough to conclude the existence of mud on their foreheads,
while obviously no group of (logically untrained) real children will come to
the same conclusion.2 However, the model’s failure to predict the behavior
of real children may be unproblematic if, for example, the model is meant
to represent the available knowledge of real children. The discrepancies with
actual human behavior may also be argued to be irrelevant to the context of
computer science in which the formal solution to the puzzle was originally
introduced (Halpern and Moses 1984). Still, although the DEL treatment of
the Muddy Children puzzle is typically meant to represent idealized human
beings, it remains an interesting open question to what extent the idealized
models of epistemic logic can be used to learn something about the behavior
of actual human beings facing similar reasoning problems.
This question, which is linked to the justification of the idealizations of
epistemic logic, is an intricate and ever-changing issue, as epistemic logic
is an active and relatively young discipline that constantly develops new
tools and expressivity. Due to some of these developments, the domains
of epistemic logic that strive more explicitly for an understanding of ac-
tual human epistemic behavior have grown during the last ten years (see,
for example, Liu 2009; van Benthem and Pacuit 2011; Baltag et al. 2013;
Vela´zquez-Quesada 2014). The emergence of these new domains demands a
re-investigation of the methodology of epistemic logic.
This paper provides a structural exposition of the current and potential
role of epistemic logic with respect to understanding actual human epistemic
behavior. The questions we ask are: ‘what is and what can be the role of epis-
1We assume that the reader is familiar with the Muddy Children puzzle. In short: Three chil-
dren are told that at least one of the children has a muddy forehead. The children can see the
dirt on others but cannot see their own foreheads. By repetitive announcements of ignorance,
the children acquire knowledge about whether there are dirty. For more details see e.g. van
Ditmarsch et al. (2008).
2See for example van de Pol et al. (2018) for a formal analysis of the complexity of the theory of
mind, i.e. the human capacity for reasoning about others’ mental states. The complexity results
show how hard it is for real agents to use theory of mind, which is required for solving the
Muddy Children puzzle.
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temic logic in understanding actual human behavior?’ and ‘to what extent
do the idealizations of epistemic logic constitute a problem towards study-
ing real human beings?’. Thereby, this paper contributes to the progress of
epistemic logic in various ways. A critical investigation of the acceptability
of idealizations with respect to the modern-day applications may avoid epis-
temic logicians to accept unjustified idealizations merely out of habit. With
a dynamic discipline such as epistemic logic, we should continuously recon-
sider whether epistemic logic is still the right tool to use. Therefore, instead
of studying the initial intentions of epistemic logic (as in, for example, Hen-
dricks and Rendsvig 2018), we analyze the practice of epistemic logic today.
The focus on epistemic logic’s contemporary research directions provides a
novel perspective on the methodology of epistemic logic, which contrasts the
existing work of others who have criticized (e.g. Hocutt 1972; Girle 1998) or
defended (e.g. Stalnaker 2006; Yap 2014) the idealizations of epistemic logic.
By refuting three often-heard arguments and formulating three alternative
constructive arguments, we take position in this discussion. Furthermore,
the topic of this paper supplements work on the relation between the psy-
chology of reasoning and logic in general, in e.g. Stenning and van Lambal-
gen (2008). In addition, we aim to stimulate dialogue on the methodology of
epistemic logic in order to increase awareness of both the strengths and limi-
tations of epistemic logic among its practitioners as well as among a broader
research community.
We begin this article by giving a historical overview of epistemic logic
and presenting a categorization of its research agendas in Section 2. In Sec-
tion 3, we discuss the practice and the advantages and drawbacks of formal
modeling in general as well as epistemic logic in specific. In Section 4 we
discuss different possible reactions towards the mismatch between epistemic
logic models and reality, and illustrate how the acceptability of idealizations
depends to a large extent on the intended research aim. We conclude that
epistemic logic may contribute to understanding actual human epistemic be-
havior, but that in doing so the intended research aim needs to be made ex-
plicit. Finally, we recommend more empirical and interdisciplinary activity
to enrich future research in epistemic logic.
2 History and Agendas of Epistemic Logic
Hintikka’s Knowledge and Belief (1962) is viewed as the main work which led
to epistemic logic3 as we know it today, although many interesting ideas had
already been put forward in connection to a systematic treatment of knowl-
3Note that the term ‘epistemic logic’ is often used for the logic of knowledge and belief. Fur-
thermore, in this paper the term ‘epistemic logic’ will generally be used to refer to the field of
epistemic logic, and thus not to a specific logical system.
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edge in an axiomatic-deductive system, in particular Carnap’s Meaning and
Necessity (1947), von Wright’s An Essay on Modal Logic (1951), and work done
by Prior and Rescher. Combining Hintikka’s epistemological considerations
and Kripke’s then recently developed modal logical framework became the
kick-off for a flourishing field of epistemic logic.
Since Hintikka’s seminal work on possible world semantics, the field of
epistemic logic has grown vigorously and many interesting contributions
have been made. Of particular relevance to this paper are the following con-
tributions. In the 1990s, multi-agent aspects of epistemic logic were taken
up and applied by theoretical computer scientists and game theorists (Fa-
gin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi 1995). Due to achievements by e.g. Stal-
naker (1996) and Baltag, Moss and Solecki (1998), additional notions such
as counterfactual reasoning and common knowledge may be studied with
epistemic logic. Among many others, works such as Plaza (1989), Gerbrandy
and Groeneveld (1997), van Benthem et al. (2006) and van Benthem (2007),
contributed to the modeling of information dynamics with epistemic logic. In
the 2000s, a new line of research was introduced by positioning agents as
active agents who infer knowledge (Hendricks 2001), update beliefs (Baltag
et al. 2012), act according to strategies, or plan towards achieving goals (An-
dersen et al. 2012). The combination of all of these developments facilitated
a recent ‘societal turn’, where concepts such as social networks, collective
informational control problems, dishonesty and trust are studied. Besides
its historical relation to philosophy, epistemic logic is now also connected to
many other fields, such as mathematics, theoretical computer science, lin-
guistics, economics, and more recently to sociology, social psychology and
cognitive science.
2.1 Research Agendas
As a result of the broad logical landscape, researchers in the epistemic logic
community have very diverse experiences and views regarding the aims, ob-
ject of study and methodology of epistemic logic. To escape knockdown con-
clusions to questions about the justification of idealizations of epistemic logic
such as ‘everybody thinks differently about it’ or ‘it is very complex and de-
pends on the context’, we introduce a categorization identifying four main
research agendas of epistemic logic.4 The two dimensions underlying this
categorization are (a) the aim and (b) the object of study of epistemic logic. The
proposed categorization is not meant to identify mutually exclusive and col-
lectively exhaustive research agendas in epistemic logic, but rather to bring
4This categorization is mainly based on our analysis of material from interviews (10 held for the
thesis Kasbergen (2017) and 25 from the book Epistemic Logic: 5 Questions by Hendricks and
Roy (2010)).
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order to the diverging views of epistemic logicians. Painting the broad logi-
cal landscape henceforth enables us to structurally investigate how epistemic
logic plays a role in understanding human epistemic behavior.
The philosophical agenda of epistemic logic comprises work that has strong
ties to philosophical, in particular epistemological, debates such as solving
the Gettier problem (e.g. Baltag et al. 2012; Vela´zquez-Quesada 2014; Balbiani
et al. 2016). Its aims reach from conceptual clarification to substantiating and
settling philosophical disputes on knowledge, belief, rationality, justification,
et cetera. There is a substantive normative part to the philosophical agenda
of epistemic logic, aiming for a rational account of knowledge and inquiry.
The formal agenda of epistemic logic comprises all technical and mathe-
matical work on epistemic logical systems. Its aim is first and foremost to
build solid epistemic logical systems and proving these systems to have cer-
tain meta-logical properties, such as soundness, completeness, decidability,
correspondence (e.g. van Benthem et al. 2009), et cetera. The objects of study
of the formal agenda of epistemic logic are logical or mathematical systems
of knowledge.
The computer science agenda of epistemic logic incorporates the work that
has the strongest ties to computer science and artificial intelligence.
Epistemic logic is used in these fields because it proved to be useful in
research on interpreted systems, and, in particular, on distributed
computing (e.g. Halpern and Pass 2017). The aims of the computer science
agenda of epistemic logic are fairly pragmatic, such as designing intelligent
multi-agent systems and security programs.
Finally, the societal agenda uses epistemic logic to describe and understand
(social) epistemic behavior. Its aims are largely descriptive, but may have a
normative side to it when, for example, discovering collective pitfalls that
can be avoided (e.g. Baltag et al. 2013, 2018). Thereby, works in this agenda
may potentially aim for improving society. The object of study in the societal
agenda of epistemic logic is epistemic behavior by individual or groups of
human agents. The societal agenda is inspired by real-world phenomena,
either observed by the researcher or described by researchers of another field.
An example of this is the social psychological phenomenon of the bystander
effect, studied by Rendsvig (2014).
By comparing the four different research agendas, it becomes clear that
epistemic logic knows both more descriptive and more normative
approaches. In fact, one never encounters purely descriptive or purely
normative approaches in epistemic logic. The reason for this is that for
describing the situation as it is, one needs to define certain concepts
(e.g. what counts as knowledge), and, likewise, it is hard to set up norms for
knowledge without describing knowledge and situations in which
knowledge occurs.
The focal point of this paper is all the research that explicitly aims at
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understanding or capturing a realistic account of human knowledge and
human agency. As the formal agenda generally does not deal with actual
human reasoning, it will not be explicitly discussed in the remainder of this
paper. Subareas of the philosophical and computer science agenda and
most projects in the societal agenda, however, do fall into this category. The
many recent publications in these areas include, for example, work on
justification and evidence (Artemov 2008; van Benthem and Pacuit 2011;
Baltag et al. 2012), explicit and implicit knowledge, (Baltag et al.
2014; Vela´zquez-Quesada 2014), learning (Gierasimczuk et al. 2014),
abduction (Vela´zquez-Quesada et al. 2013), diversity of agents (Liu 2009;
Balbiani et al. 2016), trade (De´gremont and Roy 2012; Demey 2014; van Lee
2017) and informational cascades (Baltag et al. 2013; Rendsvig 2014).
3 Formal Modeling
For the remainder of this paper, remember that epistemic logic
accommodates a great variety of applications. Although the focus of this
paper is the subfield that studies real human epistemic behavior, issues
concerning the acceptability of idealizations5 pertain to most subfields of
epistemic logic. In fact, these issues pertain to all disciplines that (formally)
model real-world phenomena. Discussions of formal modeling and
idealization are well-known in philosophy of science (see e.g. van Fraassen
1980; Hansson 2000; Weisberg 2007a,b; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Stokhof and
van Lambalgen 2011; Klein 2015). We consult these philosophers for a brief
analysis of formal modeling and idealization in general, and illustrate this
by cases of epistemic logic.
3.1 Models and Idealizations
Following Weisberg (2007b), we define formal modeling as the indirect the-
oretical investigation of a real-world phenomenon using an abstract struc-
ture. If the model is sufficiently similar6 to the world, then the analysis of
the model is also, indirectly, an analysis of the properties of the real-world
phenomenon. Compare a model to a city map. Like a model, a city map
is a partial representation of something in the real world. Some details of the
5Note that there are different terms at use for the concept of idealization, such as ’abstraction’
or ’representational imperfection’. Moreover, different researchers often use identical words to
refer to different concepts. In the current paper, ‘idealization’ refers to any kind of deviation
from reality. See Kasbergen (2017) for an elaborate comparison of the usage of these different
terms.
6Cf. Footnote 15 about the related concept of adequate description.
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city are relevant (e.g. spatial relations between streets), while other details
are generally superfluous (e.g the colors of buildings).7
In the process of (formal) modeling, the model moves away from the tar-
get phenomenon in order to reach a certain goal, for example to make the
targeted phenomenon more comprehensive or to enhance it with supernatu-
ral qualities. Some idealizations are unwanted, while others are consciously
introduced for mathematical convenience or as a useful fiction. For exam-
ple, although the concept of common knowledge8 unrealistically makes use of
infinite knowledge iterations, it is useful for epistemic logic in analyzing the
coordinated attack problem (for details see e.g. Halpern 1986).
Idealizations can be roughly divided into those that simplify and those
that perfect, cf. Hansson (2000). By simplifying reality, the real-world agent
loses all her personal details (e.g. name, nationality and gender), all her char-
acter traits (e.g. her being easily upset, contemplative or credent) and most
of her personal history (e.g. learned behavior, approaches and strategies).
Furthermore, she loses her embodiment and her present state of mind (she
can be moody, in love or drugged, et cetera). Some of such details about the
agent may be considered to be relevant for her epistemic state (e.g. her be-
ing oblivious or not being able to apply some logical rule), while others may
be considered to be irrelevant (e.g. her hair color). What is deemed relevant
depends on the task at hand.
At the same time, reality is perfected by lifting real-world knowledge to
a superhuman rational level where the subjects are typically consistent and
logically omniscient reasoners with perfect memory. In some research con-
texts, these perfections are considered desirable, as they may provide us with
a normative account of knowledge. However, logical omniscience9—one of
the most persistent and most discussed idealizations of epistemic logic (see
e.g. Halpern and Pucella 2011)—is often regarded as undesirable as it is a
clear deviation from actual human agents.
3.2 Advantages and Drawbacks of Formal Modeling
In order to evaluate the potential role of epistemic logic models in under-
standing human behavior, we will now discuss the major advantages and
drawbacks of formal modeling in general. Following Klein (2015), advan-
tages of formal modeling can be roughly divided into three categories: clar-
7The map analogy is well-known in philosophy of science (see e.g. Giere (1999); Teller (2001), or
see Hughes (1997) for a criticism of the map analogy).
8A group of agents G has common knowledge of ϕ if and only if ’all agents in G know ϕ, they
all know that they all know ϕ, they all know that they know that they know ϕ, and so on ad
infinitum’.
9In its standard form, logical omniscience is described as follows: the agent immediately knows
all the logical consequences of her knowledge (in particular, she knows all the theorems of the
system).
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ifying, exploring and verifying. By isolating important aspects of the object
of study, formal modeling can clarify complex phenomena and concepts. By
identifying and minimizing primitive concepts (e.g. defining knowledge in
terms of ignorance or true justified belief), one may reveal deeper relations
and structures. Similarly, by analyzing a phenomenon on an abstract level,
one may discover similarities between different concepts. Often, system-
atically exploring the object of study leads to additional insights that may
inspire new theoretical questions or empirical research. In the presence of
empirical data, formal models may also help organizing or interpreting the
data. Furthermore, because formal frameworks are very precise about the
assumptions they make, they allow for verification of the informal argument
by detecting implicit assumptions and tacit conditions. Additionally, in in-
terdisciplinary research projects, formal models may provide a common lan-
guage for experts from different backgrounds.
Nonetheless, formal modeling is not a carefree practice. One of the main
difficulties of formal modeling is finding the right balance between abstrac-
tion and reality. On the one hand, when one oversimplifies and thereby
leaves out crucial parameters or interrelations, false conclusions may follow.
On the other hand, too much detail may make the model too complex to
use. Another danger of the practice of formal modeling is that modelers are
sometimes tempted to make ad hoc technical constructions or ontological as-
sumptions. Such constructions and assumptions may have a negative effect
on the usefulness or applicability of the model.
It is important to realize that models are an idealization of the real world,
and are often very different from the concept or phenomenon that is being
studied. Godfrey-Smith (2009, pp.18-9) notes that, when in a particular field
of science fictionalizing with the use of models becomes more systematic, a
tradition comes into existence in which the fictional entities are studied as
topics in their own right. While the scientists of this particular field get used
to discussing these fictional models, they begin to treat them as real objects.10
As a result of these difficulties, the process of formal modeling may some-
times result in an unclear model-world relationship: the gap between the
model and the targeted phenomenon is then assessed to be so wide that
conclusions in the one cannot be unproblematically transferred to the other.
Such cases come with the extra epistemological burden of needing to provide
a ‘bridge theory’ (Stokhof and van Lambalgen 2011). Before extrapolating re-
sults from the model, the bridge theory should explain how to interpret the
model’s results in the real world. However, providing such a bridge theory
is usually not an easy task.
10Exactly the same phenomenon has been observed by Fitting in Hendricks and Roy (2010)
with regard to the epistemic logic community: “one quickly found oneself talking as if modal
notions really were about possible worlds, rather than as if the formalization of modal notions
was about possible worlds. It’s a distinction to blur.”
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4 Justification of Idealizations
As we can see from the previous section, there are advantages and draw-
backs to formally modeling epistemic concepts. The standard criticism of
epistemic logic focuses on its divergence from reality (e.g. Hocutt 1972; Girle
1998). In this section, we discuss three often-heard reactions to this criti-
cism. Although these reactions persist throughout all research agendas of
epistemic logic, we will discuss their bearing on the subfields of epistemic
logic that study actual human behavior. Reaction (a) fully dismisses epis-
temic logic as a useful tool, and Reactions (b) and (c) defend the use of epis-
temic logic by justifying all idealizations with one argument. After arguing
that these reactions are too one-sided, we further analyze the criticism in Sec-
tion 4.2 by arguing that the acceptability of a mismatch between model and
reality is context-dependent. We use this analysis to propose three construc-
tive reactions in Section 4.3.
4.1 Three Objectionable Often-heard Reactions
(a) “Epistemic logic is doomed” One way to respond to the mismatch be-
tween model and reality is to conclude that epistemic logic is the wrong tool-
box for understanding actual human behavior. Such a response maintains
that the axioms and the idealizing assumptions are unrealistic and therefore
indefensible. We will argue in Section 4.3 that this image of epistemic logic
is too negative, as there are many valuable insights to gain from models of
epistemic logic.
(b) “Compare to physical science” As idealizations are inherent to for-
mal modeling, mismatches between model and reality occur everywhere:
e.g. Bayesian rationality in probability theory, perfect equilibriums in eco-
nomics and frictionless planes in physics. A standard defense of epistemic
logic is to compare its idealizations to those in physical science, which are
more generally accepted.
However, there are some crucial differences between models in physical
science and models in epistemic logic. Firstly, models of physical science are
largely of a quantitative nature, while those of epistemic logic are rather of a
qualitative nature. Secondly, the objects of study and governing ‘laws’ of the
two fields differ in nature. Although the rules of epistemic logic have some-
times been referred to as ‘laws of thought’ (Hintikka 1962; Lenzen 2004), they
certainly do not have a similar status as physical laws. Human behavior is
erratic and humans rarely follow the structural laws of reasoning that under-
lie epistemic logic. Compare this to, for example, an apple defying gravity:
what a shock would that be! Thirdly, theories of physical science are often
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more easily tested against empirical data than theories of epistemic logic. Al-
though human behavior is measurable, the underlying epistemic motivation
for that behavior has to be studied indirectly through for example question-
naires or experiments using eye tracking. The latter methods entail a much
higher degree of subjective interpretation than experiments of physical sci-
ence. Given these intrinsic differences, we argue, justifying idealizations in
epistemic logic by comparing them to idealizations in physical science does
not suffice.
(c) “Epistemic logic is normative” Another defense of epistemic logic is to
point at its normative character which aims for a rational account of knowl-
edge, and to conclude that unrealistic idealizations are unproblematic. This
argument falls short in two ways. Firstly, we claim that no subfield of epis-
temic logic is purely normative (see Section 2). In particular, descriptive ele-
ments gain importance in the contemporary research projects that study ac-
tual human behavior. Secondly, frameworks that present a predominant nor-
mative account of knowledge and reasoning nonetheless need realistic pre-
suppositions in order to give norms that can reasonably be lived up to. Point-
ing at the normative character of epistemic logic may only potentially justify
idealizations made for normative reasons as a result of perfecting, cf. Colyvan
(2013). Accordingly, a purely simplifying idealization cannot be justified by
pointing at the normative character of the system. In other words, normativ-
ity is not an excuse for any kind of deviation from reality.
4.2 Acceptability of Idealizations is Context-dependent
Reactions (a), (b) and (c) are objectionable, because their perspectives on the
issue of idealizations in epistemic logic are too one-sided. Instead, in order
to correctly assess whether some idealization in an epistemic logic model is
acceptable or not, the whole research context needs to be considered. As
shown in Section 2, epistemic logic is used for a variety of scientific aims
and the object of study can be completely different from one research project
to another. The aim may be, for example, settling a philosophical dispute,
or constructing a machine that formulates answers in a way that humans
do. Furthermore, the object of study can vary from an everyday kind of
human knowledge to a strong (philosophical) notion of knowledge to the
notion of knowledge that computer scientists tend to use. Different kinds
of knowledge ask for different axiomatic systems. Therefore, it is no won-
der that many computer scientists happily settle on the axiomatic system S5,
whereas in the more philosophical subfields of epistemic logic there is an on-
going debate about the right system to cover knowledge, settling somewhere
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between S4.2 and S4.4.11 The closed-world-assumption12 may be absurd for
a realistic description of human knowledge, but nonetheless very useful for
applications in computer science. Finally, the extent to which the aim of a
research project is normative or descriptive also has bearing on the accept-
ability of idealizations.
Furthermore, the intended use13 is a key issue in the assessment of the
acceptability of idealizations: what use the model is intended to have de-
termines its success criteria.14 As an illustration, recall the map analogy in
Section 3.1. Maps, like models, are context-sensitive (Giere 1999). For exam-
ple, a city map should tell us how the streets are exactly located relative to
each other. In contrast, for users of a metro map, exact locations of metro
stops and distances between them are not of utmost importance. What mat-
ters most here, is that the connections between metro stops are represented
correctly and clearly. For epistemic logic, depending on the aim of the re-
spective research project, one may wish for the respective model to be any
or multiple of the following: simple (for an explanatory model), expressive
(for a realistic description), general (in order to capture multiple situations),
giving adequate descriptions15, et cetera. At another level, models of epis-
temic logic may be assessed with respect to the consequences they have. For
example, if government policies are going to be based on the model, extra
care has to be taken with deviations from reality.16
To conclude, the assessment of the acceptability of idealizations of epis-
temic logic is a trade-off between different criteria. Expressivity comes at
the cost of mathematical simplicity and elegance, while deviations of reality
such as logical omniscience can be seen as the price paid for wanting to study
epistemic concepts in a systematic way. Epistemic logicians must (like all for-
mal modelers) look for the right balance, that is, the right balance between
all the different success criteria for the epistemic logic model. Because the
success criteria may differ greatly between different practices of epistemic
logic, as well as within the subfields that model human epistemic behavior,
no general account of this balance can be given.
11For details on the axiomatic systems see e.g. Gochet and Gribomont (2006).
12The closed-world assumption states that any true proposition is also known to be true.
13See, among others, van Fraassen 1980; Giere 1988; Teller 2001 for a discussion of this concept.
14Also referred to by Weisberg as ‘representational ideals’ (2007a).
15The ambiguous notion of ‘adequate description’ can be further spelled out in different ways,
for instance as accurate quantitative description, as prediction in qualitative agreement, or as
a correct mapping of the causal structure of the concept at study. We believe that epistemic
logicians are mostly interested in giving descriptions in qualitative agreement, while largely
ignoring the causal structure.
16Like in all sciences, getting grants and having the research community interested are also used
as success criteria. This is a separate issue that will not be addressed further in this paper.
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4.3 Three Constructive Reactions
The three previously discussed reactions to the criticism of epistemic logic
ignore the influence of the different aims and uses of epistemic logic on the
acceptability of idealizations. We propose three constructive reactions that
are given relative to the research context and intended use. Given an arbi-
trary research project, the intended research aim determines which reaction,
or combination of reactions, from (d) to (f) applies.
(d) “Epistemic logic is potentially useful, because it is sufficiently close”
One may conclude that epistemic logic is an appropriate tool to use for un-
derstanding actual human behavior, because its models are sufficiently close
to reality. A model may, for example, give accurate predictions of real hu-
man behavior, because the modeled tasks of the agent require only a real-
istic level of her reasoning powers. As such, the superhuman qualities of
the agent are not invoked and therefore do not constitute a problem. For
example, a DEL model of an agent who infers ‘it is Monday’ from the an-
nouncement ‘it is Monday and we are in Amsterdam’ may be conceived as a
realistic prediction. Another way a model may be sufficiently close is if one
is solely interested in investigating rational knowers or, similarly, in study-
ing implicit knowledge or available information, instead of human knowers
and explicit knowledge. For example, a DEL model of the Muddy Children
puzzle may be sufficiently close if the solution is used to demonstrate that
agents acquire implicit knowledge from statements of ignorance. Thirdly,
epistemic logic may also be considered to be useful for a first analysis of the
phenomenon or concept to obtain a global or structural understanding of the
concept at study. For example, a DEL model of diffusion of beliefs in social
context (Baltag et al. 2018) may be inspiration for specific empirical research
questions that lead to a further understanding of the concept.
(e) “Epistemic logic is potentially useful, because we can learn from its
mismatch with reality” Another response to the criticism may be to argue
that the unrealistic models of epistemic logic are useful exactly because they
point to the limitations of human epistemic abilities. In other words, they
may identify the epistemic pitfalls of humans. In this case, the very existence
of a mismatch between real data and a normative theory is the valuable as-
set of the model. Similarly, a model that assumes superhuman qualities of
agents may be useful in the context of security. Consider the task of identify-
ing necessary conditions for an enigma to be safe against the enemy. If com-
putationally unbounded and logically omniscient reasoners cannot solve the
enigma, then a bounded reasoner cannot either.
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(f) “Epistemic logic should be improved” For some research aims, the ex-
isting frameworks are unsatisfactory. Instead of discarding epistemic logic as
a tool for understanding human epistemic behavior, one may conclude that
epistemic logic is a good toolbox to start with, but simply not yet developed
well enough. As a consequence, epistemic logic has to be improved by creat-
ing new formal systems with new assumptions, axioms, added parameters,
et cetera.17 For example, many solutions have been proposed to the problem
of logical omniscience, each focusing on a different source of the problem:
infallible logical abilities (Hintikka 1975), unlimited resources such as time
or memory (Smets and Solaki 2018), or superhuman psychological qualities
such as full awareness (Fagin and Halpern 1987).18
5 Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion
Since Hintikka’s seminal work (1962), epistemic logic has become more real-
istic, more expressive and more exhaustive by adaptations and additions to
its frameworks. However, there continues to exist a tension between the de-
sire to equip formal agents with logical abilities and the desire to stay close
to the reasoning abilities of real human beings. Human reasoning, after all,
is typically not as consistent as the logic underlying formal epistemic frame-
works. Furthermore, a balance needs to be found between abstraction and
reality in each epistemic logic project. Simple formal models allow us to clar-
ify, verify and explore complex phenomena or concepts. Yet a formal model
that is too abstract may have an obscure relation to reality and may be of
little use for understanding the real world.
We have argued in this paper that the ideal balance between the neat
mathematical world and the complex reality depends on the entire research
context. Some research projects of epistemic logic are not involved in
modeling actual human epistemic behavior, while others, especially recently
evolved research projects, are more explicitly aiming to capture real-world
epistemic phenomena. In a constantly changing landscape of applications,
practitioners of epistemic logic should constantly be aware of their research
context and the underlying idealizations. If they do, the danger of applying
conclusions beyond the appropriate context will be reduced.
Finally, we provided three reactions to the main criticism of epistemic
logic’s divergence from reality. We will refer to these reactions in Section 5.2
when answering the main questions of this paper. First, we will provide two
17Note that new or improved frameworks may also be designed with respect to other goals such
as increasing expressivity, simplicity, generality, workability. However, in this paper the focal
point is improving the framework with respect to reality.
18See Halpern and Pucella (2011) or Kasbergen (2017) for a more elaborate overview of solutions
to the problem of logical omniscience.
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recommendations for the future of epistemic logic.
5.1 Recommendations
(i) “Be explicit about research context” Epistemic logic is praised for mak-
ing implicit assumptions about the subject matter explicit.19 Meanwhile, re-
searchers in epistemic logic often stay silent about their methodological con-
siderations, such as the research context and idealizations made. The aim of
a particular scientific publication and its philosophical justification usually
appear as one or two sentences hidden somewhere in the middle of a large
work, easily overlooked. In some cases the aim or justification even remains
unmentioned.
Staying silent about the research context is troublesome in a field such
as epistemic logic, because epistemic logic has many different perspectives
and applications. There is a danger of unjustly accepting an idealization
only because it is justified with respect to a completely different research
context. One should also stay heedful of the danger of mistaking a formal
model for the targeted phenomenon itself. Furthermore, lack of communica-
tion about aims and assumptions might lead to misunderstandings between
researchers, who may misjudge each other’s scientific merits.
To avoid these problems, epistemic logicians should make their research
aims more explicit—in their publications as well as in informal dialogues
about the methodology of epistemic logic. This is especially the case for the
contemporary subfields of epistemic logic that investigate human behavior,
as here the balance between the mathematical and the real is an extraordinar-
ily intricate one. There are no generally valid answers to which idealizations
are acceptable and which are not: this may vary from project to project. Al-
though in the current paper we have provided some guidelines to becoming
aware of the assumptions made in epistemic logic, dialogues on these top-
ics should never disappear into the background. Debates about epistemic
logic on a meta-level may make researchers working with epistemic logic—
as well as outsiders—more aware of both strengths and limitations of epis-
temic logic.
(ii) “Perform interdisciplinary research for empirical alignment” As ex-
plained before, research in epistemic logic may be evaluated with respect
to many different kinds of success criteria: from meeting philosophical in-
tuitions to mathematical elegance and originality, and from improving ra-
tionality to understanding social interaction. Although claims in epistemic
logic are still mostly of a conceptual nature, there has been a shift lately to-
wards more descriptively orientated research. This human reality-orientated
19E.g. by several interviewees in Hendricks and Roy (2010).
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research brings its own hierarchy of success criteria for understanding social
behavior.
In an attempt to meet the success criteria that focus on closely capturing
reality, new logical systems are continually introduced. Traditionally, epis-
temic logicians appealed to intuition as a criterion for determining whether
the new framework is an improvement of the existing frameworks. But, es-
pecially in the modern subfields of epistemic logic that aim more explicitly
for alignment to reality, the use of intuitions should be restricted.
In some cases, a more reliable strategy for comparing competing
frameworks may be to use empirical adequacy as a criterion: only those
new frameworks that are more closely aligned to reality than the existing
frameworks are an actual improvement. Even though many projects of
epistemic logic contain at least some descriptive account, empirical
alignment of epistemic theories is scarcely executed. The rare examples
include the studies van Benthem (2008); Verbrugge and Mol (2008);
Verbrugge (2009) and Ghosh et al. (2015) where logic, computational
cognitive models and experimental results of theory of mind are being
compared.20
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the potential of experiments
for improving epistemic logic. Answering this question requires the exper-
tise of empirical scientists such as cognitive scientists, neuroscientists and
experimental psychologists.21 In general, the new research directions of epis-
temic logic require more interdisciplinary work.22 Multiple ways of model-
ing, combining and contrasting different perspectives and methods yield a
fuller comprehension of human epistemic behavior. Furthermore, as it is not
common practice for epistemic logicians to design experiments and collect
empirical data, we encourage cooperation with experts from empirical be-
havioral sciences. The need for interdisciplinary work provides yet another
argument for the explication of a particular project’s research context: the
used notions and methodology must be clear for others to understand and
relate to—especially in an interdisciplinary environment.
20The desire to enrich epistemic logic with experimental methods can be compared to develop-
ments in behavioral economics. Until the 1970s, idealized models of economics were rarely
criticized for their unrealistic assumption that economic actors make rational decisions. When
a group of influential researchers (Kahneman, Shiller and Thaler) started to promote and use
models of economic behavior that are aligned to reality by experiment, the branch of behav-
ioral economics began to flourish (Thaler 2015).
21See for example Verbrugge (2009) for a discussion on how logic and cognitive science can
productively work together to construct more realistic models of human reasoning.
22Many epistemic logicians share this opinion, as reported in Hendricks and Roy (2010).
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5.2 Conclusion
We conclude that epistemic logic can be valuable to understanding actual
human behavior in two ways. Firstly, as long as the idealizations made are
carefully acknowledged, we can learn about reality from idealized models.
For some research aims the epistemic logic model may be sufficiently close to
reality, while in other cases we can learn from the mismatch between model
and object of study. For example, the standard solution of DEL to the Muddy
Children puzzle may point to the limitations of real children and thereby
contribute to the understanding of real children’s inability to acquire knowl-
edge about the existence of mud on their foreheads. Secondly, there is po-
tentially an even bigger role for epistemic logic in understanding actual hu-
man behavior if epistemic logicians continue to develop more realistic frame-
works in the future. As we have argued above, such alignment to reality will
benefit from input of empirical sciences. In conclusion, the pursuit to cap-
ture reality more adequately by improving existing frameworks promises an
exciting future for epistemic logic.
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